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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE STRUCTURATION OF CHINESE MIGRANT WORKERS:
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS, LIFE EXPERIENCES AND SUBJECTIVE
EXPERIENCES
Chinese migrant workers are workers who (1) migrate from the countryside,
where they continue to have the right to contract farm land, work in agricultural
production, and build houses on allotted residential site, and (2) work in the nonagricultural sectors of cities and towns, where they don’t receive the same educational
and urban welfare benefits as local urban residents. Chinese migrant workers are
characterized by their dagong lifestyle, which means “leaving their home in rural villages,
going into cities, and working for others in order to make money.” Though this group of
people emerges in the rural-urban migration process associated with the rapid
industrialization and urbanization in contemporary China, they live between the
countryside and cities and are neither complete migrants, nor typical farmers, nor
standard workers. The emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers have
contributed to the rapid economic growth of China in the past decades. The future of
Chinese migrant workers is not only relevant to their life conditions, but also to the future
of China as a whole. While radical scholars see Chinese migrant workers as resisting the
current social institutions, conservative researchers argue that Chinese migrant workers
will peacefully become urban citizens with economic restructuring and institutional
transitions. This study finds that Chinese migrant workers have constituted a new
working class in contemporary China, which means that they are a group of workers, who
(1) exist in a large number, (2) possess a stable proportion in the population structure, (3)
have a distinctive lifestyle, and (4) exist for a relatively long period of time. In other

words, they are not a transitional group that will go away soon. Rather, they make up a
stable social stratum in the social structure of contemporary China. This structuration
process is supported by both macro-institutional arrangements and micro-subjective
experiences.
At the macro-level, the interaction between the state and market in the process of
institutional transition has created several innovative institutional arrangements, which
have contributed to the structuration of Chinese migrant workers. These institutional
arrangements include (1) the development of household autonomy system in rural
villages, (2) the encouragement and regulation of informal employment relationship in
cities, (3) the maintenance of differential citizenship with migrant workers receiving
less in the cities, and (4) the strengthening of identity-based market ideology. All of
these institutional arrangements have affected the emergence and existence of Chinese
migrant workers, through framing their identities and conditioning their working and
living conditions. Specifically, related to the land tenure system in rural villages, the
household autonomy is directly related to their identity as family members. The regulated
informal economy shapes their identity as guests in cities. In the background of
differential citizenship between rural and urban residents, their semi-citizenship in cities
leads to their identity as rural residents. Their Hukou-based market ideology causes their
identity as lower-level workers with less human capital.
At the micro-level, all migrant workers have their motivations to dagong and tend
to accept the dagong lifestyle. Though their motivations are stratified in different
manners, four ultimate motivations are personal honor at home, personal future in cities,
household needs at home, and family development in cities. While personal honor and
personal future are individualistic motivations, household needs and family development
are societal motivations. While personal honor and household needs are geographically
rural-oriented, personal future and family development are urban-oriented. Treating
3

dagong as a means, Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes to this dagong lifestyle depend on
whether it can meet their ends. Therefore, their attitudes are shaped by comparing the
dagong lifestyle with its alternatives (education, agricultural production, and businesses
and so on). The comparison may make them more optimistic or depressed about the
dagong lifestyle. Four types of Chinese migrant workers are identified according to their
motivations and attitudes: (1) Adventurous migrant workers want to settle in cities but
do not accept the dagong lifestyle; (2) Optimistic migrant workers want to settle in cities
and accept the dagong lifestyle; (3) Instrumental migrant workers do not want to settle
in cities and treat dagong as a means to meet family needs; and (4) Retreating migrant
workers do not want to settle in cities or accept the dagong lifestyle.
Furthermore, their motivations and attitudes are changing with their working and
living conditions during their migration process. These changes may be radical or
conservative. Senior migrant workers, who have earned better working and living
conditions in cities, will develop a strong desire to settle in cities, which is called
radicalization. By contrast, family burdens might reduce the desire to settle in cities and
make them focus on family needs, which is called conservatization. As to their attitudes,
when they fail to find alternatives, they tend to form a high degree of acceptance of the
dagong lifestyle, which is called justification (becoming optimistic). By contrast, when
they feel depressed for the dagong lifestyle and find alternatives, they tend to became
negative toward the lifestyle, which is called depression (becoming pessimistic). Out of
the four processes, the processes of conservatization and justification become the two
main micro-level dynamics of the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers.
To conclude, this research argues that Chinese migrant workers have constituted a
new working class with a distinctive lifestyle in China. As the emergence and existence
of Chinese migrant workers involve many aspects of the contemporary Chinese society,

4

this research also has theoretical and empirical implications for studying urbanization,
informal employment, migration, social stratification, labor movement, and citizenship.

KEYWORDS: China, Chinese Migrant Workers, Rural-Urban Migration, Structural
Transformation, Institutional Transition in China, Structuration
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Chapter One:
Introduction
In 2013, there was an especially stuffy summer in Beijing probably because of
considerable air pollution caused by rapid economic growth. Sweat would saturate people
even though they only rested under a tree. In the scorching sun, Tai was making concrete
outside the building, in which I lived 1 . He was mixing sand, water, lime and other
materials, using a shovel. After he prepared the material, he put some concrete in plastic
buckets and moved the 35-pound buckets by climbing to the third floor of the building
without elevators. Some other construction workers then wiped the concrete on the walls
to whiten them. Tai had worked there for two months before I met him. When I left for
America, he also moved to another construction site in Beijing. After he finished his
work in the building in which I lived, one of his friends introduced him to another boss,
who contracted a project in Xidan Area of Beijing. In addition, Tai had worked in many
cities for twenty years after he graduated from a primary middle school.
He told me that he worked in Zhongnanhai—the location of the power center in
China—before he came to work in the community I lived in. However, after he worked in
Zhongnanhai and before he came to work in the community, he went back to his
hometown in Shandong Province, where his parents, wife and two children lived. His
family contracted a small farm of about six mu’s in his home village 2. When he worked
outside his hometown, other family members took care of the land until harvest season
when he went back to his home village and helped his family harvest wheat. His only son
went to a local primary school. He said he was unable to bring his family to Beijing,
1

Tai is one of my informants. However, in order to follow the principle of privacy and confidentiality,
pseudonyms are used in this dissertation.
2
A mu is about 666.7 square meters, or 0.1647 acres. So his farm is less than one acre.
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because that would cause a double loss—his family would not earn the money through
agricultural production, and he would have to spend more money supporting the family,
especially when his wife would not be able to work. Tai is not alone; rather, he is only
one of the 268.94-million migrant workers in China (NBS 2014). This group of people
has existed in China for more than three decades and generations of rural residents have
joined in this group. This study answers two questions about this group of people: (1)
what will Chinese migrant workers’ future be like, and (2) why has this group of people
existed such a long time, even though their working and living conditions are unfavorable?
This study argues that Chinese migrant workers have formed a social class with a
distinctive dagong lifestyle for four reasons. First, this group of people has a large
number of individuals, possesses persistent proportion in Chinese social structure, and
has existed and will exist for a long period of time. Second, stable institutional
arrangements have maintained the existence of Chinese migrant workers by shaping their
life conditions, identities, motivations and attitudes, and these institutions include the
development of household autonomy system in rural villages, the encouragement and
regulation of informal employment relationship in cities, the maintenance of differential
citizenship with migrant workers receiving less in the cities, and the strengthening of
identity-based market ideology. Third, Chinese migrant workers’ motivations have
justified their dagong lifestyle even when their desire to permanently stay in cities has
been blocked, and these motivations include personal honor at home, career future in
cities, household needs at home and family development in cities. And fourth, they tend
to accept the dagong lifestyle, especially when they fail to meet their needs by returning
to agricultural activities, starting their own businesses, and/or pursuing further education.
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All of these four factors and processes have contributed to a structuration process of
Chinese migrant workers in contemporary China.
These findings can be summarized by a class-structuration theory of Chinese
migrant workers 3. These workers are important to understanding the rapid and continuous
economic growth in China because Chinese migrant workers have provided most of the
labor force for China’s economic growth, gave it a competitive advantage, and made it a
world factory. These findings are significant in explaining the social stability of China
because they can reveal Chinese migrant workers’ response to their life conditions and
social institutions. These findings also have significant implications for state policies for
removing the migrant-worker class because the logic of their emergence and existence in
this study points out the underlying forces maintaining this class, which must be
abolished or ameliorated in order to eliminate the discrimination against the migrantworker class and integrate them into new or existing cities.
Definition and History of Chinese Migrant Workers
Before going further, this section will critically examine three previous definitions
of Chinese migrant workers and then present the definition used in this work. Then, I will
present a brief history of Chinese migrant workers.
Definition
While Chinese migrant workers have existed for more than three decades, there
has not been a definitive version of the term “Chinese migrant worker.” Three types of

3
The term “structuration” used here has two meanings. First, it refers to a substantial social change of
Chinese class structure. That is, a new migrant-worker class has emerged in contemporary China. Second,
this emergence of a new working class in China is based on the interaction between structural-institutional
arrangements and social actors’ experiences, which is the meaning of “structuration” in Giddens’ sense
(1984).
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definitions can be identified, all of which have been employed by some researchers in
this field and can point out some important characteristics of Chinese migrant workers.
The first type of definition is the one that emphasizes the status of Chinese
migrant workers in Chinese industrial structure. Like many other countries in the world,
China has been experiencing industrialization and urbanization processes in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So, Chinese migrant workers have been considered as
an intermediary group between agricultural farmers and industrial workers. For example,
Wu (2009) argued that in the transformation from a traditional-agricultural society to a
modern-industrial society, farmers would gradually change to semi-industrial workers
and finally become industrial workers. Similarly, He and Zheng (2007) also argued that
Chinese migrant workers were a temporary form of workers who appeared during the
transformation from agricultural to industrial production.
The second type of definition concentrates on Chinese migrant workers’ double
statuses and identities that are related to both their economic activities and institutional
arrangements, especially the Hukou system. As to their economic activities, some
migrant workers work in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. Regarding their
Hukou statuses, Chinese migrant workers are assigned as rural-agricultural residents,
even though some of them don’t live in rural villages or work in the agricultural sector
(Liu, 2004; Cai and Chan , 2009). So in this definition, Chinese migrant workers are
characterized by their double occupations—farmers and workers—and double social
statuses—rural Hukou status and semi-urban resident.
The third type of definition focuses on Chinese migrant workers’ behavior and
lifestyle. This definition usually calls Chinese migrant workers as “dagongzhe”—those
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who dagong in cities and towns (Gongyouzhijia, 2013; Wang Ying, 2005). Literally,
“dagong” means leaving their homes in rural villages, going into cities, and working for
others in order to make money4. This is a more descriptive definition, though it doesn’t
include the structural transformations and institutional arrangements that have caused the
dagong lifestyle associated with Chinese migrant workers.
All three definitions have grasped some characteristics of Chinese migrant
workers. First-generation migrant workers have all of these characteristics, which have
become the basis of these traditional definitions. However, further changes of Chinese
migrant workers require redefining their key characteristics. First, some secondgeneration migrant workers have never worked in the agricultural sector (Liu, et al., 2009;
Institute of Labor Movement in China, 2011). So, the definition of Chinese migrant
workers based on their occupation or industry might exclude these migrant workers,
though they have the other two characteristics. Second, Chinese migrant workers’
identities have gone beyond their Hukou status and the reforms of the Hukou system have
changed the value of the various Hukou statuses (Solinger 1999; Zhan, 2011; Huang,
2011). So, the definition of Chinese migrant workers derived purely from their Hukou
status has become inadequate to understand their working and living conditions.
To better describe the common characteristics of Chinese migrant workers, this
study tries to focus on their behavioral characteristics and integrate their occupational and
social characteristics. Chinese migrant workers are defined as those workers
characterized by their dagong lifestyle, whereby dagong means leaving rural villages,
where they have the rights to contract farm land and build houses, and work in towns and

4

In Chinese, “dagong” can be a noun or a verb. Here I use “dagong” as a verb and use “dagong lifestyle” to
describe the common characteristics of the migrant workers’ life condition.
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cities, in which they work for others in order to earn wages. This dagong lifestyle has
also led Chinese migrant workers to unfavorable life conditions. They commute between
rural and urban areas, especially during traditional festivals and harvest seasons (Wang
2005). They concentrate in physically demanding jobs where they work long hours under
severe working conditions, but their wages are usually higher than workers in the villages
but lower than most city dwellers (Wang et al. 2002; Hannan 2008). Even though their
work is legal and vital to the economy, they work without formal job contracts (Lee 2007;
Meng 2010). Most of them have no health insurance, retirement insurance, injury
insurance, unemployment compensation, and other welfare benefits or social services
(Zhan 2011; Meng 2010). Their living quarters are very small and most of them have to
live separate from most of their family members (Lü 2013). Their jobs are neither secure
nor stable (Chan 2010b). Furthermore, these unfavorable life conditions often cause
psychological problems, such as depression (Mou, et al. 2011; Qiu, et al. 2011). In sum,
these workers constitute a particularly vulnerable section of Chinese society without the
same citizenship rights as urban residents (Solinger 1999; Fan 2002; Lee and Meng 2010;
Taylor 2011).
A Brief History of Chinese Migrant Workers
Chinese migrant workers emerged in the late 1970s when China launched its
Reform and Opening-up Policies. In 1978, when China initiated its economic reform, 82
per cent of the total population in China was rural population, who worked in agricultural
sectors with extremely low productivity and income (Li 2008). This part of the Chinese
population had been collectivized into communes in agricultural production before 1978
by the communist party-state (Unger 2002). Furthermore, the Hukou arrangement had
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been developed to tightly control rural people’s movement from agricultural sectors to
non-agricultural sectors and from the countryside to cities (Chan 2009).
Economic reforms started first in rural areas, which were characterized by the
spread of the household responsibility system. This new system allowed rural households
to contract land with the local government and to have their own rights to manage
agricultural production, and this undermined the rigid commune system. The rural reform
featured by the de-collectivization of land provided a strong incentive for the rural
household to produce more efficiently, and, with the improving agricultural productivity,
a large number of surplus laborers were released from agricultural production. From 1978
to the mid-1990s, these surplus labors were mainly absorbed by the Township and
Village-Owned enterprises (TVEs), which represent the development of rural nonagricultural sectors, with the government’s strategy emphasizing on the development of
small towns rather than large cities (Wu 2012; Li 2008).
The rural urbanization process represented by TVEs came to an end with the
ownership transformation in the mid-1990s (Putterman 1997; Kung and Lin 2007; Shen
and Ma 2005). However, the rural-urban migration didn’t decrease, but increased more
rapidly because the reformed SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises) and the development
driven by foreign investment in industrial and export zones replaced the Sunan model
characterized by TVEs (Wu 2012; Li 2008). At the same time, the government started
removing many controls on labor migration and gave local governments the rights to
formulate their own policies on the arrangements of Hukou system (Chan 2008).
Because of the economic growth and institutional reforms since 1978 when
Chinese government launched the project of Reform and Opening-up, the number of
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migrant workers has been increasing for more than three decades. The number of longdistance migrant workers has been increasing by 56% from 104.7 million in 2002 to
163.4 million in 2012 (See Figure 1 in the end of this chapter). The total number of
migrant workers (including local migrant workers) also has been increasing by 16% from
225.42 million in 2008 to 262.61 million in 2012 (Figure 2).
The Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
The main argument of this study is that Chinese migrant workers have constituted
a social class with a distinctive dagong lifestyle in contemporary China. This
structuration of Chinese migrant workers is supported by some characteristic institutional
arrangements in contemporary China, which have shaped Chinese migrant workers’ life
conditions, motivations and attitudes. This section will review the relevant literature
about the future of Chinese migrant workers, institutional arrangements related to them,
and their subjective experiences, and introduce the main arguments of this study in detail.
A Social Class of Chinese Migrant Workers
With respect to Chinese migrant workers’ emergence and future, most previous
studies have adopted a transitional perspective; that is, previous studies explicitly or
implicitly assume that the phenomenon of Chinese migrant workers is a transient
phenomenon and this group of people will disappear soon. This transitional perspective
can be divided into two schools of research: structural analysis and institutional analysis.
In structural analysis, because the internal rural-urban migration in China involves
the processes of industrialization and urbanization, the frequently referred point is W.
Arthur Lewis’ “dual sector model” (Altmann 2011) in development economics. For
Lewis, in developing countries, there are two economic sectors: the traditional

8

agricultural sector composed of subsistence farming, handicraft workers and petty traders;
and the modern industrial sector including mines, plantations, manufacturing companies.
The starting point of his reasoning is the unlimited supply of unskilled workers because
of a limited amount of land and no capital from subsistence economy. However, because
of rising capital investments, expanding labor productivity, and increasing profits and
capital accumulation, the rising labor demand and higher wages above subsistence level
together would draw the surplus labor from agricultural sectors (Lewis 1954). By
considering the contextual characteristics of Chinese political economy, this Lewis model
has been creatively applied to analyzing and predicting the development of Chinese
economy and labor markets. A paradigmatic paper was published by Fang Cai (2007),
who distinguished the factors that have contributed to the economic growth in China in
the past. These factors include the gain from demographic dividends, the improvement of
total factor productivity, and the realization of comparative advantage in the global
economy. However, tracing these factors is not his aim; rather, what he wanted to say is
that the economic growth in China is approaching the Lewis turning point, at which point
of time the surplus labor force would be completely absorbed by the modern industrial
sector. This is because the demographic transition has reduced the demographic dividend
and the resulted shortage of migrant labor will promote a unification of labor markets.
In institutional analysis, two viewpoints about their future could be distinguished:
conservative and radical. Conservative scholars believe in the effect of institutional
transitions, in which the state has reformed and will continue to change the barriers to job
creation and labor participation, and the market will play a more fundamental role in
regulating the employment relationship, labor mobility and wages (Cai, et al. 2008). The
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market mechanisms, especially the price lever in the interaction between demand and
supply of labor, will gradually increase migrant workers’ bargaining power and
employment terms. For example, migrant workers’ higher turnover rate has been treated
as a kind of strategy by migrant workers to improve their market status and wage levels
(Han 2011; Wang and Wu 2010). Radical scholars argue that capitalist development and
the marketization process has made a new working-class of rural migrant workers as
China becomes the “World’ factory,” the process they called “semi-proletarianization”
(Ngai and Lu 2010). Furthermore, both state policy and market exchange have
contributed to the labor struggles initiated by the new-working class. For example, Ngai
et al. (2009) argued that this state-driven economic development was accompanied by a
state withdrawal from the areas of social reproduction and social protection. Lee (2007)
argued that the migrant workers in the Sunbelt of China have gradually recognized their
legal rights and become a Marxist-type working class, which has caused labor
movements to rise up against the capitalists and local governments. From a global
perspective on the struggle between capital and labor, Silver applied her framework of
the relationship between globalization and the workers’ movement to China. She thought
China was an emerging epicenter of labor unrest because “where capital goes, conflict
follows,” as spatial fix and technological fix have made China a part of global capitalist
system (Silver 2003; Silver and Zhang 2009).
The problem with this transitional stance is their explanatory deficit, which is
related to their ideological assumptions. That is, the transitional stance could not explain
why the number of Chinese migrant workers has been increasing for more than three
decades with the high rate of economic growth and urbanization. If this increase could be

10

defined as a stage of a long-term transformation, then how long will the transition be?
How long could it be defined as a “transition” or “transformation” process? Whether the
institutional reforms were trustable or believable is still a controversial issue. Some have
argued that the Chinese reforms have been trapped in a “partial reform equilibrium,”
which means that a small group of ruling elite has captured the fruit of economic growth
and will prevent further fundamental reforms that might benefit migrant workers (Pei
2006; Hellman 1998). Finally, nearly all scholars on labor protests admit that “labor
rebellion largely remained tame and nonmilitant” because of the institutional
arrangements such as household responsibility system in rural villages and strong state
controls on union organizing (Lee 2007: 204).
These explanatory deficits of conservatives and radicals are closely connected to
their ideological frameworks. The structural analysis and its associated conservative
viewpoints believe in the market mechanism and argue for the urbanization associated
with industrialization, while the radical viewpoints advocate for social equality and rights
of Chinese migrant workers.
The transitional perspectives cannot explain why the number of Chinese migrant
workers has been increasing for more than three decades. I argue that Chinese migrant
workers are not a transitional or transient phenomenon. Or, at least we could see that the
Chinese migrant worker should not be understood as a transitional or transient
phenomenon because Chinese migrant workers have made up a structural stratum in the
social structure of China since late 1970s when China began its reform and opening-up
policies. This process can be called the structuration of Chinese migrant workers. Here,
my structuration theory means the emergence of a social class, who (1) has large numbers,
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(2) possesses stable proportions in the Chinese social structure, (3) has a distinctive
lifestyle, and (4) has existed and will exist for a long period of time. Generally speaking,
the structuration of Chinese migrant workers means that there are a number of social
positions occupied by a group of people, which have existed and will last for a certain
historical period. Specifically, this structuration has two aspects.
Macro-Institutional Basis of the Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
First of all, the structuration of Chinese migrant workers is embedded in the
structural disparities in contemporary China. Corresponding to the two general trends of
the internal migration in China—from rural villages to cities and from less-developed
regions to more-developed regions—there are two structural disparities that were thought
of as relevant to the emergence of Chinese migrant workers: the division between urban
and rural areas and the disparity between different regions. The two macro-level
structural disparities have created “push” and “pull” factors for Chinese internal
migrations.
The problem with structural analyses is that the “push” and “pull” facts derived
from structural disparities can only provide the emergence of Chinese migrant workers
with a possibility of moving, without acknowledging how policies can intervene to show
what the terms of their move might be. In other words, though these analyses point to
necessary conditions, these conditions are far from sufficient conditions. Comparative
studies on different countries confronting similar structural conditions have suggested the
importance of institutional arrangements besides structural disparities. For example, the
research by Meng and Manning (2010) indicates that though China and Indonesia face
similar structural transformations, their different state policies have led to different
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consequences: in Indonesia, free rural-urban migration have resulted in a large number of
urban poor people, who take jobs in informal sectors and live in urban slums; in China,
an internal “guest worker” system with state control on the migration process has
prevented the emergence of a large class of urban poor people and made a huge number
of rural migrant workers (i.e., the floating population) who maintain some connections
with their home villages. This is also the case for the difference between China and India
(Smart, et al., 2013). So, previous structural analyses are not enough to understand the
logic of the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers. It is necessary to
investigate the institutional arrangements in China in order to understand the emergence
and existence of Chinese migrant workers.
According to Fan (2008: 11), the “Hukou paradigm” is a dominant framework for
explaining the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers. The Hukou
paradigm argues that population movements were tightly controlled and restricted
through the Hukou system in the Maoist era. However, after economic reforms in the late
1970s, the tight control of population migration through the Hukou system has been
gradually loosened but not unleashed. With respect to the extent of Chinese migrant
workers’ migration, the Hukou system still limits the welfare benefits to migrants and
educational benefits to their children. So they will become a group of migrant workers
staying in the city because they still cannot enjoy the same state-provided benefits as
urban residents. So, the continuation of the Hukou system hinders the urbanization or
permanent migration of Chinese migrant workers (Wang 2005; Fan 2008; Chan 2008;
2009; Cai, et al. 2008; Cai 2011).
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Reforming the Hukou system and loosening migration control are prerequisites to
the emergence and existence of a large number of Chinese migrant workers because they
are almost never allowed to establish urban citizenship in the cities even though they may
work there. Consequently, the partial reform of the Hukou system still makes it too hard
for Chinese migrant workers to settle down in the cities and to permanently migrate.
However, this Hukou paradigm does not tell the whole story. First, the Hukou
system is by no means a primary social institution. Its establishment, reform and function
depend on the interaction between the state and markets. Fan (2008) argues that the
transition of labor regimes is more than the Hukou paradigm which is only a part of a
larger labor regime. During the Maoist period, the allocation of labor was monopolized
by the state, in which the Hukou system was used to divide labor forces between
agricultural and industrial sectors. However, the introduction of market mechanisms in
labor allocation ushered in a new labor regime of migrant workers. The migrant labor
regime channels and constrains migrant workers to specific sectors and jobs based on
their Hukou status. So, the partial reform of the Hukou system has to be understood in the
context of the mutual constitution between the state and labor markets. Second, the
Hukou paradigm emphasizes structural and institutional constraints on Chinese migrant
workers’ living conditions. Though this paradigm has investigated how the Hukou status
has affected Chinese migrant workers’ life conditions, it largely fails to examine how the
Hukou system has shaped their identities, motivations and attitudes. In other words,
relying only on the Hukou system misses the other reforms and how all of this has been
perceived by Chinese migrant workers. Furthermore, because the Hukou system is so
complex that everything can be included in the Hukou system, the Hukou paradigm

14

doesn’t elaborate how the Hukou paradigm has influenced Chinese migrant workers’ life
conditions. I argue that the essential elements of the Hukou system are migration control
and differentiated citizenship between rural and urban residents.
Considering Chinese migrant workers’ immediate living conditions, identities,
motivations, and attitudes, the interaction between the state and market has led to four
institutional arrangements, which have shaped both Chinese migrant workers’ living
conditions and subjective consciousness. Furthermore, most institutional arrangements
are related to the Hukou system because they involve some legacy of the Hukou system.
These institutional arrangements include (1) the development of household autonomy
system in rural villages, (2) the encouragement and regulation of informal employment
relationships in cities, (3) the maintenance of differential citizenship with migrant
workers receiving fewer rights in the cities, and (4) the strengthening of identity-based
market ideology. All of these institutional arrangements have affected the emergence and
existence of Chinese migrant workers by framing their identities and conditioning their
working and living conditions. Specifically, related to the land tenure system in rural
villages, the household autonomy is directly related to their identity as family members.
The regulated informal economy shapes their identity as guests in cities. In the
background of the differential citizenship between rural and urban residents, their semicitizenship in cities leads to their stronger embrace of identity as rural residents. Their
Hukou-based market ideology confirms their identity as lower-level workers with less
human capital.
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Micro-Subjective Basis of the Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
Second, it is important to examine Chinese migrant workers’ motivations and
attitudes in order to understand their emergence and existence. Previous institutional
analyses indicate that the market is the main mechanism through which China’s ruralurban migration happened in the three decades (Li 2008; Cai, et al. 2008), as the
government didn’t force Chinese farmers to relocate as it did in the communistic era
(such as the Intellectual Youth Movement) (Wang and Liu 2006; Fairbank, et al. 2006).
This is true despite the fact that the state policies and development ideology, especially
the reform policies since late 1970s (including the reforms of the Hukou system), have
contributed to the huge rural-urban migration and that the situation of labor market is still
controversial (Fan 2008; Ngai, et al. 2009). This means that Chinese migrant workers
make their own decisions to migrate without straightforward physical coercion to do so 5.
Theoretically, it is also necessary to investigate Chinese migrant workers’
motivations and attitudes because this investigation can elaborate how structural and
institutional factors have contributed to their emergence and existence. Structural
analyses have pointed out the “push” and “pull” factors relevant to the huge internal
migration in China and institutional analyses have mentioned several institutional
arrangements contributing to the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers.
However, these analyses don’t elaborate on how these structural disparities and
institutional arrangements have influenced Chinese migrant workers’ personal life
conditions, motivations and attitudes. It is an irony that all structural and institutional
analyses start with descriptions of Chinese migrant workers’ unfavorable life conditions,
5

In more colorful symbolic interactionist terms, this involves “cooling the mark out” or making migrant
workers accept their positions without much in the way of labor unrest. This is especially how this study
differs from radical or Marxist accounts such as Ching Kwan Lee’s Against the Law (2007).
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but they tend to overlook the relationship between macro-level conditions and microlevel experiences. So, this study tries to figure out the mechanisms that connect macroand micro-level analyses.
Practically, it is important to examine Chinese migrant workers’ motivations and
attitudes because they will affect their responses to their life conditions and the society at
large. As to the future of Chinese migrant workers, both conservative and radical
perspectives seem to consider Chinese migrant workers as a transitional phenomenon. So
they are inconsistent with the current situation of Chinese migrant workers, especially the
increasing number of them. The increasing number of migrant workers indicates that (1)
the majority of them have not adapted to urban communities or become urban residents
and (2) they have not launched effective resistance against the institutional arrangement,
in the past three decades. As a result, there are three possibilities. First, will migrant
workers adapt and integrate into urban society as conservative scholars have argued? Or
second, will migrant workers resist and force the government to change the current
institutional arrangements to satisfy their desire to permanently migrate as the radical
perspective contends? Or third, will migrant workers simply accept their migrant-worker
lifestyle and the discrimination that goes with it, in order to balance out an urban and
rural life? In order to answer these questions, investigating their motivations and attitudes
toward their dagong lifestyle is necessary and in response I will present a “middle way”
theory to describe these Chinese migrant workers.
With respect to Chinese migrant workers’ motivations to dagong, the permanent
migration paradigm assumes that all migrant workers have a strong desire to settle down
in cities, and the household strategy paradigm argues that they just treat dagong as a
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household strategy to diversify household income and reduce future risks. This study
found that not all Chinese migrant workers have a desire to settle down in cities. Even for
both migrant workers with such a desire and those without it, the nature of the desire or
lack of the desire to do so is different. Four types of the desire to permanently migrate
were distinguished. “No desire” which indicates that some migrant workers didn’t have a
desire to settle in cities, because they emotionally felt it impossible to do that. “Lost
intention” means that some migrant workers didn’t hold a goal to settle in cities because
they thought it impossible based on their rational thinking about the possibility. For those
with such a desire, the “hopeful desire” is largely an emotional force, while the “expected
desire” is based on rational thinking about the possibility and meaning of settling down in
cities.
More generally, four types of motivations were identified. Geographically
speaking, Chinese migrant workers’ motivations can be rural-oriented or urban-oriented.
Socially speaking, their motivations can be personal or social. According to the two
dimensions, four types of motivations are constructed: “personal honor at home” is a
personal and rural-oriented motivation; “personal future in cities” is a personal and
urban-oriented motivation; “household needs at home” is a social and rural-oriented
motivation; and “family development in cities” is a social and urban-oriented motivation.
As far as Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes toward their lifestyle are concerned,
all migrant workers treat dagong as a means to achieve their needs. However, motivation
is not the only factor shaping their attitudes. It was found that another factor is comparing
dagong with its alternatives with respect to whether they can achieve their needs.
Possible alternatives will reduce their acceptance of the dagong lifestyle, while having
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few other options will make them accept the dagong lifestyle. Combining Chinese
migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes, four types of Chinese migrant workers are
distinguished. Adventurous migrant workers want to settle in cities but do not accept the
dagong lifestyle. Optimistic migrant workers want to settle in cities and accept the
dagong lifestyle. Instrumental migrant workers do not want to settle in cities and treat
dagong as a means to meet family needs. And retreating migrant workers do not want to
settle in cities or accept the dagong lifestyle.
To conclude, Figure 3 summarizes the main approach and findings of this study.
First, after the removal of tight migration control through the Hukou system reforms,
there are four institutional arrangements contributing to the structuration of Chinese
migrant workers: household autonomy, differentiated and partial citizenship, informal
employment, and market ideology. Furthermore, these institutions contribute to the
structuration of Chinese migrant workers by shaping their life conditions, identities,
motivations and attitudes. The chapters that follow will provide qualitative and some
institutional evidence of these assertions that are quite different from the previously
mentioned conservative and Marxist arguments of urbanization and labor protests.
Theoretical Perspective: an Analytical Structuration Theory
In order to examine the inter-influence between Chinese migrant workers’
experiences and broader structural-institutional arrangements, I used an analytical
structuration theory. This theory is constructed on a critique of Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s
structuration theories from the stance of analytical dualism. This section will first
introduce the characteristics of structuration theory and then present the four mechanisms
involved in the interaction between structure and agency.
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Characteristics of Structuration Theory
According to Parker (2000), structuration theory emphasizes the similarity and
consistence between social structure and social agency. Therefore, he treats both Giddens’
and Bourdieu’s theories as structuration theory. Though Bourdieu didn’t use the term
“structuration,” as Giddens, he also emphasizes the embodied nature of social structure
through social actors’ mental and motive structures (Lòpez and Scott, 2000). At least four
characteristics of structuration theory can be identified, as Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s
theories indicated. First, they both try to solve the dualism between structure and agency.
Second, structure and agency are interrelated in process. Third, both theories have an
implication of social reproduction. Finally, unconscious factors are emphasized in the
assumption of duality.
First, though different terms are used, both Giddens and Bourdieu try to criticize
and solve the dualism between structure and agency through the concept “duality.” For
Giddens (1994), in sociology and philosophy, structure and action usually appear as a
pair of opposite concepts. Those theories emphasizing social actions are difficult to deal
with structural factors and social causality; on the other hand, functionalism and
structuralism give priority to social objects or structure, rather than social subject or
agency. He argued that structure is not external to action, because memory can save
structure and structure can only be embodied in social practice, and thus structure is
internal to social action (Giddens, 1984). Similarly, Bourdieu (1990) criticized objective
structuralism and subjective constructionism and tried to transcend their opposition. He
used the concept “habitus” to illustrate how objective structures are maintained in social
actors’ stable mental and motive structure. Habitus, as a kind of embodied structure, is
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consistent with and corresponding to objective social structure (Bourdieu and Wacquant,
1992).
Second, both Giddens and Bourdieu emphasize the importance of process. So,
they don’t use “structure” as a noun, but as a verb. They also use such terms as
“structuring,” “structured” and “structuration.” Giddens (1984: 17) said,
“Structure thus refers, in social analysis, to the structuring properties
allowing the “binding” of time-space in social systems, the properties
which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist
across varying spans of time and space and which lend them “systemic”
form” (Giddens, 1984: 17)

Similarly, Bourdieu (1977) argued that habitus is both a structured product and a
structuring force. This nature of habitus can especially be found in his emphasis on
practice. He said, practice happens in time and practice and time are inseparable
(Bourdieu, 1990).
Third, their theories have an implicit assumption of social reproduction or social
continuity6. According to Giddens (1984), social science focuses on those stable social
practices which transcend time and place. He defined social system as composed of social
actors who are reproducing social relationships binding time and place. Similarly,
Bourdieu (1977) emphasized the role of habitus for social reproduction, because habitus
is a structuring force, which reproduces social structure. For him, habitus are stable
norms that regulate actions in concrete situations. The practices regulated by habitus tend
to reproduce the stable and internal norms of social structure, which in turn are the
preconditions of those norms.

6

Both theorists have analyzed social change. However, social reproduction and social continuity is a
characteristic of their theories, rather than their substantive studies.
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Finally, social reproduction involves unconscious elements. In his stratification model of
the agent, Giddens (1984) said social actors might not be conscious of their motivations,
though they could tell their intentions and reasons through their rationality. Similarly,
Bourdieu (1977) argued that, in habitus, social structure had become a second nature of
social beings. In practice, habitus becomes a nature through historical process. However,
social actors reject this historical process. This unconsciousness is the result of forgetting
history.
Toward an Analytical Structuration Theory
Though these characteristics of structuration theory have made it able to combine
the long-standing chasm between objective structuralism and subjective constructionism,
both its ontological basis and theoretical orientation have been questioned especially by
post-structurationists. Ontologically, the central conflationism of structure and agency
has been criticized from the perspective of analytical dualism. Parker (2000) identified
four stances with respect to the relationship between objective structure and subjective
construction. Objective structuralism emphasizes the importance of social structure.
Subjective constructionism gives priority to agency. Structuration theory argues for
duality or identity of structure and agency. Finally, analytical dualism advocates the nonidentity and interaction of structure and agency. For pose-structuration theorists, to
combine structure and agency doesn’t necessarily means to reject the difference, dualism
and non-identity between structure and agency. Theoretically, the conservative
orientation of structuration theory to social reproduction and social order has been
considered as unable to explain social changes. Related this theoretical orientation to the
above ontological assumption, Mouzelis (1995, 1997, 2008) argued that to assume the

22

difference between structure and agency can help analyze not only social reproduction,
but also social change, because to analyze these problems requires assuming the
independence, objectivity and continuity of social system.
In order to solve these two problems with structuration theory, I propose an
analytical structuration theory to describe the interplay mechanisms between structure
and agency involved in traditional structuration theory and argue that these mechanisms
can be applied to both social reproduction and social change. This analytical analysis of
structuration theory results in the following four mechanisms between structure and
agency: resource-shaping, cognition-framing, motivation-orienting, and dispositionconditioning.
First, both Giddens and Bourdieu criticized the assumption of social consensus in
structural functionalism and borrowed some elements from social conflict theory. This
can be found in their analyses of the equal distribution of resources and domination
relationship. Giddens (1984:33) identified two distinguishable types of resources:
allocative resources and authoritative resources. While allocative resources are
capabilities to generate command over objects, goods and material phenomena,
authoritative resources are the transformative capacity to generate command over persons
or actors. The two types of resources constitute the domination relationship. Bourdieu
(1986; 1984; 2004; 2005) distinguished many kinds of capital, including cultural capital,
social capital, economic capital, technical capital, and scholastic capital and so on. He
also applied these concepts to analyzing different kinds of field. Based on the
conceptualization of resources, they emphasize that their unequal distribution have
shaped social actors’ life conditions.
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Second, both of them stress the role of social actors’ mental structure, which will
frame their perception of their surrounding world. Giddens (1984) used the term
“interpretative scheme” to describe social actors’ account, interpretation and
communication. As classification models in their knowledge storage, these interpretative
schemes can be applied again and again in different time-space situations. Furthermore,
these schemes developed and existed in stable social systems. When he analyzed
Algerian farmers’ perception of their future, Bourdieu (1979) also described how their
life conditions have framed their rationality. Specifically, he argued that only with stable
material livelihood can they rationally predict their future, or they would remain in their
habitual reasoning.
Third, both Giddens and Bourdieu emphasize the role of normative components in
social actions, which are oriented by social institutions. As Giddens (1984) pointed out,
social actors would have to legitimate or justify their actions. A normative system of
social rights and responsibilities is available to them, which are used to evaluate and
sanction social actors and their actions. Similar to interpretative schemes, these social
norms are also involved in the reproduction of social systems. This also refers to what
Bourdieu (1972; 1979) said motive structure, another component of habitus. He argued
that the motive structures are different in traditional society and modern society. For
instance, in traditional societies, labor is for a sense of honor, and is not merely for
survival; in modern societies, employment becomes a way of livelihood.
Finally, disposition-conditioning is a stabilizing process, or a habituating process,
through which their mental and mental structure become taken-for-granted in social
actors’ disposition. This process is closely related to what Giddens said unconscious

24

factors and practical consciousness. He also used routinization and regionalization to
describe this process. For Bourdieu (1972), this is a process of forgetting history, in
which social actors become unconscious of how their habitus has developed. However,
social actors’ unconscious disposition is gradually developed through living under the
abovementioned conditions for a long time.
I apply this analytic approach to structuration theory in this study of Chinese
migrant workers, which results in the following four mechanisms between structure and
agency in the following way: (1) Chinese migrant workers’ living and working conditions
have been shaped by the differential and partial citizenship and informal employment
relationship, (2) their motivations to dagong have been oriented by household autonomy
and traditional family culture, (3) their attitudes toward their life conditions have been
framed by the market ideology, and (4) during their migration process and life course,
they tend to reduce the desire to settle in cities and tend to accept the dagong lifestyle.
Furthermore, these structuration mechanisms provide for the creation of a new structure
of a permanent class of migratory workers; that is, the four mechanisms have also
contributed to the change and maintenance of Chinese class structure. In this way my
work follows Giddens and Bourdieu, but bypasses pure reproduction and has more
emphasis on the construction of a new class of Chinese migratory workers.
Research Methods
This research combines descriptive interpretation of Chinese migrant workers’
own perspectives and critical examination of the institutional contexts which have shaped
their subjective consciousness. So, interpretative and critical qualitative methodologies
are integrated in this research. This section will introduce the interpretative-critical

25

qualitative methodology and the specific techniques of contacting participants, data
collection and analysis.
An Interpretative-Critical Qualitative Methodology
Lather (1992) distinguished three post-positivist paradigms: interpretative, critical
and postmodern qualitative research. Merriam (2002) elaborated them as three paradigms
of qualitative research. An interpretive qualitative research focuses on the meaning
developed by people in their interaction with their surrounding world. A critical
qualitative research emphasizes the social, cultural and political situations and how they
have affected people’s construction of reality. This study will investigate migrant workers’
subjective experiences in the migration process, especially their changing desire to
permanently migrate and degree of accepting the migrant-worker lifestyle. They are
meanings attached by migrant workers to their life experiences. Qualitative methods in
general and interpretative qualitative methods in particular are good at interpreting
meanings and process. Second, this study will investigate how institutional factors
influence migrant workers’ subjective experiences. The critical approach could figure out
the roles of family, state, market and social exclusion from the migrant workers’ own
perspective.
Moreover, I think interpretation and critique are only analytically distinct. An
interpretative-critical qualitative methodology practically integrates the two approaches.
That is, the interpretation is an inherent part of criticism, while the critique is an integral
element of interpretation. In the interpretative-critical research of Chinese migrant
workers, the critical examination of institutional context (family, state, market and social
exclusion) will be justified by the interpretation of migrant workers’ subjective
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experiences, and the interpretative investigation of migrant workers’ subjective
experiences would be confirmed by the critical analysis of its institutional background.
That is, in practice the interpretive and critical approaches are not distinct, but mutually
beneficial.
Theoretical and Snowballing Sampling
In order to include all kinds of Chinese migrant workers in this research, a
theoretical sampling method was employed. However, the principles for sampling are
gradually developed in the research process. Four theoretical principles—gender, family
life, migration distance and industry—were adopted, because these characteristics
influence migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes (Table 1). The three main industries
in which migrant workers work—service, manufacturing and construction—were
included. Because men and women have different life courses, so both male and female
migrant workers were included in this research.
This study includes a more balanced view toward its subjects. For the three types of
household structure, I use single, married and married with dependent children, and elder
with independent children. Because these household structures are consistent with the
stages of the family life course, these household structures can also help examine the
influence of the many changes in family life. Furthermore, according to the consistency
between household structure and family cycle, I select informants at different ages,
because they have different household structures and family life conditions. So, this
principle could include the information of age, family life and life course at the same time.
This study also considered both short- and long-distance migrant workers. Short
distance is defined as the distance within local city or nearest city, while long distance is
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the distance between cities or provinces. I conducted research in three cities—Liaocheng,
Jinan, and Beijing (Figure 4), which correspond to three administrative levels—local,
provincial and national. Furthermore, in cities of different administrative levels, migrant
workers’ migration distances are different. In Beijing, for example, there are more longdistance migrant workers from other provinces.
At first, this study was to include 36 (3*3*2*2) types of informants according to
theoretical principles. However, I didn’t find single girls working in the construction
industry in both long- and short-distance migrant workers, or elderly women working in
far-away cities in service and manufacture sectors. So, there are only 32 types of migrant
workers were included in this study, though there might be more than one informant in
certain categories. This points to some limitations on young and older women’s
occupational choices.
As this study involves my intense interactions with my participants, it is
extremely important to get each participant’s trust. Combining theoretical sampling,
snowballing sampling was employed to select participants, which has made it easier to
get participants’ trust. Fortunately for this research, I was born and raised in a rural
village. Nearly all my relatives, friends and classmates have some experiences as migrant
workers. Moreover, they work in different cities, industries and occupations. So their
relatives, friends, coworkers and classmates could provide interviews with people who
represent all types of migrant workers defined by the theoretical principles for sampling.
In order to create personal trust, I firstly contacted my relatives, friends and classmates.
Some of them have become my informants and we have personal trust because of
common life experiences. My relatives and friends have also introduced their own
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relatives, friends and coworkers as my informants. Through their introduction, I could
construct personal trust with those persons whom I have never known 7.
Data Collection and Analysis
As this research tries to combine macro- and micro-level analyses, two types of
data are included. At the micro-level, semi-structured, in-depth, and open-ended
interviews were used to get information about Chinese migrant workers’ values,
motivations and attitudes. Because this research also focuses on the changes in Chinese
migrant workers’ working conditions, family lives, and subjective consciousness,
interviews were organized in two ways. If a migrant worker has worked in less than three
cities or companies, the interview was organized by life events of his/her family. Then,
his/her working conditions and subjective consciousness were asked at each stage of
his/her family lifecycle (Table 2). If a migrant worker has worked in more than three
cities or companies, the interview was organized by his/her working places. Then his/her
family life events and subjective consciousness were organized through each workplace
(Table 3).
At the macro-level, secondary data were used to analyze structural and
institutional factors, which have influenced Chinese migrant workers’ experiences and
consciousnesses. Statistics by governments and scholars were used to outline the
characteristics of the industrial structure, the regional uneven development, and the ruralurban disparities in China. As to the institutional transitions in China, legal documents,

7

There may be some disadvantages to interview people whom I know well, which is why I asked for many
referrals. In either case, I carefully monitored how my kinship status (uncle, aunt or cousin) might affect
my interviews. However, I do not believe my kinship status affected their answers about their own life
conditions. The main bias might be that they wanted to look successful to a more educated relative. But I
did not detect any such bias, perhaps because they knew that I was in a position to discover any
exaggeration. On the referral side, the “presentation of self” by relatives to those I did not know was mainly
on the basis of helping a Chinese student from America to complete this research study.
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official speeches and government reports were used to understand the history of state
policies related to Chinese migrant workers.
Data analysis is conducted through three levels of coding—open coding, axial
coding, and selective coding, which were proposed by Corbin and Strauss (1990). Three
specific analysis strategies will be adopted: conceptualization, categorization and
connection (Maxwell 2005). Conceptualization means labeling and defining the same
phenomena taking place in different sites and cases. This method is especially useful for
summarizing the similarities of migrant workers’ subjective experiences in the migration
process. Categorization is to classify concepts by comparing similarities and differences.
This method could help categorize different paths of migrant workers’ subjective
experiences. Connecting strategies could connect events, categories and contexts. So,
connection methods could (1) connect the events in a certain migrant worker’s
experiences; and (2) connect the migrant workers’ personal experiences with their
institutional contexts.
The Presentation of Arguments in What Follows
The following chapters are divided into two parts. The first part is composed of
Chapters two to four focusing on the structuration of Chinese migrant workers and its
institutional basis. The second part, from Chapters five to seven, concentrates on Chinese
migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes toward the dagong lifestyle. The structural
and institutional factors in the first part are the background of Chinese migrant workers’
motivations and attitudes in the second part, while the motivations and attitudes in the
second part elaborate on the influences of institutional arrangements in the first part.

30

Focusing on the current situation and future of Chinese migrant workers, chapter
two will critically examine two transitional perspectives—structural transformation
theories and institutional transition theories—with respect to: (a) their explanations of the
emergence of Chinese migrant workers, and (b) their predictions about their future.
Because of the explanatory deficits and ideological assumptions in these transitional
perspectives, this chapter presents empirical evidence for the structuration of Chinese
migrant workers. This part of the structuration of Chinese migrant workers means the
emergence of a group of human beings, who (1) have a large number, (2) possess stable
proportions in Chinese social structure, (3) have a distinctive lifestyle, and (4) have
existed and will exist for a long period of time. In other words, they are not a transitional
group that will go away soon. Rather they make up a stable stratum in the social structure
of contemporary China.
As “the Hukou paradigm” is a dominant paradigm for studying Chinese migrant
workers, chapter three discusses the Hukou system and its reforms. It argues that the
Hukou system has been dramatically reformed to support the party-state’s new
development strategy of lifting the tight restrictions on migration. So, the reforms of the
Hukou system have contributed to the emergence of more Chinese migrant workers.
Moreover, in a socialist market economy, the Hukou system still maintains differential
citizenship between rural and urban residents in China, which continues to negatively
influence migrant workers’ working and living conditions.
Chapter four goes beyond the reformed Hukou system and focuses on other
institutional arrangements developed out of the interaction between the state and markets.
It argues that the Hukou system alone could not explain the emergence and existence of

31

Chinese migrant workers. Four institutional arrangements are emphasized, as all of them
have influenced Chinese migrant workers’ identities, working and living conditions. The
household autonomy system derived from the rural land-tenure reform reinforced their
identities as family members; differential citizenship between rural and urban residents
and migrant workers’ “semi-citizenship” in cities strengthened their identities as rural but
migratory residents; regulated informal employment in cities supported their identities as
guests in cities; and identity-based market ideology enhanced their identities as low-level
workers.
Part two examines the bottom-up or micro-aspects of the structuration process. As
the permanent migration paradigm is another dominant paradigm in studies on Chinese
migrant workers’ consciousness, chapter five examines migrant workers’ desires to settle
in cities. It finds that not all migrant workers want to settle in cities. However, the reasons
for not having the desire are different: while some migrant workers never thought about
settling down in cities, some thought it impossible to settle in cities. For migrant workers
with the desire, the nature of their intention is also different: some of them only had the
hope of settling in cities, while some have developed specific plans to do so. So, four
types of desire to settle in cities are identified: no desire, lost intention, hopeful desire and
expected intention.
As not all Chinese migrant workers have the desire to settle in cities, chapter six
investigates their motivations to Dagong or stay in what amounts to be an in-between
state. Although the finding that the permanent migration and family needs are two
ultimate motivations to Dagong is consistent with previous permanent-migration
paradigm and household-strategy paradigm, it also finds that permanent migration could
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be an end or a means. While permanent migration is treated as a means, family life
becomes the ultimate motivation. Furthermore, household strategy could be a strategy of
an individual as a family member and a strategy of household as a whole. Finally, the
motivations are changing with the alterations of their working and living conditions and
family lives.
Chapter seven concentrates on Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes toward the
dagong lifestyle—whether they accept this lifestyle or not. As all migrant workers treat
dagong as a means to achieve their ends, their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle are
investigated through their own emotions and calculations. Comparing dagong with its
alternatives has shaped their attitudes. Dagong has become a reasonable choice for
Chinese migrant workers when they failed to achieve its alternatives. Though they also
compare their lifestyle with urban residents and new urbanized citizens, they think that
their lack of human capital and opportunities make it hard for them to integrate into city
life.
Finally, chapter eight concludes this study by summarizing main findings and
reviewing the implications and limitations of this study. I show that my approach is a
middle road between “permanent transition” and mounting “labor protest.” Instead the
structuration of migrant workers is a macro- and micro-process that reveals a number of
motivational processes that change over time. This leaves a large and evolving social
class that Chinese workers and policy makers will have to deal with over time. Though
Chinese migrant workers are constantly moving, they are not going away soon.

33

Table 1. Principles for Theoretical Sampling
Family
structure

Migration Distance
Short-distance migration
Long-distance migrant workers
Male
Female
Male
Female

Single

Construction*
Hu**
Service
En
Manufacture
Shun

Service
Jing
Manufacture
Yan

Construction
Qian
Service
Di
Manufacture
Gang; Jun

Service
Ping
Manufacture
Juan

Construction
Long
Service
Ling
Manufacture
Laoge

Construction
Ju
Service
Hua
Manufacture
Mi

Construction
Tai; Laosi
Service
Yang; Ye
Manufacture
Liao; Wang

Construction
Hong
Service
Li
Manufacture
Hui

Married
and
married
with
children

Construction
Construction
Construction
Yao
Na
Laoshao
Service
Senior
Service
Service
Service
Yu
migrant
Qiang
Lan
Su
workers
Manufacture
Manufacture
Manufacture
Qiao
Yue
Ning
*construction, service and manufacture are three main industries in which migrant
workers work
**italic words are interviewees’ pseudonyms
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Table 2 Interview Outline （Type I）
This type of interview is used for those migrant workers who have worked in more than
three cities or companies. These migrant worker’s life experiences could be organized by
the cities or companies in which they used to work.
Where did you How is your How was your Why did you What was your
work?
family
like working
work there?
plan
about
then?
condition?
future?
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Table 3 Interview Outline (Type II)
This second type of interview note is used for those migrant workers who have worked
no more than two cities or companies. These migrant worker’s life experiences could be
organized by the changes in their family life.
When did you How
is Which city or How
was Why did What was
graduate……?
your
company did your working you work your plan
family life you
work condition?
there?
about
like?
then?
future?
Graduation
from school

Starting work

Engagement

Marriage

Children’s birth

Children’s
education

Children’s
independence
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Figure 1 The Number of Long-Distance Migrant Workers (millions), 2002-2012
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Note: Long-distance migrant workers are those who work outside their
local cities and cannot commute between workplaces and homes every day.
Source: the numbers of long-distance migrant workers from 2002 to 2008
are from Cai and Chan (2009); the numbers of long-distance migrant
workers from 2009 to 2012 are from the National Bureau of Statistics
(2013)
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Figure 2 The Total Number of Migrant Workers (millions), 2008-2012
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Notes: These numbers are total numbers of both long-distance and local
migrant workers. Though migrant workers are able to commute between
cities or towns and villages every day, some of them don’t commute in
reality.
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Figure 3 The emergence and Existence of Chinese Migrant Workers

1. Structural disparities
a-Rural-urban disparity
b-Regional uneven
development

2. Institutional transition between
the state and market
a- Reforms of the Hukou system
1-removal of migration
2-differential citizenship
b- Reforms of employment
relationships in cities
c- Household Autonomy and family
life in rural villages
d- Market ideology

3. Chinese migrant
workers’ life and
subjective experiences
a-life conditions,
motivations, attitudes, and
identities
a-four types of Chinese
migrant workers
b-Changes during
migration process

4. The Structuration of
Chinese migrant workers
a-Large number
b-Stable proportion
c-Distinctive lifestyle
d-Long-term existence
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Figure 4 Interview Sites

Note:
The three stars in this map mark the three cities where I conducted my interviews. The
largest star marks the capital city of China, Beijing. Beijing, at the top administrative
level, has more long-distance migrant workers from other provinces. The immediate-size
star corresponds to Jinan, the capital city of Shandong Province. Jinan, at the
intermediary administrative level, has both long-distance and short-distance migrant
workers. The smallest star indicates Liaocheng, a municipal city. Most of migrant
workers in the city of Liaocheng are short-distance migrant workers.
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Part One:
Structure and Institutions
Focusing on their behavioral characteristics and integrating their occupational and
social characteristics, Chinese migrant workers have been defined as those workers
characterized by their dagong lifestyle, whereby dagong means leaving rural villages,
where they have the rights to contract farm land and build houses, and work in towns and
cities, in which they work for others in order to earn wages. Because of the economic
growth and institutional reforms since 1978 when Chinese government launched the
project of Reform and Opening-up, the number of migrant workers has been increasing
for more than three decades. According to the latest national statistics, the number of
Chinese migrant workers has reached 268.94 million in 2013.
Why have generations of rural residents joined the army of migrant workers, even
if their working and living conditions are unfavorable? What would the future of this
group people be like? This part will argue that Chinese migrant workers have constituted
a social class with a distinctive dagong lifestyle. This process is called the structuration
of Chinese migrant workers, which means the group of people (1) has a large number, (2)
possesses stable proportions in Chinese social structure, (3) has a distinctive lifestyle, and
(4) has existed and will exist for a certain period of time.
Why Chinese migrant workers have constituted a stable group of people? Though
all countries have experienced or are experiencing industrialization and urbanization
processes, it seems that only in China these processes have produced a social class of
Chinese migrant workers. So, it is important to examine the unique institutional
arrangements in China, which have contributed to the structuration of Chinese migrant
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workers as a social class. Related to the Hukou system, the differentiated citizenship
between rural and urban residents and the partial citizenship of migrant workers in cities
are still relevant to Chinese migrant workers’ life conditions and identities. Beyond the
Hukou system, household autonomy in the countryside, informal employment in cities
and towns, and market ideology also have shaped migrant workers’ life conditions and
identities.
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Chapter Two:
The Structuration of Chinese Migrant-Worker Class
As the number of Chinese migrant workers has been increasing for more than
three decades, this group of people didn’t become urban citizens immediately after they
worked in cities or launch revolutionary resistances against the institutional arrangements.
Then, what will Chinese migrant workers’ future be like? In this chapter, two dominant
perspectives on Chinese migrant works—structural transformation theories and
institutional transition theories—will be critically examined, with respect to: (a) their
explanations of the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers, and (b) their
predictions of the future of Chinese migrant workers. Based on criticizing the transitional
assumption of the two dominant perspectives, this chapter will argue that Chinese
migrant workers, as a social class, have been gradually structured into the political and
economic structure, even though some migrant workers have successfully become urban
citizens in the processes of industrialization and urbanization. This process is called the
structuration of Chinese migrant workers, which means that Chinese migrant workers
have gradually constituted a social class, who (1) exists in a large number, (2) possesses
stable proportions in Chinese social structures, (3) has a distinctive lifestyle, and (4)
stably exists for a relatively long period of time.
Transitional Perspectives on Chinese Migrant Workers
The previous studies on the rural-urban migration and migrant workers in China
could be divided into two categories—structural analyses and institutional analyses,
despite the variations within each perspective. While structural analyses focus on the
structural disparities of scarce resources, institutional analyses focus on the mechanisms
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by which scarce resources are distributed. However, the distinction is only analytical and
they are in fact overlapping with and complementary to each other.
Structural Transformations and Migrant Workers’ Future
Because the internal rural-urban migration in China involves the processes of
industrialization and urbanization, the frequently referred point is Lewis’ “dual sector
model” (Altmann 2011) in development economics. For Lewis, in developing countries,
there are two economic sectors: the traditional agricultural sector composed of
subsistence farming, handicraft workers and petty traders; and the modern industrial
sector including mines, plantations, manufacturing companies. The starting point of his
reasoning is the unlimited supply of unskilled workers because of a limited amount of
land and no capital from subsistence economy. However, because of rising capital
investments, expanding labor productivity, and increasing profits and capital
accumulation, the demand of more labor and the higher wages above subsistence level
together would draw the surplus labor from agricultural sectors (Lewis 1954).
Even though the Lewis model has been criticized, revised and elaborated by other
scholars (Ranis 2004), this model still became popular to Chinese scholars, not only
because its theoretical relevance to China’s development, but also because its prediction
of so-called “Lewis turning point.” By considering the contextual characteristics of
Chinese political economy, this Lewis model has been creatively applied to analyzing
and predicting the development of Chinese economy and labor markets. A paradigmatic
paper was published by Fang Cai (2007). Cai distinguished the factors that have
contributed to the economic growth in China in the past. These factors include the gain
from the demographic dividends, the improvement of total factor productivity, and the
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realization of comparative advantage in global economy. However, tracing these factors
is not his aim; rather, what he wanted to say is that the economic growth in China is
approaching the Lewis turning point, at which point of time the surplus labor force would
be completely absorbed by the modern industrial sector. This is because the demographic
transition has reduced the demographic dividend and thus led to a shortage of labor, all of
which will promote a unification of labor markets. Cai and Wang (2008) continued to
argue that there is no longer a large pool of surplus laborers in rural China, after most of
them have become urban citizens or migrant workers during the past three-decade
economic growth.
Since then, whether China has reached the Lewis turning point has become a hot
topic in academic research, which focuses on whether China still have surplus labor in
the countryside. Kwan (2009) indicates that there are still a large number of surplus
labors in rural China. Knight, Deng and Li (2011) indicate that while there are migrant
labor scarcities and rising migrant wages, there is still a considerable pool of relatively
unskilled labor available in the agricultural sector. However, the basic logic underpinning
these studies is same. As to the explanation of the emergence of Chinese migrant workers,
it argues that the surplus labors in rural-agricultural sectors are drawn to the urbanindustrial sectors by the higher wages in cities. As to the future of Chinese migrant
workers, it implies that Chinese migrant workers will integrate to the industrial sector
when the balance between supply and demand of labor is stricken. This logic also
supported other concepts such as “under-urbanization” and “incomplete urbanization,”
which also argued that the urbanization process should go exponentially with the
industrialization process (Chang and Brada 2006). The question is that why surplus labor
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from the countryside has become migrant workers with dagong lifestyle. Another
question is that whether migrant workers from countryside will shed their dagong
lifestyle when there is a balance between supply and demand. Of course, there is still a
question about the definition and number of surplus labors in rural sectors.
Institutional Transitions and Migrant Workers’ Future
Actually, the structural analysis did not ignore the institutional differences in
different countries. The Lewis model also has its institutional assumptions—“the faith
and optimism in market-driven capitalist development” (Huang 2009: 414). Those
scholars assessing the number of surplus labors in rural sectors also considered the
institutional arrangements in the countryside (Knight, et al. 2011; Kwan 2009; Tao, et al.
2011; Chan 2010a). However, the importance of institutional analysis derives from the
fact that though industrialization will draw on the labor force of rural primary to
secondary and tertiary industries, institutional arrangements might cause different paths
of urbanization. For example, Meng and Manning (2010) indicate that though China and
Indonesia face similar structural transformations, the state policies have led to different
consequences: in Indonesia, free rural-urban migration has resulted in a large number of
urban poor people, who take jobs in informal sectors and live in urban slums; in China,
an internal “guest worker” system with state control on the migration process has
prevented the emergence of urban poor people but made a huge number of rural migrant
workers who maintain some connections with their home villages. As to the explanation
of the formation of Chinese migrant workers, the institutional analyses emphasize the
institutional transition since the late 1970s when China started the Reform and OpeningUp policies.
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Analytically, structural analyses focus on the distribution of scarce resources
among different groups of people, while institutional analyses concentrate on the
mechanisms through which the scarce resources are distributed in such a way that social
actors might accept the unequal distribution of income and rights. With respect to
Chinese migrant workers, three mechanisms or institutions were emphasized in previous
studies. The mechanism of markets has been stressed by the market transition theory.
From this perspective, Zhan (2011) argued that the importance of Hukou has declined
substantially due to Hukou reforms and other socioeconomic changes, and that the
market has become the most important factors in limiting migrant workers’ life chances.
Though the market has played a positive role of peasants by helping them get improved
means of making a living, the market also places them in a disadvantaged position
because most of them have limited marketable resources, as compared with urban
residents. Specifically, migrant workers lack two important types of resources: human
capital, including education and marketable skills, and economic capital, including
income and property. The mechanism of the state is emphasized by the state policy
theory. As to the labor market for the migrant workers, the state industrialization
strategies have been treated as the fundamental, influential factor because changes of
state industrialization strategy have influenced the Hukou reform, rural policies, urban
policies, economic organizations and so on (Solinger 1999; Chan 2008; 2009). Related to
state industrial strategy, Hukou system and its reforms have direct influences. Fan even
treats “Hukou system” as a paradigm to explain the internal circular migration in China
(Fan 2008). The mechanism of social culture is stressed by the social exclusion theory.
Zhan (2011) pointed out that besides markets social exclusion is another factor that
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determines the migrant workers’ life chances in cities. Specifically, identity-based
exclusion and separated social networks reduced migrant workers’ economic
opportunities. It has become a commonsense that migrant workers have become an
integral part of cities in present China. Social exclusion happens through labor market
segmentation, with migrant workers concentrating in labor-intensive industries, such as
construction, manufacture, service and so on (Wang, et al. 2002).
These institutional analyses were also related to the viewpoint about the future of
Chinese migrant workers, because whether they accept these institutions would determine
their responses. Two viewpoints about their future could be distinguished: conservative
and radical. Conservative scholars believe in the effect of institutional transitions, in
which the state has reformed and will continue to change the barriers to job creation and
labor participation, and the market will play a more fundamental role in regulating the
employment relationship, labor mobility and wages (Cai, et al. 2008).

The market

mechanisms, especially the price lever in the interaction between demand and supply of
labor, will gradually influence migrant workers’ bargaining power and employment term.
For example, migrant workers’ higher turnover rate has been treated as a kind of strategy
by migrant workers to improve their market status (Han 2011; Wang and Wu 2010).
Radical scholars argue that the capitalist development and marketization process
had made a new working-class of rural migrant workers as China becomes the “World’
factory,” the process was called “semi-proletarianization” (Ngai and Lu 2010).
Furthermore, both state policy and market exchange have contributed to the labor
struggles initiated by the new-working class. For example, Ngai et al. (2009) argued that
the state-driven economic development was accompanied by a state withdrawal from the
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areas of social reproduction and social protection. Lee (2007) argued that the migrant
workers in Sunbelt of China have gradually recognized their legal rights and become a
Marxist-type working class, which has caused labor movements to rise up against the
capitalists and local governments. From a global perspective on the struggle between
capital and labor, Silver applied his framework of the relationship between globalization
and workers’ movement to China. She thought China was thought as an emerging
epicenter of labor unrest because “where capital goes, conflict follows,” as spatial fix and
technological fix have made China a part of global capitalist system (Silver 2003; Silver
and Zhang 2009).
Comments on Transitional Perspectives
The two analytically distinct perspectives—structural analysis and institutional
analysis—are not only complementary, but also based on a common foundation: both
adopt a transitional stance with respect to the future of Chinese migrant workers. For
example, in both perspectives, it has become popular to distinguish old-generation (or
first-generation) from new-generation (or second-generation) migrant workers to describe
the heterogeneity within the group of migrant workers (Yue, et al. 2010; Ngai and Lu
2010). This distinction has pointed to the changes of migrant workers’ consciousness and
actions, which implies that the migrant workers will take actions to resist the institutional
arrangements and thus change their working and life conditions. Speaking in a milder
tone, Wang Xingzhou (2008) argued that new-generation migrant workers had posed a
challenge to both company management and social structure, because they have a
weakening connection with rural villages, a lower identification and evaluation of social
condition, a better knowledge of law, and a clear awareness of their rights. More radically,
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some argued that in the process of proletarianization new-generation migrant workers, as
a new working class, have become more and more conscious of their interest and rights
and thus participate in various forms of interest-based or class-oriented labor protests
(Chan and Ngai 2009; Lee 2007).
The problem with this transitional stance is their explanatory deficit, which is
related to their ideological assumptions. That is, the transitional stance could not explain
why the number of Chinese migrant workers has been increasing for more than three
decades with the high rate of economic growth and urbanization. If this increase could be
defined as a stage of a long-term transformation, then how long the transition will be.
How long could be defined as a “transition” or “transformation” process? Whether the
institutional reforms were trustable or believable is still a controversial issue. Some have
argued that the Chinese reforms have been trapped in a “partial reform equilibrium,”
which means that a small group of ruling elite has captured the fruit of economic growth
and will impede further fundamental reforms (Pei 2006; Hellman 1998). Finally, nearly
all scholars on labor protests admitted that “labor rebellion largely remained tame and
nonmilitant” because of the institutional arrangements such as household responsibility
system in rural villages (Lee 2007: 204). These explanatory deficits are closely related to
their ideological assumptions. The structural analysis and its associated conservative
viewpoints believe in the market mechanism and argue for the urbanization associated
with industrialization, while the radical viewpoints advocate for social equality and rights
of Chinese migrant workers.
The above analyses about the study on Chinese migrant workers also indicate a
paradigmatic shift from migration and urbanization to class process. As class-formation
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analysis demonstrated, Chinese migrant workers have started to constitute a social class
in the Thompsonian sense with their consciousness and protests (Lee, 2007; Thompson,
1966; Chan and Ngai, 2009). However, the exclusive focus on the process of developing
class-for-itself has narrowed down the scope of class analysis, for example, how about
the class-in-itself nature of Chinese migrant-work class? So, it is helpful to treat Chinese
migrant workers as a new working class. However, this requires recognizing various class
processes

besides

the

class-formation

process.

Though

there

are

different

conceptualizations of the term “class” in academic and popular spheres (Crompton, 2008;
Savage, 2000), this chapter will treat Chinese migrant workers as a working class with
their distinctive dagong lifestyle, which distinguishes them from other workers like
traditional SOE workers and influences their life chances and social interactions.
Empirical Evidence: the Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
The transitional perspectives cannot explain why the number of Chinese migrant
workers has been increasing for more than three decades. It is reasonable to say that the
group of Chinese migrant workers is not a transitional or transient phenomenon. Or, at
least we could see that the Chinese migrant worker should not be understood as a
transitional or transient phenomenon, because Chinese migrant workers have made up a
structural stratum in the social structure of China since late 1970s when China began its
reform and opening-up policies. Here, the structuration means the emergence of a social
class, who (1) has a large number, (2) possesses stable proportions in Chinese social
structures, (3) has a distinctive lifestyle, and (4) stably exists for a relatively long period
of time. Generally speaking, the structuration of Chinese migrant workers means that
there are a number of social positions occupied by a group of people, which have existed
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and will last for a certain historical period. Specifically, this structuration has three
aspects. Economically speaking, Chinese migrant workers have become a structural
element in both external and internal labor markets in China. Socially speaking, Chinese
migrant workers have become a group of people who are characterized by their distinct
lifestyle. Politically and speaking, Chinese migrant workers have been defined as a group
of people by state and scholars, and based on this definition, many state policies aim to
deal with the problems of Chinese migrant workers. On the other hand, Chinese migrant
workers have become a regular force to influence state policies and make the government
continuously be reforming institutional arrangements.
The economic dimension of the structuration of Chinese migrant workers
The existence of a group of people needs material goods to feed them; that is, the
existence of Chinese migrant workers is first of all their economic existence. Chinese
migrant workers exist as a kind of worker in China; that is, Chinese migrant workers earn
their living through working. As Althusser (1971: 127) said, “every social formation
arises from a dominant mode of production…the process of production sets to work the
existing productive forces in under definite relation of production.” The Chinese migrant
workers also need means of production to work and feed them.
“Fortunately,” the economic growth in China since late 1970s has produced the
productive forces and enabled Chinese migrant workers to work and feed themselves. In
the institutional transition process since the late 1970s, there are four main sources of
capital—Township and Village-Owned Enterprises (TVEs), private enterprises, foreign
investment and reformed State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), all of which have provided
means of production for migrant workers and thus contributed to the structuration of
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Chinese migrant workers. One cannot say more on the role of TVEs to absorb the surplus
labors from agricultural sectors.
Within Chinese industrial structure, migrant workers concentrated in laborintensive industries, including manufacturing, construction and service industries (Wong,
et al. 2007). Furthermore, this industrial distribution didn’t change much in the past
decades. In 2002, Wang Feng et al. investigated rural migrant workers in Shanghai and
found that migrant workers concentrated in sale/trade/restaurant services, manufacturing,
and construction. According to the latest survey by the National Bureau of Statistics, the
industrial distribution of migrant workers largely remains the same, despite a few
changes across years (Table 4). All of these indicate that Chinese migrant workers have
become a structural element in Chinese industrial structure in the past decades.
On the supply side, the employment opportunities described above have attracted
surplus labors from rural agricultural sectors, which produced both rapid urbanization and
increasing migrant workers. It should be noted here that some migrant workers have
become urban residents, but the personal social mobility that might have happened didn’t
influence the structuration of Chinese migrant workers because social structure largely
exist independent from personal mobility. The proportion of migrant workers out of total
urban employments could be used as an indicator to describe that Chinese migrant
workers have grown to be a structural element of Chinese labor forces (Table 5).
The social dimension of the structuration of Chinese migrant workers
All kinds of workers are not merely workers, who just exist as labors at the
moment of production. Matthew Watson (2005) criticizes and goes beyond the “states
and Markets” approach, arguing that economic agents are moral agents along with Adam
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Smith. He agrees with Thorsten Veblen on the habituating effects on action of life. He
adopted the concept of social embeddedness of individuals from Karl Polanyi. Similarly,
Althusser (1971) also emphasized the social existence and social reproduction of labor
power. As to Chinese migrant workers, Ching Kwan Lee also adopted Michael
Burawoy’s notion of “Labor regime” to describe the holistic existence of Chinese labor
forces, as this notion could link “state regulations of labor and the social reproduction of
labor power to workplace control of workers’ capacity for resistance” (Lee 2007;
Burawoy 1976; 1983). Examining the migrant workers’ personal experiences, here it is
argued that the Chinese migrant workers have been structured as a social group of people
with their distinctive lifestyle, which includes their life conditions at the moments of both
production and reproduction.
Various rural connections

All migrant workers are from agricultural sectors

and have some connections with rural villages. The connections with rural villages is also
the reason why migrant workers move between their hometowns and cities more or less
frequently. This connection could be of economic nature, which could contribute to the
social reproduction of labor power. As Ching Kwan Lee’s (2007) case studies indicate,
when plant closure or relocation happened, the financial pressure could drive migrant
workers to go home for a short term visits, which could at least guarantee subsistence.
According to Lee, what makes this possible is the system of land use rights and land
contracts in the household responsibility system which emerged in the late 1970s and
gradually extended nationwide. The continued connections with rural villages are also of
a social network phenomena maintaining solidarity. The split household strategy adopted
by rural families usually involves leaving some family members in rural villages. The
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separation of family members is the main source of especially strong social connections
of migrant workers with rural villages. For example, C. Cindy Fan and Wenfei Winnie
Wang distinguished three models of division of labor employed by migrant workers’
households, including “inside-outside” model, “dual migrants” model and “second
generation” model; all of these models involve some household members working in
cities and other staying behind in villages; furthermore, all of these models have led to
the high circularity of migrant workers between rural and urban areas (Fan and Wang
2008).
However, migrant workers’ connections with rural villages are of double nature.
As to the land use right, migrant workers treat it as both an asset and a liability (Lee
2007). When treated as an asset, the land use right is a kind of privilege or entitlement
which could serve as a social protection and state provision. When treated as a liability,
the land use right could be a burden which made them not completely abandon their rural
lives and migrate to cities. As to the relationship with rural villages, social ties could be
both a place of protection and a force of exclusion. For example, in Pun Ngai and Lu
Huilin’s (2010) case study, the informant returned to his hometown because he wasn’t
treated like a human being in Shenzhen and felt he had no prospects. He went back to his
hometown hoping that he would receive treatment as a human being and start his own
business. Though some of his relatives and neighbors supported his plan, his father, a
typical farmer, knew that there was no future in agricultural production and opposed his
plan. Finally it turned out that his father was right and he returned to cities.
Marginalized urban life Migrant workers go to cities to work, but their jobs are
marginalized jobs as they are distained by urban residents. As to migrant workers’ jobs,
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they concentrate in physically demanding jobs or they work as manual labors, which are
usually disdained by urban residents (Wang, et al. 2002). So, the occupations taken by
migrant workers have low prestige, such as domestic worker, security staff, porter, and
construction worker, and so on (Li 2012). Their jobs are very unstable, with some of
them being day labors and some of them changing jobs for many times a year. The
working conditions at workplace are usually not clean and safe. They work over-time
frequently (Lü 2013; Loyalk 2013; Pai 2012; Luyn 2008).
Migrant workers’ life conditions in cities are also marginalized, with respect to
their consumption, residence, and children’s education. Taking living conditions as an
example, most local migrant workers commute between the countryside and the city
every day. Especially in TVEs, migrant workers work in towns in daytime but live in
villages at night (Larus 2010; Wu 2012; Li 2008). For those long-distance migrant
workers, there are two residence models: dormitories provided by factory and informal
settlements they rent from local residents (Lü 2013). Wherever they live, they are largely
separated from the mainstream city life. So, in cities, a rural-urban dualism has
transformed into a new dualism in the cities, because a fragmented spatial form of
Chinese cities could be found: on the one hand, migrant workers live in informal
settlements in urban villages (chengzhongcun); on the other hand, urban citizens live in
modern apartments surrounded by shopping malls, supermarkets and office buildings
(Wu 2012; Fan 2011; Madrazo and Kempen 2012; Zhang 2011).
To conclude by Li Qiang’s (2012) concept of “ternary social structure” caused by
Chinese migrant workers. According to Li, in the whole Chinese history, there has been a
rural-urban differentiation in Chinese social class structure, especially after the
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establishment of the Hukou system in 1950s. However, the emergence of rural migrant
workers resulted in a ternary social structure, which was composed of three social groups:
urban residents, rural residents, and migrant workers. He didn’t think migrant workers as
a class, but as a status group; but Chinese migrant workers could be thought as a social
class, if we define a social class as a group of people who have a distinctive lifestyle and
relation to the mode of production. Furthermore, the lifestyle includes nearly every aspect
of their lives. For example, Gan Mantang described the main dimensions of Chinese
migrant workers’ lifestyle (table 6).
The Political Dimension of the Structuration of Chinese migrant workers
Politically speaking, Chinese migrant workers have become a part of political
discourse, a target of state policies and a force to influence state actions.
The definition of Chinese migrant workers by the state In order to avoid the
confusion of the logic of things with the things of logic and the confusion of theoretical
group with practical group, Bourdieu (1987: 13-15) announces that he “finds again, but in
a completely transfigures form, the problem of the ontological status of social class, and,
for that matter, of all social groups,” that is, it is through an “endless work of
representation,” “the definition of the boundaries between groups” and “the very
definition of the groups” that a social group could exist and become a political force.
Practical groups or functioning groups depends on the groups defined as such. So how
Chinese migrant workers have politically become structured depends on a cultural
definition about them. Politically and culturally speaking, the structuration of Chinese
migrant workers could firstly be found in the definition of Chinese migrant workers as a
social group by both the state and academic scholars. Actually, the structural and
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institutional analyses could be treated as the definitions of Chinese migrant workers
presented in the academic field. Those definitions have a paradox in common: on the one
hand, there is a characteristic group of migrant workers that has emerged in China’s
industrialization process and, on the other hand, Chinese migrant workers are a
transitional or transient phenomenon, which would disappear with structural
transformation, institutional reform or labor struggles.
How has the state defined “Chinese migrant workers”? There are two discourses,
which are to some extent contradictory and dialect. First, the state re-emphasized the goal
of four modernizations—modernization in the fields of agricultural, industry, national
defense, and science and technology—on December of 1978 at the Third Plenum of the
11th Central committee. 8 Since then modernization, development, industrialization, and
urbanization have become the dominant discourse in China, though the wording and
contents of this discourse have changed. Under this development discourse, the rural
development, the improvement of agricultural productivity, and the labor movement are
good things for China’s modernization project. This is also why the state has adopted
more and more open policies to migrant workers. On the other hand, the gradualist
transition from a planned economy to a market economy also needs social stability. So,
more practically, the state issued regulations to manage migrant workers’ movement, for
the reasons of the lack of urban capacity to bear a larger population, traffic jam, urban
poor, and increasing crime rate and so on (2011). However, since the beginning of the
reform in late 1970s, the migrant workers, as a group of people, have been in the eyes of
policy makers, which make the existence of migrant workers in political agenda. For

8

The “Four Modernizations” was initially announced by Zhou Enlai (the Premier at that time) to the first
session of the Third National Congress in the December of 1946.
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example, in the November of 1977, the State Council has approved the document “On
Dealing with Hukou Transformations” proposed by the Ministry of Public Security.
State policies towards Chinese migrant workers

The government also

introduced regulations particularly targeted at migrant workers. However, there are three
stages of policy making toward migrant workers. However, all of these policies are to
permit and serve the existence of migrant workers, rather than to eliminate migrant
workers by pre-reform system or completing remove that system. The first stage is the
pendulum between permission and limitation. The symbolic documents of the first stage
are the No. 1 Document of 1984 and the No. 1 document of 1985. Both documents
admitted the positive role played by migrant workers and gave the approval of migration
and work to migrant workers. However, the second stage, from permission to
management, immediately started by the “Temporary Regulation on Urban Temporary
Residents,” which require those who live for more than 3 months to get temporaryresidence permit. The end of the second stage is signified by the “Announcement on
Completely Canceling Fees for Migrant workers” jointly issued by the National Planning
Commission and the Treasury Department, which eliminated seven fees collected from
migrant workers.
Since then, the third stage started, which characterized by the transition from
managing to serving migrant workers. A typical event during this period is that the in
2003 Premier Wen Jiabao helped a migrant worker (Xiong Deming) to get her wage from
her employer, which led to a famous photo “The Premier Helps Me Get my Wage.” 9 In
the November of 2003, the General Office of State Council issued an “Announcement on
Effectively Solving the Problem of Wage Arrears for Migrant Workers.” And in the
9

http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2011_07/06/7463853_0.shtml?_from_ralated.
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February of 2004, the Department of Construction made an urgent announcement on
“Further Solving the Problem of Wage Arrears for Migrant workers.” Since then, the rate
of wage arrears has dropped dramatically as many surveys indicated. According to a
survey in 2001 and 2005, Sun Meiyan found that the rate of wage arrears decreased from
12.0%1 in 2001 to 2.38% in 2005. According to the statistics by the National Bureau of
Statistics, the rate of wage arrears has been decreasing (figure 5). There are other service
policies for migrant workers, including employment service, children’s education, urban
planning, working conditions, and living conditions and so on. Though these policies
didn’t change the basic institutional arrangements (Li 2012; Chan and Buckingham 2008;
Huang 2011), they indeed helped “migrant workers” and maintained the existence of this
group of people.
Chinese migrant workers’ bottom-up political pressures There are more and
more studies on migrant workers’ resistance. How should we conceptualize this
resistance? Do they mean that migrant workers are not structured in Chinese structure, or
have they contributed to the structuration of Chinese migrant workers? Existing studies
indicate the resistances launched by migrant workers are another mechanism through
which Chinese migrant workers were structured.
First, the resistance particularly launched by “migrant workers” indicates that
migrant workers have some common working and life conditions, which also have led to
shared perceptions, attitudes and actions. Labor protests initiated by migrant workers
have become a type of labor protests because of their common life experiences and
institutional background. For example, Ching Kwan Lee (2007) distinguished two types
of labor protests in contemporary China: protests of desperation in rustbelt launched by
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laid-off workers in State Owned Enterprises and protests against discrimination in sunbelt
launched by migrant workers in new industrial zones. Some others directly pointed out
that migrant workers’ struggles indicate a new working-class was in making, based on E.
P. Thompson’s (1966) idea that class happens when some men feel and articulate their
interests against others (Ngai, et al. 2009; Ngai and Lu 2010).
However, the structuration of migrant workers not only means that a social group
exists, but also that the group of people exist for a relatively long period of time. If
migrant workers’ resistance suggests the existence of a new group of people, will their
resistance revolutionize the institutional arrangements that underlie their existence?
Evidences show that the group of migrant workers might exist for some time. On the one
hand, nearly all studies indicate that migrant workers’ resistance was still at the initial
stage, which also implies that this resistance could not change the basic institutional
arrangements within a short-term period. The protest processes indicate that their
resistance is still largely autonomous and not well organized, usually based on factory or
cross-factory level. Especially, they do not have their own trade unions to protect their
legal rights, as the existing trade unions are affiliating to the All Federation of Trade
Unions and are usually led by managers. The reasons or purpose of resistance is targeted
at their wages, working conditions, factory relocations, and other specific interests. The
activists would be promoted or disposed by the factories after emergent events (Cooke
2005; Chan 2008; Chan and Ngai 2009). More importantly, their everyday life is still to
work hard or eat bitterness to make money (Loyalk 2013).
Third, resistance could serve as a signal to the state, which could develop
corresponding policies to solve the problems causing resistance. But as analyzed above,
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these state policies might not change institutional arrangements and eliminate the group
of migrant workers. From the beginning, the transition from a planned regime to a market
economy took a gradualist approach, which different from the shock-therapy approach
employed by some Eastern countries (Pei 2006; Larus 2012). This could be found in
Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic idea of “crossing the river by feeling for the stones.” Ahlers
and Schubert (2011) argued that China developed an “adaptive authoritarianism”
characterized by continuous, problem-oriented institutional and ideological reforms.
Ching Kwan Lee (2013) calls it bargained authoritarianism, which includes three microfoundations

of

Chinese

authoritarianism—protest

bargaining,

legal-bureaucratic

absorption, and patron-clientelism—to deal with social unrest. In the gradual reform
process, the state has taken counter measures to solve the problems involved in migrant
workers’ resistance, so that some migrant workers treat the central government as their
protector against the corruption of local governments and the exploitation of their
employers (Wright 2010; Cai 2010).

62

Table 4. Industrial Distribution of Chinese Migrant workers (%), 2008-2012
Year

Industries

2008
Manufacturing
37.2
Construction
13.8
Transportation and logistics
6.4
Retail
9.0
Restaurant
5.5
Community service
12.2
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics (2013)
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2009
36.1
15.2
6.8
10.0
6.0
12.7

2010
36.7
16.1
6.9
10.0
6.0
12.7

2012
36.0
17.7
6.6
10.1
5.3
12.2

Table 5. The Composition of Urban Employment
Employment in Urban Area
A. Migrant workers
B. Urban employments
A/B
2002
104.7
251.6
41.62%
2003
113.9
262.3
43.42%
2004
118.2
272.9
43.31%
2005
125.8
283.9
44.31%
2006
132.1
296.3
44.58%
2007
137.0
309.5
44.26%
2008
140.4
321.0
43.73%
2009
145.3
333.2
43.60%
2010
153.4
346.9
44.22%
2011
158.6
359.1
44.16%
2012
163.4
371.0
44.04%
Sources: the numbers of migrant workers from 2002 to 2008 are from Cai and Chan
(2009); the numbers of migrant workers from 2009 to 2012 are from the National Bureau
of Statistics (2013); the numbers of urban-Hukou workers are from the China Statistical
Yearbook 10.
Year

10

http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/indexeh.htm. This is a table updated based on Cai and Chan’s
table. However, the numbers of urban-hukou workers used here are different from theirs, because the China
Statistical Year book in 2013 was also updated. However, they thought the numbers of urban employment
are the numbers of urban-hukou workers; but these numbers are total urban employments, including parttime workers, second-job workers and temporary workers.
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Table 6. Basic Conditions of Ternary Social Structure
Dimensions of
lifestyle
Employment

Income resources

Unemployment
insurance
Labor insurance
Pensions
Residence

Urban residents
Mainly in stateowned enterprises
Institutional wages
and work-unit
welfare
Yes

Yes
Social
Welfare
apartments, or
apartment bought
under government
help
Medical insurance
Public insurance
Education
Obligatory
Source: Gan, Mantang (2001)

65

Residents
Migrant workers
Mainly in non-stateowned enterprises or
self-employed
Market wages, no
work-unit welfare

Rural residents
Agricultural

Agricultural
sectors

No

No

No
Family
Rent, dormitory or
apartment bought
through market price

No
Family
Self-built

Self-support
Extra fees

Self-support
Obligatory

Figure 5. The Rates of Wage Arrears, 2008-2012
4.5%

4.1%

4.0%
3.5%
3.0%
2.5%
1.8%

2.0%

1.4%

1.5%

0.8%

1.0%
0.5%

0.5%

0.0%
2008

2009

2010

2011

Source: The National Bureau of Statistics (2013)
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Chapter Three:
Hukou System Reforms and the Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
According to Fan (2008: 11), the “Hukou paradigm” is a dominant framework in
explaining the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers. For this research,
this argument is significant because the emphasis on the Hukou system direct the
research on Chinese migrant workers to institutional analyses. Institutional analysis is
important because the same industrialization and urbanization processes can lead to
different results as a result of institutional differences. This chapter and the next one will
focus on institutional transitions and arrangements, which are related to migrant workers’
life conditions and consciousnesses. This chapter will focus on the influences of the
Hukou system, because of its importance for explaining the emergence and existence of
Chinese migrant workers.
However, there is a controversy on the role of the Hukou system for Chinese
migrant workers’ existence and future. Most scholars have argued that despite its reforms,
the Hukou system is still an institutional barrier to migrant workers’ urbanization and a
main cause of their hard lives in cities, because the agricultural Hukou status still affects
their welfare benefits (Solinger 1999; Fan 2002; Zhang 2012). However, Zhan (2011: 248)
argued that “in fact, Hukou now plays such a small role that abolishing the remnants of
the system will not improve the life chances of migrant workers significantly” because
the value of Hukou statuses has been declining with its reforms.
In order to solve this puzzle, this chapter will firstly examine the nature of the
Hukou system and its reforms. Then, it will examine the influences of the Hukou system
and its reforms on the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers. It argues
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that the Hukou system, even after its reforms, still has strong influences on Chinese
migrant workers’ emergence and existence, though some of them might not have
consciously criticized this institutional arrangement. However, it also emphasizes that the
“Hukou paradigm,” which tends to treat the Hukou system as the only institutional factor
influencing migrant workers’ emergence, existence and future, is not enough to
understand the structuration of Chinese migrant workers as a social class.
The Nature of the Hukou System
In order to understand the nature of the Hukou system, this section will briefly
examine its origin, operation, purpose and value.
The first aspect of the nature of the Hukou system is its origin: where did the
Hukou system come from? Wang (2005) traced the origin of the Hukou system to
China’s early history: the earliest Xia dynasty (21st-16th century B.C.) has initiated a
population census and household registration, and since then household registration
system have gradually become complex and perfect. However, the more recent Hukou
system developed after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949
has its own characteristics, which are also this research’s focus. In 1949, there was no
such a Hukou institution. The de facto first constitution of PRC—the Common Program
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—guaranteed its
citizen’s rights of the freedom to migrate. At first the Hukou management was just a
provisional means to maintain social order and was first established in cities (Wang 2005;
Li 2012). In August 1950, a “Provisional Regulation on the Management of Special
People” started the Hukou system. In 1951, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued
“Provisional Regulations on the PRC Hukou Management.” In 1953, new rural Hukou
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files were created to facilitate the previous urban Hukou system. However, the
provisional regulations gradually became a permanent arrangement (Lu 2003; Cheng and
Selden 1994). In 1955, the State Council of PRC required local governments to establish
permanent Hukou system. Finally, on January 9, 1958, the ninety-first meeting of the
Standing Committee of the First National People’s Congress passed the “Regulations on
Household Registration (Hukou) in the PRC,” which was considered as the starting point
of a mature Hukou system. This analysis on the origin of the Hukou system indicates that
the Hukou system is a state project, an institutional arrangement created and reinforced
by the state.
The second aspect of the nature of the Hukou system is its operation. At its
surface, Hukou is a classification system of individuals based on their family origins and
geographical locations. More generally, Wang (2005) pointed out four ways to divide
(and exclude) the population of a country: according to “who you are,” “what you have,”
“where you are,” and “what you do/did.” He also thought China’s Hukou system is a
division based on “where you are.” In the Hukou system, Chinese nationals’ personal
Hukou was categorized by two criteria—Hukou type and residential location. The Hukou
type was divided into agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou and residential location is
the place of Hukou registration with respect to administrative units in the central-local
hierarchical structure (Attané 2002; Chan 2009; Lu 2003). Besides the Hukou types and
residential location, Hukou registration also distinguishes permanent and temporary
Hukou and records the history of migration. There were special bureaus of public security
in charge of Hukou registration at each administrative level (Lu 2003; Wang 2005).
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The third aspect of the nature of the Hukou system is its purpose. If the Hukou
system is created and implemented by the state, then why did the state build the Hukou
system? It is important because its design, functions and consequences mostly depend on
the meaning attached by its designer and implementer, though there are unexpected
consequences. If the Hukou system was just to make it easy to collect information, then
its design would be very simple, its function would be to collect more accurate
information, and its consequences for citizens’ lives would be limited. However, the
purpose of creating the Hukou system was much broader than information collection.
Generally speaking, after the foundation of PRC the communistic state’s purpose of
institutional designs is to control all of the population, materials, power and thoughts in
the country so that the state could organize them (White 1993; Naughton 2007; 2008;
Brandt and Rawski 2008). The Hukou system is originally designed to control population
migration so that they could maintain social order, as the industrialization has led a large
number of peasants to leave the countryside for cities, but they were defined as “blind
flows” in official documents (Chan 2009; Liu 2008; Li 2012). For example, the
conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural Hukou was only possible through stateowned enterprises employment, land expropriation, higher education, administrative
promotion, crises-caused relocation, army recruitment (Chan 2009).
The fourth aspect of the nature of the Hukou system is the value of Hukou
statuses. If the purpose of the state to make the Hukou system was to control population
migration, did a person’s Hukou status influence their life conditions? The value of
Hukou statuses refers to these influences. This question also involves other social
institutions which, together with the Hukou system, have affected how other resources
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are distributed between populations with different Hukou statuses. Zheng (2003) argued
that the Hukou system was just a secondary social institution, which divided the China’s
population to status groups together with class statuses, employment statuses, and
property-ownership. According to Yang and Cai (2003), Hukou system was an integral
part of the Big Push industrialization strategy. In order to promote industrialization, the
socialist state adopted three institutions, which mutually supported one another. The three
institutions are the compulsory procurement and the monopoly of sales of farm products,
the rural collective system, and the Hukou system that controlled population mobility.
Chan (2009; 2010) treated the Hukou system as a major institutional pillar underlying the
deep rural-urban chasm in China. So, together with other social institutions of economic
production, social redistribution, and political organization and so on, the Hukou system
has caused a system of dual citizenship between rural and urban residents. This is true for
all four types of citizenship rights and responsibilities outlined by Janoski (1998),
including legal, political, social, and participatory rights and responsibilities.
To conclude, the Hukou system is a state project, through which the state has
tightly controlled the population’s migration in the communistic era, and which also
provided a basis for the state to organize its citizens and other resources. This definition
emphasizes its role of controlling population migration, but the value of Hukou statuses
depends on other institutional arrangements. So, this definition distinguishes the Hukou
system from other institutional arrangements such as the economic organizations, social
redistributions, employment relationships, and educations in both rural and urban areas.
Figure 6 illustrates this nature of the Hukou system in China by emphasizing its role of
migration control and linking the migration control to other social institutions. Though
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nearly all aspects of rural and urban residents’ lives have been divided by their Hukou
statuses, other institutions and the Hukou system are different, because even though the
Hukou system remained the same, other institutional arrangements in both rural and
urban areas have been changed, especially before the state launched the Reform and
Opening-Up policies in 1978. For example, when the state started to control population
migration, the commune system in rural areas and work-unit system in cities hadn’t been
developed. Similarly, when the Household Responsibility System was implemented in
rural areas in early 1980s, the Hukou system remained the same (Larus 2012; Unger
2002).
This definition and distinction are also important for explaining the emergence
and existence of Chinese migrant workers. The “Hukou paradigm” tends to treat the
Hukou system as the only institutional arrangement relevant to migrant workers, if the
Hukou system was defined broadly by including all other institutional arrangements. This
tends to underemphasize the role of other institutional arrangements in explaining the
emergency and existence of Chinese migrant workers, because they are only accessories
to the Hukou system in the tendency.
Focusing on the role of the Hukou system for migration control, the following
sections will examine its reforms and their influences on Chinese migrant workers. The
next chapter will talk about other institutional arrangements and their effects.
The Reforms of the Hukou System
The above investigation only focuses on the Hukou system constructed after the
foundation of the PRC and before its reforms in early 1980s. How about its reforms?
Because the Hukou system was a state project, its reforms are also state actions which
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have changed the system. Because the Hukou system was to control population
migrations, its reforms were also relevant to population migrations. There are four main
trends of its reforms: the control of population migration was loosened, the value of
Hukou statuses was reduced, the administration of Hukou registration was localized, and
the purpose of the Hukou system was re-directed.
As to migration control, in 1978 and 1979 measures were taken to tighten
migration approval procedures and to limit contract workers from countryside in cities
(Lu 2004; Chan 2009). However, in the 1980s a series of regulations and decrees were
issued to adjust the Hukou system. A landmark document in the history of the Hukou
system is the “Notice on the Issue of Peasants Moving to Reside in Small Towns,”
published by the State Council on October 13, 1984 11. This notice created a new kind of
Hukou status—Hukou with self-supplied food grain, which was the Hukou for farmers
migrating to small towns without state-provided grain distribution. The creation of this
new type of Hukou status indicated that farmers’ migrations were allowed. On July 13,
1985, MPS (Ministry of Public Security) made “Provisional Regulations on the Hukou
Management of Temporary Urban Residents,” which built temporary urban-resident
permit and officially allowed those temporary migrants with legitimate businesses or
employments to migrate to cities. Since then, the control of population migration has
been lifted up, even though the Hukou system still existed. On May 6, 2013, the new

11

On January 1, 1984, the “Decisions on Works in Rural areas in 1984” by the Central Committee of CCP
has said, each province, autonomous regions and direct-controlled municipalities were allowed to build test
sites, in which farmers could get Hukou with self-supplied food grain in towns.
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Premier Li Keqiang chaired a State Council Executive Meeting, on which he proposed a
“Residence Permit System” and “reforming the Hukou system categorically” 12 .
The value of Hukou statuses have declined. As pointed above, the value of Hukou
statuses depends on other institutions, which have related resource distributions to Hukou
statuses. However, as markets played more and more important roles in resource
distribution and the state retreated from several social areas, the values of Hukou
statuses—associated resources with Hukou statuses—have been declined. For example,
in 1992 the policy of food grain rationing was ended, which means the social welfare
benefits associated with Hukou statuses had been reduced. However, there are still many
social welfare benefits associated with Hukou statuses, which will be discussed in the
part of “differential citizenship” and “semi-citizenship” of the next chapter.
The management of Hukou system has become localized and hierarchical. In
August, 1992, MPS published the “Notice on Locally-Effective Hukou Statuses,” which
allowed the local governments to make their own policies with respect to Hukou
registration and conversion. This has led to a new “blue Hukou document” to distinguish
from nationwide “red Hukou document.” This also caused the phenomena of selling and
buying urban Hukou during 1990s (Solinger 1999; Liu 2008). Comparing with traditional
Hukou system, these policies have made it possible and easier for citizens to migrate to
and live in cities. However, the Hukou policies are also differentiated according to the
administrative levels of cities. Since beginning, population migration and Hukou
conversion were only allowed in small towns. Gradually, these policies were extended to
middle-sized cities. At present, migration control and Hukou conversion are still strictly

12

General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic China, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/201305/06/content_2396810.htm.
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limited in large cities. In November, 2013, the decisions of the third plenum of the
Eighteenth Congress of CCP still regulated that population growth in large cities should
be strictly controlled 13 . However, those cities at higher administrative levels are also
places where migrant workers are concentrated.
Finally, the purpose of the Hukou system was re-directed to economic
development. Correspondingly, the criterion for Hukou conversion was also changed to
economic standards (Chen 2008). Huang (2010) and Pei (2008) argued that the predatory
government in China had led to local governments’ informal practices for economic
profits. These predatory practices are to promote economic prosperity. So the local
governments lower the labor cost to promote investments. One of the measures to lower
the labor cost is to control the farmers’ permanent migration from other areas, so that
they could reduce their public spending.
The Hukou system and the emergence of Chinese migrant workers
From the above analysis, we find that by and large, the problem of internal
migration is the problem of Hukou system in the People’s Republic of China, because the
Hukou system was initially design to control internal migration between urban and rural
areas and between different locations. It is the creation of Hukou system that internal
migration was restricted; it is the change of Hukou system that internal migration was
encouraged; and it is the future of Hukou system that reflects further economic
development, state capacity and internal migration. As the reforms of the Hukou system
have removed the barriers to population migration, some scholars argued that the Hukou
system is no longer relevant to the life chances of Chinese migration workers (Zhan
2011). Furthermore, the value of the urban Hukou has been declined, especially in more
13

http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm
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developed areas, so some migrant worker do not want to change their Hukou statues
(Chan 2010; Wen 2002; Zhu 2007).
Somewhat consistent with these studies, this research also finds that the reforms
of the Hukou system have gradually lifted the barriers to population migration. This has
made the dagong lifestyle a possible way for rural and migrant people to meet their needs.
This is true both for the first- and second-generation migrant workers.
Qiang was fifty years old and was a first-generation migrant worker. As most
other migrant workers, he used to work for many companies and in many cities. He first
worked in Liaocheng City in 1988 for a state-owned construction company. He told me
in the communistic regime nobody worked in cities except for the command from above.
When I asked him why he didn’t work in the city before, he said,
“There was almost nobody working in cities at that time. I thought I was
the one of a few who firstly worked in cities (…) I don’t know why only
few people work in cities, probably there were no opportunities (…)
Before I worked in cities, I was a carpenter in the production team of my
village. I could work as carpenter to earn units of work, which determined
a family’s benefits (…) Sometimes, I was required to work outside the
commune and worked together with other skillful farmers. At that time I
knew several friends, some of whom were technicians from the city (…)
Then, a friend I knew introduced me to work in the construction company.”
As he was a craftsman in the commune, I asked him why he didn’t do
something else to earn money by his own skill. He mentioned the organizational
arrangements in rural communities, which were an integral part of the
communistic institutional. He said it was forbidden to exit the production team
and work in cities in the Maoist era:
“We craftsmen were also organized into the production team. The
organization assigned task to us. If the team didn’t have anything for us to
do, we still need work on farm land. I was not allowed to do anything else.
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Everything I did was assigned by the production team, who might also
have followed the order from the village or commune.”
For the first-generation migrant workers, to dagong is an acceptable means based
on their personal experiences of the reforms of migration policy. Qiang was forbidden to
freely move at first, and then he was allowed to work in cities. It was the loosened
migration control that enabled him to work in cities. However, we can also find that
migration control goes beyond the Hukou system and involves economic organization in
both rural and urban areas. This also implies that it is not enough only to examine the
Hukou system, in order to understand the institutional background of the emergence of
Chinese migrant workers.
For the second-generation migrant workers, to dagong becomes acceptable
because they treat it as an alternative to education and agricultural production. Even
before they become migrant workers, they have felt that to dagong is their only choice
because they thought they lacked human capital. For example, Long was born in 1984.
He has worked in cities for ten years. After he graduated from the primary middle school,
he went to the local city and worked as a migrant worker. I asked him why he didn’t
continue his education. He gave me two reasons: first, he didn’t like studying, and second,
he thought education is useless.
“I took the entrance exam to a higher middle school. But I failed. I got a
very low score. It is impossible for me to pass the exam (…) I think at that
time I just didn’t like studying. So, I didn’t study (…) Probably, not
[higher education cannot give him a brighter future]. You know, now even
college students are hard to find jobs. Some of them even become cashiers
(…)”
On the other hand, even when he was at school, he has learned about the
dagong lifestyle as a reasonable alternative to education. I asked him “did you
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have any plan before you graduated, when you felt that you were tired of
studying?” He said,
“To dagong. To make money (…) It seemed that I had no other choices if
I could not continue my education. My parent told me I would have to
dagong if I didn’t work hard. My teacher said to me that I had to work
hard if I didn’t want to dagong. Actually, I was ready to dagong even
before I graduated (…) They are right because I can only go to dagong if I
could not continue my education. But they are wrong because one might
be unable to find a good job even if s/he went to colleges. But to dagong
can bring money to me.”
I also asked about his opinion on agricultural production. He expressed a
kind of superiority because he had more options.
Fayin: “How about agricultural production?”
Long: “I felt I would feel more comfortable doing agricultural production
than to study in schools.”
Fayin: “How did you think about to dagong, compared with agriculture?”
Long: “At least, I have another choice besides agricultural production. To
dagong can make more money.”
Long is a second-generation migrant worker, who was born after the state
launched the Reform and Opening-up Policies. So, he didn’t personally experience the
tight migration control in the communistic regime. However, reforms of the Hukou
system, especially loosened migration control, also influenced his choices. Furthermore,
as migration control was lifted, to dagong has become a reasonable and inevitable choice
for adolescents even when they are still in schools. However, the Hukou system and its
reforms are not the only factor which can explain the emergence of migrant workers. The
case of Long indicates that education and culture also matter (Wills 1977). It seems that a
culture has developed. In this culture, to dagong is an unavoidable and natural outcome
because of the lack of human capital. As schooling is thought as boring, some students
have become ready to become migration workers before they left school. Both schooling
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and parents have told children the possibility to dagong, which would become reality if
they could not continue their education.
The Hukou System and the Existence of Chinese Migrant Workers
If the emergence of Chinese migrant workers is related to migration control
through the Hukou system, their existence is related to the value of Hukou statues, which
depend on associated social institutions with the Hukou system. According to Han (2007),
there were two futures for migrant workers: to become farmers or urban citizens. This
implies that the existence of migrant workers means they are not complete farmers or
typical workers. How has the present Hukou system contributed to the existence of
migrant workers? How has the present Hukou system kept them from becoming rural
farmers or urban citizens? As migrant workers are defined as workers who still have the
possibility to do agricultural production and the reforms of the Hukou system have
removed tight migration control, the problem of their existence is why they could not
settle in cities and become urban citizens. How has the current Hukou system contributed
to the existence of Chinese migrant workers?
Of course, the right to migrate and the freedom to seek economic opportunities is
the key value associated with Hukou statuses in the Hukou system. However, there are
many other functions and values of Hukou statuses. For example, before the reforms of
the Hukou system, Hukou statuses influenced Chinese citizens’ economic organization,
food rations, employer-provided housing benefit, health care, education, marriage permits,
etc. So, besides the geographical division between rural and urban citizens, they are also
divided in political, economic and social terms. With institutional reforms in various
social spheres, the value of Hukou statuses has declined for both rural and urban citizens
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(Mallee 1995; Sia 2010; Chan 2009; Lu 2003Solinger 1999; Wang 1997; Chan 2010c).
There is much quantitative research on the influences on migrant workers’ income,
working conditions, psychological health, social welfare benefits, and living conditions in
China and so on (Han 2007; Huang 2011; Zhang 2012; Bao, et al. 2009; Mackenzie 2002;
Chen and Guo 2010). By contrast, this qualitative study is good at figuring out how
migrant workers themselves have thought about their life conditions which have been
affected by the Hukou system and its reforms.
First of all, most migrant workers knew about the Hukou system, but they didn’t
know the details of the differential citizenship between rural and urban residents. That is,
they didn’t know the exact value of Hukou statuses. When I asked my informants where
their households were registered, all of them knew the location of their Hukou
registration. But, when I asked them whether they knew detailed regulations of the
Hukou system, all of them were unclear. But they indeed feel the differentiation between
them and urban residents with respect to their citizenship and life conditions. The
following is a part of my conversation with Wang, one of my informants. He was from
Sichuan Province and working for an electronics company in Beijing. Like most of other
migrant workers, he only graduated from a primary middle school. He was 34 years old.
He got married ten years ago and had a nine-year old son. He left his wife and son in his
hometown. As all migrant workers are similar on their life conditions and perceptions, I
will use Wang as an example to illustrate the influences of Hukou statuses.
He only had a general idea about his Hukou registration but didn’t know detailed
regulations of the Hukou registration system. I asked him, “Where is your Hukou
registration? What kind of Hukou do you have?” He said “It is in my hometown. It is a
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rural-agricultural Hukou.” I asked him whether he had anything related to his Hukou
status, he said he left his Hukou Registration Book at home and only brought his personal
ID with him. But when I asked him whether he had any idea about official and legal
regulations of the Hukou registration system, he said “Official and legal regulations? Are
you kidding? How can I time to learn these things?”
He didn’t know how his Hukou status had influenced his life, but he could feel the
differences between his life conditions and urban citizens’. I asked him “Do you think
your life condition is different from urban citizens’?” He said, “Of course. With all
aspects, my life is worse than theirs.” Then I asked him what the biggest difference was,
he emphasized his immediate life conditions, his family life:
“They could live together with their family. But I cannot (…) I don’t have
enough money to support my family. I can only earn 3000 Yuan. This can
make me live better in my hometown. But it is impossible for me to live in
cities (…) I have to rent a room to live. I have to support my son’s
education. I don’t have enough money.”
However, he suddenly recognized more influences of his Hukou status on
his life conditions when I talked with him about his son’s education. He seemed
surprised when he attributed the limit on his son’s schooling to his Hukou status.
Fayin: “Are these things (including his son’s education) very expensive?”
Wang: “Sure. There is a private school in a near village. But it is too far.
Though I can pay for the education, I cannot support the whole
family. My wife has to come here to look after the child.”
Fayin: “Why not think about public schools?”
Wang: “I am not qualified because of my Hukou status.”
From outsiders’ perspective, migrant workers have many reasons to know the
Hukou system, because their Hukou statuses are still relevant to their life conditions.
However, from insiders’ perspective, that migrant workers are concerned with their life
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conditions doesn’t mean that they are concerned with the Hukou system. This is called
the uncoupling of system and life-world (Habermas 1984; 1987).
From the above conversation, we can find that migrant workers don’t have
specific knowledge about the Hukou system, but they can generally feel the difference
between them and urban residents with respect to their life conditions. Furthermore, after
thinking about the relationship between their life conditions and their Hukou statuses,
they can specifically recognize the influences of Hukou statuses. Then, how do they
explain the differentiation? The answer can be found when we talked about his
employment relationship. I asked him whether he had work-injury, health, retirement
insurance, unemployment compensation and minimum living support. He said his
employer only provided work-injury insurance.
“I work and get my pay. When I didn’t have jobs, I resorted to my friends
and asked them to introduce me new jobs. Sometimes, I go back home and
had a rest.”
When I asked him whether other workers had these insurances, he said,
“Sure. They are official employees and have “iron rice bowl” 14. Most of them are
officially employed. However, I am just temporarily employed.” Then I asked
him to explain the reason. He said,
“Most of them are technicians and graduated from colleges. They are
skillful. The company depends on them (…) I am a manual labor. I am not
as important as those technicians.”
Wang didn’t use the work “human capital.” He indeed thought he lacked human
capital, compared with technicians in “his” company. Furthermore, the Hukou system

14

“Iron rice bowl” is used to describe the lifetime employment relationship between urban residents and
state-owned enterprises before economic reforms in 1978. Actually, with the reform of state-owned
enterprises, the “iron rice bowl” has disappeared. Wang probably didn’t know this. Or he wanted to use this
phase to describe the difference between his employment and others’ official/informal employment.

82

still mattered because Hukou statuses still influence migrant workers’ life conditions.
However, from insiders’ perspective, the benefits associated with Hukou statuses are
“marketized” because they are thought as rewards to their contributions to their
companies. Again, we can find that the Hukou system alone cannot explain the existence
of Chinese migrant workers. Especially, the Hukou system cannot explain migrant
workers’ own interpretations of their life conditions.
For short-distance or local migrant workers, the small cities have fewer
limitations on Hukou conversion. That is, they are more likely to move to cities. How do
these migrant workers think about the Hukou system? Mi, whom I have talked about her
in the third chapter, also expressed her opinion on the Hukou system. She had a strong
desire to settle in the city for her child. As shown in chapter three, she recognized the
influence of their Hukou statuses on her child’s education. The following conversation
indicates her attitude to the Hukou system.
Fayin: “Just now, you said that the Hukou system still influenced your
family life especially your child’s education. Do you think it is
acceptable?”
Mi: “No. But I cannot change it.”
Fayin: “But it is important to you and your family.”
Mi: “Yes. Fortunately, it becomes easier to settle in this city. If we can
buy an apartment in the city, then we could send our children to
public school. Actually, even if we don’t have an apartment, we
still have social relationships (networks), which can help us with
our child’ education.”
Fayin: “Is it free?”
Mi: “No, we have to pay extra fee to the school.”
Fayin: “Is it fair for you?”
Mi: “No. That is why we want to migrate to the city. I believe within
several years we will have enough money to migrate to this city.”
Fayin: “Why not migrate now?”
Mi: “It seems that Hukou statuses have become meaningless. Now we
have rural Hukou, so my family contract farm land from the village.
My parents-in-law help us take care of the land. You know, land is
important.”
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Fayin: “Why is land so important?”
Mi: “At least we have a sense of security if we have some land at home.
Furthermore, with industrialization the government is expanding
cities. The government also needs land. If the government wants to
expropriate farm land, it will give compensation to us.”
Fayin: “If you migrate to the city, will you lose the farm land?”
Mi: “I think we will not immediately lose the land. Rather, our family
might not be able to contract so much land if we migrate to city.
After all, the land is not enough for such a large population in the
village. So the community has to balance the right to use farm land
among households.”
Fayin: “What is the requirement for you to settle in the city?”
Mi: “The company I am working for cannot solve this problem. I can only
migrate to cities by buying a house in the city.”
Here, we can find that the loosened migration control has made it objectively
easier. This objective possibility also leads to a subjective hope of migrating to cities.
This resonates Bourdieu’s (1979; 1980) argument that subjective hopes tend to be
consistent with objective chances. However, the reduced migration control doesn’t mean
migration is free. There are still some limitations of migration. Though the two points
might be contradictory, they together have led permanent migration to be one of migrant
workers’ goals. Again, this also indicates that the Hukou system alone is not enough to
explain migrant workers’ life conditions and consciousnesses. From an objective
perspective, the value of an urban Hukou status depends on other institutional
arrangements in cities, including the education system. From a subjective perspective,
migrant workers’ evaluation of the urban Hukou status is related to the value of the rural
Hukou status. On the other hand, the value of rural Hukou status depends on the
institutional arrangement in the countryside.
Conclusion: the Hukou Paradigm and its Limits
Because of the dominance of the Hukou paradigm in institutional analyses of
Chinese migrant workers, this chapter examined the role of the Hukou system for their
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emergence and existence. To conclude this chapter, this section will summarize the main
findings about the Hukou system and then discuss its limits.
While the traditional Hukou paradigm tends to emphasize its reforms launched by
the state, this study especially focuses on how the Hukou system and its reforms have
influenced migrant workers’ life conditions and consciousness. This investigation is
based on two distinctions: the distinction between the emergence and the existence of
Chinese migrations, and the distinction between life experiences and subjective
experiences. As to the emergence of migrant workers and their decision to dagong,
because of the removed migration control and the structural disparity between origin and
destination areas, both first- and second-generation migrant workers have thought to
dagong as a reasonable means to meet their needs, especial the direct goal of making
money. Furthermore, after they start working in cities, reforms of the Hukou system also
influence migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes toward the dagong lifestyle, which
has contributed to the existence of the group of Chinese migrant workers. For example,
reforms of the Hukou system have lowered the requirement of Hukou conversion, but
there are still some values of urban Hukou status, especially children’s public education.
So, permanent migration became a motivation to dagong. After they started working in
cities, though the Hukou system still influences their working conditions, most migrant
workers didn’t know the detail of the Hukou system. However, when they recognized the
influences of the Hukou system, they have interpreted state-provided benefits as a part of
their work rewards. They think that they could not enjoy those benefits because they lack
human capital compared with other workers.
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Though reforms of the Hukou system has lowered the requirement of Hukou
conversion but maintained some values of urban Hukou statuses, not all migrant workers
have developed the motivation to permanently migrate to cities. But facing the structural
disparities between rural and urban areas, and between different regions, why didn’t they
want to settle in cities? This question involves their family lives, which are not only
influenced by the Hukou system, but also by the rural institutions, especially land tenure
system and household organizations in villages.
After they started working in cities, why didn’t they immediately settle in cities?
This may be because they cannot earn enough money to support their family especially
for long-distance migrant workers. So, this question refers their jobs, employment
relationships, and incomes in cities. Furthermore, after they found the differentiation of
citizenship between them and urban residents, why do they understand it as a result of
human capital? This refers to their interpretive schemes. With these questions in mind,
let’s go to a new chapter to examine relevant institutional changes more completely.
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Figure 6 The nature of the Hukou System in China
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Chapter Four:
Institutional Arrangements beyond the Hukou System
As shown in the end of the last chapter about the Hukou system, the “Hukou
paradigm” is not enough to explain the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant
workers, because this paradigm tends to treat the Hukou system as the only institutional
arrangement behind this phenomenon. For example, the loosened migration control,
which was achieved through reforming the Hukou system, made to dagong a reasonable
means for farmers to meet their needs. But this logic doesn’t explicate their needs or
motivations to dagong. There are three reasons for the limits of the Hukou paradigm,
which also requires a broad institutional investigation.
First, the value of Hukou statuses and the operation of the Hukou system depend
on other institutional arrangements in contemporary China. As Yang and Cai (2003) said,
the Hukou system is just an element of a trinity of state policies to extract agricultural
products in the communistic regime. Together with collective commune system and
compulsory procurement of agricultural products, the Hukou system became a
component of the Big-Push industrialization strategy (Chan 2009). Even if the Hukou
system was broadly defined as including all social institutions resulting in the rural-urban
divide, it still needs to investigate the complex relationships between these institutional
arrangements. Otherwise, other institutions would be underemphasized. The last chapter
has adopted the term of “the value of Hukou statuses” to describe the relationship
between the household registration, the migration control and other institutional
arrangements. Similarly, the meaning and operation of the reformed Hukou system
should also be examined in broad social contexts.
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Second, the Hukou system is by no means the primary institutional arrangement.
The last chapter defined the Hukou system as “a state project, though which the state has
tightly controlled the population’s migration in the communistic era, and which also
provided a basis for the state to organize its citizens and other resources.” As far as its
origin is concerned, the Hukou system is created by the state. So the Hukou paradigm
only involves the relationship between migrant workers and the state. However, state
policies have to consider social and market forces in order to maintain its legitimacy and
survival (Sun 2004; Guo 2010; Larus 2012). The analysis of the Hukou system in the last
chapter indicates that other state policies still matter for migrant workers. But state
policies are by no means only the Hukou system and its reforms.
Third, though Hukou statuses still objectively contribute to the existence of
Chinese migrant workers, Chinese migrant workers might not subjectively and fully
understand the operation of the Hukou system. So, the Hukou paradigm is not enough to
explain their motivations and attitudes. Therefore, in order to understand how the Hukou
system has influenced the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers, it is
necessary to elaborate the mechanisms through which the Hukou system has shaped their
immediate life conditions and subjective experiences.
With this background, it is necessary to examine other institutional arrangements,
which have directly influenced Chinese migrant workers’ life and subjective experiences.
Four institutional arrangements have directly influenced migrant workers’ life conditions
and consciousness: household autonomy, differential citizenship, a regulated informal
economy, and an identity-based market ideology. All of them have influenced both
migrant workers’ life conditions and identities. The life conditions and identities together
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have influenced their motivations and attitudes, and thus their emergence and existence in
the labor market. As the chapter two to four have focused on how life conditions have
conditioned migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes, this chapter will focus on how
these institutional arrangements have shaped and framed their identities, which are very
important for their attitudes and responses. Household autonomy has strengthened their
identity as family members. The differential citizenship between rural and urban areas
and the semi-citizenship in cities have reinforced their identity as rural residents. The
regulated informal economy has resulted in their identity as guest workers. The identitybased market ideology has led to their identity as lower-level workers.
Household Autonomy
If the reform of the Hukou system involves individuals’ freedom to move within
their country, the reform of the rural organization is related to rural households’
autonomy in a market economy. The household autonomy policy has two aspects:
production autonomy and consumption autonomy. The consumption autonomy becomes
the motivation to dagong, through which households can make money to meet their
family needs. Production autonomy releases them from agricultural production with the
improvement of agricultural productivity, so that they try other ways to make money. On
the other hand, the industrialization and the Hukou reforms have provided an alternative
to agricultural production.
Since the foundation of PRC in 1949, the economic organization in rural areas has
experienced two transformations, both of which are related to land reform, the most
important means of production. The first transformation is from private farming to
collective production during the 1950s, and the second is from collective farming back to
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household production (Oi 1999). It is the second transformation that is directly related to
the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers. Before the foundation of PRC,
rural reform has been at the top of the agenda of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
because of its rural experiences. Since the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the party had
tried several collective organizations in rural areas, including mutual aid groups of a few
households, producer cooperatives of about 24 families, collective cooperatives of 40 to
200 households, and communes of many thousands of villagers. However, the disastrous
Great Leap Forward forced the party state to reorganize the rural organization and build a
relatively viable, stable, and layered system composed of production teams, brigades and
communes. At the bottom of this hierarchical structure were production teams containing
some 10 to 50 households. These production teams owned some agricultural land and
member households working together as a group. Not only was the agricultural
production collectivized, but also the social redistribution. Production teams provided a
relatively equitable redistribution of agricultural products among households. The village
brigades organized key public services, including free health care, elementary schooling,
and sustenance of orphans, widows and childless elderly (Chan et al. 1992; Ruf 1998;
Unger 2002). To conclude, production and consumption activities of rural households
were collectivized in the communistic regime, which also led to the lack of incentives
and the low efficiency of agricultural production (Unger 2002; Brandt and Rawski. 2008;
Attané 2002).
In the late 1970s, economic reforms started in the rural area, which was
characterized by de-collectivization. In the process of disbanding collective agriculture,
many experiments were conducted. Finally a household responsibility system spread over
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China’s villages. At first, households contracted production tasks and were responsible
for their allocated plots of land, which was called bao chan dao hu. Then, in the stage of
dabaogan, households could manage the land they contracted from the village and
diversify crop plantation (Unger 2002; Attané 2002). After meeting crop-quota, they
could sell their remaining products. Finally, they were free to manage their land and just
give money to the state. From January 1, 2006, agricultural tax was removed in China.
All of these indicate that rural households have become autonomous production unit. The
reorganization of labors and production means through the household responsibility
system has resulted in an improvement of agricultural productivity and a large surplus
labor forces have emerged (Cai, et al. 2008; Han 2007). All of these changes make it
possible for farmers to work in cities.
With rural reforms, rural households also became autonomous unit of
consumption, which became farmers’ own reasons to dagong. While an outsider’s
perspective in previous structural and institutional analysis largely ignored this
phenomenon, household strategy theories took it for granted. In the communistic regime,
village brigades organized key public services, including free health care, elementary
schooling, and sustenance of orphans, widows and childless elderly (Chan et al. 1992;
Ruf 1998; Unger 2002). However, after the communistic system collapsed and before a
new health care system was implemented in 2008, rural households had to pay for
expensive health care expenses. They have to pay for their children’s’ education. In the
communistic system, all households were equally poor and there were not many ways to
improve their relative status in the community. Furthermore, the household autonomy has
changed both intra- and inter-household relationships. With respect to the inter-household
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relationship, family members want to make contributions to their family so that they
could earn respect from others. Within rural communities of inter-household relationship,
they were more concerned with their relative status in the community which was
expressed by their houses, transportation, foods, and clothes and so on.
As households became autonomous, individuals were more concerned with their
family life conditions. For this reason, they all thought themselves as family members.
This is true for all migrant workers, male or female, long-distance or short-distance,
single or married, and younger or older. As the following chapters will show, household
autonomy changed people’s identities as family members and has provided Chinese
migrant workers with three kinds of motivation to dagong in cities:
1. To meet the needs of family as a whole;
2. To earn respect from other family members; and
3. To improve their families’ relative statuses in their communities.
“Regulated” Informal Employment
If the household autonomy system has given Chinese migrant workers more
motivations to dagong by strengthening their identity as family members, how would
their working and living conditions in cities be influenced by these institutional
arrangements? This section focuses on their informal employment in cities, which have
reinforced their identity as guest workers.
Informal employment is defined by their illegal and/or unregulated nature. In their
article, Castells and Portes firstly defined informal economy through comparing formal
and informal sectors:
“The informal economy is thus not an individual condition but a process
of income-generation characterized by one central feature: it is
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unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social
environment in which similar activities are regulated.” (Castells and Portes
1989: 12)
This definition emphasizes the unregulated nature of informal employment
as an income-generation process. It is based on comparing formal employment
and informal employment. That is, informal employment is defined relative to
formal employment, which exists together. With respect to Chinese migrant
workers, most scholars have defined the informal employment of migrant workers
by comparing their employment relationships with those of traditional, formal
SOEs workers in communistic regime, and they held a positive attitude to the
contribution of informal employment to the national development and personal
life conditions (Li and Tang 2002; Hu 2006).
Castells and Portes also emphasized the illicit nature of informal
employment, which was related to legal regulations:
“Some economic activities may be termed informal because of their very
nature, namely, because they are defined as criminal by the institutions of
society…When the laws concerning them are enforced, such categories
often represent sources of economic opportunity outside the pale of
institutional regulation. Criminal activities possess, however, distinct
characteristics that set them apart from those otherwise termed
informal…Those labeled “criminal” specialize in the production of goods
and services socially defined as illicit.” (Castells and Protes 1989: 15)
It seems that this definition is only to distinguish criminal employment from
informal employment, because the former involves illicit final products and the latter
doesn’t. However, illegality is treated as the key characteristics of underground economy
and informal economy (Losby, et al. 2002; Samers 2004; Wan 2009).
However, the two characteristics—illegality and unregulatedness—are not
exclusive to each other, because the illegality might be derived from not being regulated
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if the legal regulations exist, and not being regulated might be related to the absence of
legal regulations. For this research, informal employment is defined as employment
caused by not being regulated by the state, which is distinct from regulated employment
relationship by the state. However, informal employment might possess an illegal nature
if employment practices are inconsistent with existing legal regulations. On January 1,
1995, a new National Labor Law went into effect. Before that, unregulated informal
employment was not illegal because there were not universal, legal regulations as a
standard to judge the nature of informal employment. However, after that informal
employment was illegal according to the National Labor Law.
But, why is informal employment unregulated? Here we can identify four reasons.
First, informal employment might be ignored or not recognized, which can be called
“ignored informal employment”. Second, they might be unregulatable, because they are
underground, which can be called “unregulatable informal employment”. Third, they
might be non-regulated, or even encouraged, which can be called “non-regulated
informal employment”. Finally, they might result from deregulation, which can be called
“deregulated

informal

employments”.

Deregulated

and

unregulatable

informal

employments are largely because of external conditions, while ignored and non-regulated
informal employments are derived from policy-makers’ ignorance or encouragements.
Deregulated and non-regulated informal employment are based on policy-makers’
proactive actions, while ignored and unregulatable informal employments are passive
responses. According to the cause and the role of state, these four types of informal
employments represent four ideal types (Table 7).
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Chinese migrant workers were informally employed, whether their employment
relationships are compared with other workers’ employment relationship, or with the
legal regulations (Huang and Xue 2009; Wan 2009; Li and Tang 2002). Employers don’t
construct formal labor contracts with migrant workers. Migrant workers are more likely
to work for longer time and not to enjoy national holidays. They usually receive low
wages, which may not be guaranteed. Their working conditions are under the standard set
by the state. They cannot attend occupational and professional training regulated and
provided by the state. They don’t have pensions and work-injury and employment
insurances.
However, Chinese migrant workers’ informal employment is largely caused by
the central and local governments’ non-regulation and even encouragement. According to
Hu (2006), in developed countries, the government tends to neglect informal employment
or define them as illegal employment, while the government in China took policies to
encourage, help and manage the development of informal employment. This is especially
true for the relationship between local governments, employers and workers. After the
fiscal reform granted fiscal autonomy of local governments since the middle 1990s, the
economic decentralization has provided the local governments with incentives to develop
local economies (Montinola, Qiang and Weingast 1996; Lee 2007; Wong and Bird 2008).
In order to enhance local economic development, local governments have engaged in
informal practices against legal regulations in order to maintain their cooperative
relationships with enterprises. One of these informal practices is to reduce labor standards
to guarantee enterprises profits, which resulted in a large number of informal
employments being filled by migrant workers (Huang 2009; 2010; Wu 2009; Lee 2007).
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How has the informal employment influenced migrant workers’ identities? In the
interviews, I found that most migrant workers treat themselves as temporary workers or
guests in the urban economy and community because of their precarious employments
and resultant unfavorable working and living conditions. One of reasons for Chinese
migrant workers to think their jobs as temporary is that they don’t have formal labor
contracts and associated employment benefits.
Here is a case, Jun. He was a worker in an electronic factory of Beijing. He came
from Shandong Province. He had worked in the factory for three years. He said he came
to Beijing to dagong, because his job was temporary. Here is a part of our conversation,
which illustrate his employment relationship and its influence on his identity.
Fayin: “Why do you think your job is temporary?”
Jun: “I am ready to go back home or change my job at any time.”
Fayin: “Why do you go back home?”
Jun: “My family has contracted farm land in my village. We have our own
house in the village. My wife and children live in the village. I
think finally I will live at home.”
Fayin: “Why are you ready to change jobs? At least, you have already
worked here for three years.”
Jun: “Many of my colleagues have changed jobs.”
Fayin: “Why didn’t they continue to work here?”
Jun: “Some of them thought they could not earn enough money, so they
ask for a higher wage…But the boss directly fired them…At
another time, the boss dismissed some of my colleagues just
because the hotel didn’t have many customers.”
Fayin: “Did they launch a strike?”
Jun: “No. Probably the boss only thought they were hard to control.”
Fayin: “It seems that the boss could arbitrarily fire workers. Do you have
any labor contracts with the boss? I think a labor contract can
protect your interests.”
Jun: “Not at all.”
Fayin: “Have your boss bought insurance for you?”
Jun: “I don’t know. But it is said that the boss bought injury insurance for
all workers because he doesn’t want to spend his own money
compensating to injuries.”
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Jun thought he came to dagong in Beijing. Literally, dagong means he thought his
home was not in Beijing and he just temporarily worked in Beijing. So, he identified
himself as a temporary worker or guest in Beijing. Furthermore, this identity is shaped by
their informal or unregulated employment relationship.
Differentiated Citizenship between Rural and Urban Residents
Both the household autonomy and the informal employment have influenced
Chinese migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes through their economic life
conditions. The differentiated citizenship between rural and urban residents involves their
relationship with the state regarding their legal, political, social and participatory rights
and responsibilities (Janoski 1998). This section will firstly discuss the differentiated
citizenship between urban and rural residents and then focus on migrant workers’ semicitizenship in cities.
Citizenship rights are differentiated between urban and rural residents, because
rural residents are treated as second-class citizens and cannot enjoy the same rights and
benefits given to urban residents. Before the market reforms, urban citizens were entitled
to lifelong jobs and comprehensive social benefits, including pensions, health care,
housing, food and education, while rural citizens relied on collective organizations and
only received supplementary relief and development aid from the government (Unger
2002; Wong 1998). This differentiation is also true after economic reforms in the late
1970s, even though the meaning of both rural and urban citizenship has been changed by
institutional transitions (Solinger 1999). Differential institutional arrangements still exist
at this time with respect to rural and urban residents’ residences, land rights, taxations,
political participations and welfare benefits. He (2005) uses the concept of “village
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citizenship” to describe the rural residents’ citizenship. To have a village citizenship
means villagers have a rural Hukou registration, which is associated with the rights to
build houses in allotted housing land and to work on farm land contracted from the
village. In terms of political participation, a village citizen has the right to nominate and
elect public officers of the village and to participate in village decision-making processes
and monitor village affairs. With respect to welfare benefits, the state provided different
pension, health care, housing and insurances from those of urban residents (Smart and
Smart 2001; Branigan 2013; Liu 2007; Wu 2010).
With this background, let us turn to migrant workers’ situation in the two-track
citizenship in China. Many policies, measures, announcements and actions have been
applied to migrant workers, which have extended their social rights in cities. In March
2003, the State Council issued “Suggestions for Advancing the Reform of the Hukou
Administration System in Small Cities and Towns,” which, for the first time, holistically
regulated migrant workers’ employment, residence, civil, legal, and welfare rights (Wong
2013). However, because the complexity of the project and the gap between regulations
and practices, most scholars argued that there is a long and complicated journey to
achieve an urban-rural harmonization (Shi 2012; Cai 2011; Xu, et al. 2011). Based on the
survey data from the China Household Income Project in 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007,
Gao, et al. (2013) showed that social benefits system was still divided between rural and
urban residents with respect to the size, structure and nature of the two social welfare
systems. More importantly, they indicated that migrant workers’ social benefits had been
improved mainly through in-kind benefits, such as food and housing. However, their
social benefits were provided by their employers to accommodate them and they were
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deducted from their salary. So, the social welfare system for migrant workers was almost
the same with rural residents’, if food and housing provided by their work-units and
deducted from their salary were not counted.
According to Janoski (1998), citizenship should include both rights and
responsibilities and they should be balanced. Apparently, there is a strong imbalance
between Chinese migrant workers’ rights and responsibilities in cities. Though they have
substantially contributed to urban economic growth by doing dirty, dangerous and
demeaning jobs, they work for long hours under poor working conditions. Though they
work in and for cities, their rural Hukou status has excluded them from basic social rights
such as housing, education, social security and public goods. Through they live in cities,
they lack political rights to vote and usually are considered as scapegoats for city crime
and congestion. So, they are economically exploited, socially excluded and politically
marginalized (Wang 2005; Wong 2013).
Here, we can find that though migrant workers spend most of their time working
in cities, they do not have equal civil, political, social and participatory rights and their
rights and responsibilities in cities are imbalanced. Even if their rights have been
extended after the reform of social welfare system, they still could not enjoy full
citizenship in cities. So, they are second-class citizens or semi-citizens in cities. How
have the differential citizenship and semi-citizenship influenced migrant workers’
identities and attitudes? They usually compare their semi-citizenship in cities and their
full citizenship in villages, which have led them to thinking themselves as rural residents
and guests in cities.
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According to Lü (2013), migrant workers get lost between the countryside and
cities. This can be found in the fact that migrant workers build very luxury and beautiful
houses (according to local standard), but they work and live in cities and leave those
houses void. However, in my interviews, those migrant workers who built houses in their
home villages tended to think building houses as one of their privileges in rural villages.
For example, Laosi, the migrant worker from Sichuan Province also built a house in his
home village. He said:
“Houses in cities are unaffordable for me. I have to have a home
(house)…After all, it is much cheaper to build a house in the countryside,
because the land for residence is free in the rural villages…I thought I had
to build the house, because I could apply for the land of residence at that
time.”
So, Laosi didn’t get lost between the countryside and cities. Rather, he had his
own identity and calculation. Similarly, all migrant workers have participated in the new
cooperative health care system designed for rural residents.
The Identity-Based Market Ideology
All the above three institutional arrangements are relevant to Chinese migrant
workers’ material life conditions, which have “shaped” their identities as family members,
guests and rural citizens. This section will focus on market ideology, which has “framed”
their identity as low-skilled and low-income workers because of their lack of human
capital.
All economic systems are socially defined meaning systems, to which the state
also has contributed. Very generally, Richard Swedberg (2001; 2005) argued that
economic action is a form of social action, economic action is socially situated or
embedded and economic institutions are social constructions. As to market economy, the
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meaning of commodities is socially defined (Carruthers and Babb 2000; Zelizer 2001);
human beings are socially defined as laborers (; Webster, et al. 2008); land, initially a
part of nature, is defined as commodities (Polanyi 2001; Harvey 2010); and the existence
and value of money are also socially defined (Polanyi 2001; Ferguson 2008). How the
meanings of goods, labor, money and land are defined? Institutional economics
emphasized the role of ideology in reducing transaction costs. This function is guaranteed
by instilling moral norms and interpretive rules among social members. So, the ideology
was called “pre-theoretical ideology,” a set of habits, maxims, codes of behavior that
regulate and guide individuals’ everyday behavior (North 1981: 48). Specifically, I think
North (1981) distinguished three aspects of ideology: cognitively, ideology provides
individuals with a world view for decision-making; normatively, ideology limits and
justifies their life conditions; and practically, ideology helps individuals organize their
experiences.
As to the labor market, the commodification of human beings and a certaindegree smooth operation of labor markets depend on the extent to which individuals
accept the definition of themselves as labor. Althusser (1971: 132-133) put it very plainly:
“I shall say that the reproduction of labor power requires not only a
reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its
submission to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of
submission of the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of
the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of
exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the
domination of the ruling class in words.”
As Wills (1977) said between working-class jobs and working-class labors was a
cultural level, which framed their expectations and attitudes. Furthermore, Wills said that
the cultural level might be different from official ideology; for example, those working-
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class boys just want to show their maturity and masculinity, which made them despise
schooling. As analyzed above, household autonomy and family values are also relevant to
migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes toward their dagong lifestyle. What kinds of
ideology did Chinese migrant workers hold? It was found that market ideology in general
and human-capital ideology in particular had shaped their identity as low-level workers.
Here, I want to distinguish three kinds of ideas about labor markets. That is,
conceptions of labor markets could be pre-theoretical, theoretical or political. The
theoretical conception of labor markets involves different, complex scientific frameworks
proposed in academic fields, including classical economics, Marxist political economy,
human capital theory, and segmented labor market theory and so on (Fine 1998). The pretheoretical conception of labor market is about how labors interpret and assess their life
conditions as workers. As North (1981) said, the pre-theoretical conception can influence
workers’ interpretations, attitudes and motivations. Any knowledge involves power
relationship (Foucault 1977; 2006). Furthermore, the power-knowledge relationship
could exist in both generalized and particular situations. At the national level, state
ideological apparatus will manipulate theoretical conceptions and shape pre-theoretical
conceptions.
As to Chinese migrant workers, in the process of market liberalization, the
human-capital ideology and supply-demand logic have been spread through mass media
and education. These two conceptions also framed their identity as low-level workers,
because they think they lack human capital compared with other kinds of workers and
there are a large number of surplus labors in the rural area. Furthermore, they feel market
forces are beyond their control and success depends on chance. Finally, they also
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included the state-provided benefits in the reward from labor market. They think their
precarious employment relationships, low pay, unfavorable labor conditions and lack of
state-provided benefits are related to their status of lower-level workers.
When I asked migrant workers how they felt when compared with other higherlevel workers (managers or technicians), nearly all of them thought that they were lowerlevel workers, there were a large supply of lower-level workers, and they could not
receive the same rewards from labor markets because of their lack of human capital.
When I asked them how they thought about those successful migrant workers, who have
become mangers or migrated to cities, migrant workers thought those successful were
lucky in the labor market, the labor market was out of their control, and it was normal for
someone to be lucky in labor markets.
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Table 7. Four Types of Informal Employment
The role of state
Active
Passive

Cause
External
Deregulated
Unregulatable

Copyright © Fayin Xu 2015
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Internal
Non-regulated
Ignored

Part Two:
Agency: Motivations and Attitudes
Part One has argued that Chinese migrant workers have constituted a social class
with a distinctive dagong lifestyle. This structuration of a new social class indicates
changes in Chinese economic and social structures. Furthermore, besides structural
transformation similar to other developing countries (especially industrialization,
urbanization and uneven regional development), Part One also identified unique
institutional arrangements in contemporary China, which have contributed to the
structuration of Chinese migrant workers.
However, this is only part of the story. Three questions remain. First, the
structuration of Chinese migrant workers depends on that a group of people live a dagong
lifestyle. Why have migrant workers left home and worked in cities, even though their
working and living conditions are unfavorable? Second, if such institutions as household
autonomy, informal employment, differentiated and partial citizenship, and market
ideology have contributed to the structuration of Chinese migrant workers, how have they
led to this process? Third, to some extent institutional transitions were result of Chinese
migrant workers’ actions. For example, the Hukou system reforms are the responses of
the party-state to the emergence and increase of Chinese migrant workers. Recently,
some labor movement researchers have emphasized labor protests launched by migrant
workers. How have Chinese migrant workers responded to their life conditions and
institutional arrangements at large?
To answer the above three questions, it is important to examine Chinese migrant
workers’ motivations and attitudes toward their dagong lifestyle. This investigation can
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help (1) explain the structuration of Chinese migrant workers, (2) elaborate the influences
of institutional arrangements, and (3) understand Chinese migrant workers’ responses to
their life conditions and the society at large.
This part will focus on Chinese migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes
toward their dagong lifestyle. Chapter five will examine Chinese migrant workers’ desire
to permanently migrate to cities and towns. It tested that not all of them have a strong
desire to settle down in cities. Chapter six will investigate Chinese migrant workers’
motivation to dagong in general. Chapter seven will consider their attitudes to the dagong
lifestyle—whether they accept the lifestyle.
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Chapter Five:
Migrant Workers’ Desire to Permanently Migrate
If their working and living conditions are not favorable, why has the number of
Chinese migrant workers been increasing for more than three decades. To answer this
question, we need to examine migrant workers’ motivations to dagong. That is, why have
migrant workers left home to work in the cities? Because the dominant paradigm
explaining migrant workers’ motivation and main ethical concerns of migrant workers’
future have derived from the permanent migration paradigm, this chapter will reexamine
their desire/goal to permanently settle in cities. 15
Chinese migrant workers’ desires to settle in cities have entered into the policymakers’ horizon. On March 17, 2013, in the press conference after the first session of the
twelfth National Congress, when the new Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (2013) answered
questions about urbanization and the Chinese migrant workers’ future, he said:
“The new type of urbanization we emphasize is an urbanization that put
humanity at its heart. Now, there are 260 million migrant workers. It is a
long-term and complex process to make those with the desire settle down
in cities”.
Is it reasonable for government to make policies based on migrant workers’ desire
or goal to settle down in cities? Besides describing Chinese migrant workers’ wishes to
permanently migrate, this chapter will also explain this motivation by linking them with
their working and living conditions. The next section will review the debates in, and the
problems with, previous studies on migrant workers’ desires and goals to settle in cities.
Then, the meaning of “settling in cities” will be presented from migrant workers’ own

15

Desires seem to be emotional, while intentions sound rational. However, rational intentions are largely
based on emotional desires. As shown below, previous studies have examined both desires and intentions
of migrant workers, and this study treats intentions as a kind of desires—rational desires.
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perspective. The third section focuses on migrant workers without the desire or goal to
settle in cities and distinguishes two kinds of situations—no desire and lost goal—in
which they don’t have the desire to settle in cities. Then, for migrant workers with the
desire to settle in cities, the desire is divided to two types: hopeful desire and expected
goal. These chapters will conclude by categorizing migrant workers’ different kinds of
desire or goal to settle in cities and pointing out unsolved problems requiring further
investigation.
Debates and Problems
This section will first review the debates on migrant workers’ desires and goals to
settle in cities. Then problems with previous studies will be discussed.
Debates on Migrant Workers’ Desire/goal to settle in cities
The starting point of examining migrant workers’ desire to permanently migrate
should be the so-called permanent migration paradigm. The basic assumption of this
paradigm is that rural labor migrants have the “desire to stay in city and bring their
families there” (Fan 2008: 11). 16 This assumption has been supported by many
researchers, who found that some migrant workers want to settle in cities (Ye 2011; Li
2006; Xiong and Shi 2009; Cai and Wang 2007). As a paradigm, this theoretical
approach also has its own interpretations and applications, besides this basic assumption.
Specifically, both development economics and migration theory have provided
justifications for the assumption of permanent migration. The structural disparities
between rural and urban areas and between regions will pull surplus labors to non-

16

Fan distinguished two dominant paradigms—the Hukou paradigm and the permanent migration
paradigm—with respect to the study of Chinese migrant workers. However, she didn’t agree with the
permanent migration paradigm and emphasized the nature of migrant as a household strategy. However,
her concept of “permanent migration paradigm” summarized a group of studies.
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agricultural sectors. It is a reasonable choice for rural laborers to pursue superior wages,
social services, job opportunities and consumption patterns in urban and developed areas
(Cai, et al. 2008; Li 2008; Unger 2002; Hare 1999; Lewis 1954; Fan 2008).
This paradigm has become a dominant convention, because this assumption has
been explicitly or implicitly involved in research on all important questions about
Chinese migrant workers. These areas of application include migrant workers’ decision to
migrate (Lee and Meng 2010), migrant workers’ social adaptation (Connelly, et al. 2011),
migrant workers’ life conditions in cities (Lü 2013), migrant workers’ desire to settling
down in cities (Li 2006), structural transformation (industrialization and urbanization) in
China (Chai 1997; Li 2006), critics of institutional arrangements (Chan and Buckingham
2008; Chan 2009; Huang 2010), and migrant workers’ consciousness and responses (Lee
2007; Lo and Jiang 2006).
Permanent migration paradigm has been challenged by empirical studies on
household strategies and institutional barriers. Hare examined both their decision to
migrate out and return. For him, both migrating out and return are migrant workers’
rational responses to an uncertain environment. Especially, Hare argued that household
characteristics, including household labor and land endowments, are the main
determinants of returning (Hare 1999). Zhu and Fan argued that migrant workers treat
dagong as a household strategy to diversify and maximize economic opportunities and
spread economic risk. Both also pointed out that structural transformation (e.g.,
industrialization and urbanization) and institutional transition (especially, the reform of
Household Registration System) have contributed to the temporary nature of Chinese
migrant workers (Fan and Wang 2008; Zhu 2007). In institutional analyses, Huang
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argued that the dual institutional arrangements between rural and urban areas, including
dual Household Registration system, dual land-tenure arrangements, dual employment
institution, and dual social security system, are the dominant barriers for migrant workers’
permanent migration (Huang 2011). These institutional arrangements will influence
migrant workers’ life chances in cities, which might reinforce their desire to return to
home (Zhan 2011; Yue, et al. 2010).
However, whether migrant workers have the desire/goal to settle down in cities
and to what extent they have the desire are empirical questions. Facing the debate
between permanent migration paradigm and its challenges, migrant workers’ settlement
intentions have become a hot topic in empirical studies. This research implies that
permanent migration is at least an option available to Chinese migrant workers. However,
the results are very different. Based on his survey in five cities, Huang Qian (2008)
concluded that migrant workers in general don’t have strong desires to settle down in
cities. Zhu and Chen (2010) admitted that the intention of Chinese migrant workers to
settle in the cities has increased and argued that the structure disparity between rural and
urban areas (including social services, working opportunities, and life conditions) has
reinforced their intention to settle down in cities. Tang et al. (2012) argue that migrant
workers have strong desire to change their rural Hukou and settle in cities because those
who work in large cities choose small cities as their intended places to settle down. In her
article of 2011, Fan (2011) also empirically examined migrant workers’ settlement
intentions based on a survey of migrants in Beijing’s urban villages conducted in 2008.
On the one hand, she argues that not all migrant workers have the desire to settle down in
cities, even when more family members live together in cities; on the other hand, she
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admits that younger, more sophisticated, more educated and more socially involved
migrant workers have stronger desire to settle down in cities.
Problems with Previous Debates
This study also treats Chinese migrant workers’ desire to settle in cities (or
settlement intentions) as an empirical question. Though previous studies have moved
forward along in this empirical direction, there are still two main deficiencies. From these
debates on migrant workers’ desire to settle in cities, we can find that the key question of
previous studies is “do migrant workers have the desire to settle down in cities.” To
answer these questions, it is inevitable that previous studies are trapped by the dichotomy
of “have versus haven’t” the desire to permanently migrate. Even when studies on
migrant workers’ settlement intentions pointed out alternatives to settling down in cities
where they are working, they still didn’t go beyond this dichotomy. This dichotomy
could be found in the “whether or not” measurements of settlement intention, such as
“whether or not” migrant workers are willing to give up their farmland in rural villages,
“whether or not” migrant workers are willing to change their Hukou to the city, and “stay
or leave” (Cai and Wang 2008; Fan 2011). However, these “whether or not” dualisms
tend to conceal the gray areas between the extremes. This research investigates the degree
of migrant workers’ desire to settle down in cities, with the following two possibilities in
mind: (1) even for those treating migration as household strategy and intend to go back, it
is still reasonable for them to settle down in cities because of the structural disparity
between rural areas and urban areas, and (2) even for those with the desire or intention to
settle down in cities, the intensity of their desire or goal might still be different and they
may not settle down.
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Second, largely because previous studies were based on quantitative data, they
focused on such questions as “what proportions of migrant workers have the desire,” or
“what kind of migrant workers have the desire.” So, they only selected two important
time points of migrant workers’ experiences—the decision to leave home and the
decision to return or to settle down in cities. Though these studies were able to single out
significant factors which could influence Chinese migrant workers’ settlement intentions
at the time when the data were collected, they had two main problems: a descriptive one
and an interpretative one. For example, in his elegant Multi-nominal Logistics model, Ye
Pengfei (2011) pointed such factors as human capital, regional origin, family life, social
relationship, and social insurance, which will influence whether migrant workers would
have or would not have the desire to settle down in cities. 17 With respect to the
description of migrant workers’ settlement intentions, these studies ignored the
possibility that migrant workers’ values, attitudes, and intentions might change during the
migration process. As far as interpretations were concerned, they failed to explicate how
those factors singled out in survey day had influenced their settlement intentions. Some
cases studies have pointed to the possibility that Chinese migrant workers’ migration
experiences might change their intentions (Ngai 1999; Loyalk 2012; Pai 2012). This
research is conducted along this line of research, tracing the changes of Chinese migrant
workers’ desire to settle down in cities.
The meaning of “to settle down”
In my interviews, I asked interviewees to present their understanding of settling
down in cities or permanent migration. The informants tend to associate “to settle down”
17

This multi-nominal logistics model include three values of the dependent variable—having the desire to
settle down, have not the desire to settle down, and have no clear intentions. Again, this measurement was
based on a “whether or not” logic as described earlier.
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with two Chinese terms—“anjia” (安家) and “luohu” (落户). Literally, “jia” (家) can be
translated as “home” or “family,” and “hu” (户) is related to “household” or “house.”
As the literal meanings show, for migrant workers, the “home” and “household”
are separate and represent two aspect of “settling down,” though not all of them can
clarify the differences between the two terms. In retrospect, they use “home” to describe
their family life or intra-household relationship, while the word “household” is referred to
their community life or inter-household relationship. For those migrant workers who left
some family members behind in the rural villages, “family” and “home” are their
prominent concerns and their dominant reasons why they didn’t think they haven’t
succeeded in moving to cities where they were working even for many years.
For example, Tai was a migrant worker in Beijing. He was from Shandong
Province. His hometown is about 800 kilometers away from Beijing. He lived in a
suburban village (an urban village) about 30 kilometers from the city center. When I
interviewed him, he just came back from his hometown, after finished harvesting wheat
in the rural village. His parents, wife and children lived in the rural village. When I asked
him about his “home,” he said his home is in Ningyang County of Shandong Province. In
other words, he didn’t think of Beijing as his “home.” When I asked him why the rural
village in Shandong Province was his home, he emphasized that all his family members
were living there. He said:
“You know, in Shandong Province we plant wheat during the winter and
harvest in the summer, and plant corn in the summer and harvest in the
autumn. (…) Between harvest seasons, my wife takes care of the plants.
She also needs to look after my two children. So, I have to go back to help
her in the busy harvest season, because other relatives are also busy.”
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I also tried to ask him why he didn’t consider Beijing as his home. He said
he just temporarily worked in Beijing and had to circularly migrate between his
hometown and Beijing for family and agricultural production. He said:
“I came here about five years ago for the first time (…) But I went back to
my hometown for three or more times during harvest time and Spring
Festival.”
Another reason why he didn’t think of Beijing as his home is that he
thought it impossible for him to bring his family to Beijing. That is, he didn’t
have such a hope that his family would live in Beijing. When I asked “Why not
take your wife and children here,” he said,
“It is impossible. As the children need my wife to look after, she couldn’t
work here. But they will need money to survive here. So, it seems that I
will have double-loss here: earn less but spend more.”
Apparently, Tai emphasized his family or home, when he thought of settlement.
For all migrant workers who don’t live together with their family members in cities, they
tend to emphasize their family connections, whether they are male or female, and old or
young. However, for single migrant workers, they not only consider their parents but also
their future partner.
For example, Yan was a single and female migrant worker. She was working for a
food processing company in Liaocheng. Before worked in the local city, she worked in
factories in Hebei Province and Tianjin Municipality. When I asked “why not work in
those large cities and settle there,” she said:
“Those cities are too far from my home. Sometimes I missed my parents.
After all, I want to work somewhere close to my parents (…) Furthermore,
even if I got married in those cities, it is still hard for me to bring my
parents there. So, I came back to my hometown… In the future, I want to
live in my hometown.”
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For those migrant workers who work in the same city with all family members,
they are more concerned with the household aspect of permanent migration. These
migrant workers are called family-migrant workers (Ji 2012). These migrant workers can
live or work together with their family members in cities, but they feel they are separate
from the city because their families are not independent members in the urban
community. The isolation could be economic or political, but it is more often social and
cultural.
I interviewed a family from Jiansu Province, which is about 1000 kilometers far
from Beijing 18. Su and his wife (Yu) worked together as a team to do indoor decoration.
Their only child (Juan)—a 17-year old girl—also worked in Beijing, making shoes in a
factory. Su and his wife lived a modern apartment in an urban village, which was
informally constructed by the local residents (Wu 2012). Their daughter lived in the
dormitory of her factory. The family used to live together. Only after the daughter
became tired of traveling, she moved to the dormitory for free (and the food is also free in
the factory). But the family lived together sometimes. I said “it is even better for your
family. Your family has migrated to Beijing. Congratulations! Where do you live?” But
Su didn’t think so:
“No. You should not say that we migrate to Beijing … 19 We rent an
apartment in Fangshan District. It is in a village originally. Only in recent
years, there are apartments in that village. It is far from Beijing. It is not
Beijing (…) My daughter lives in the factory, though it is not far from the
apartment. But the dormitory is free for her and there is also free food in
the factory.”

18

I interviewed the three members of this family separately, because they represent three types of migrant
workers. Su and his wife represent male and female senior migrant workers in service industry, while their
daughter is a female and single migrant worker in manufacturing industry.
19
…indicates pauses in informants’ presentations.
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Then I asked him “Why do you think your family hasn’t moved to Beijing
yet?” It seems that he gave me two reasons. One of them is material—having no
house—and the other is social—having no sense of community. But both refer to
the relationship of the family as a whole with the community.
Su: “We are dagong here. We are here just to make money. We don’t have
our own house [he said “home” actually].”
Fayin: “Is a house so important? After all, your whole family works here.”
Su: “I don’t have any relatives here. All my other family members are at
my hometown now.” [He has two brothers who were working on
farmland. He also subcontracts his land to his brothers for free.]
Fayin: “I think you should have some close friends or other close social
relationships after you have worked here for such a long time.” [He
said he has worked here for about twenty years.]
Su: “Yes, but all of us come here to dagong and to make money. We are
all guests and will go at some time. We are floating. We are not
members of this city … We are working for this city.”
Fayin: “What do you mean “settling down in cities” generally?”
Su: “We should have a stable job and buy a house. So, that we can be
equal with the local residents and live a same life with them.”
From the above two cases, we can find that Chinese migrant workers’
understanding of permanent migration not only means they live together with family
members (intra-household aspect), but also means they have a equal status with local
residents, especially have their own stable jobs and settlements (inter-household aspect).
This distinction between “home” and “household” has some important implications. First,
some studies implied or pointed that “having more family members in city facilitates the
earning of urban wages but is not necessarily indicative of a long-term plan to stay” (Fan
2011: 12; see also, Ji 2012). However, these outsiders’ conclusion fails to reveal the
insiders’ logic behind this phenomenon. The distinction of migrant workers’ perception
between “home” and “household” could explain why the fact that family members live
together in cities doesn’t mean that they have a strong desire to settle down in cities.
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Second, outsiders, especially institutional analysts, implicitly tend to confuse migrant
workers’ perception of “household” with the “Hukou” status. 20 While they are inevitably
related, they are also different: migrant workers themselves define “household” in the
context of an intimate community relationship, but institutional analysts tend to define
“household” as represented by the Household Registration System.
Migrant Workers Who don’t Have the Desire/Goal to Settle in Cities
At least at the time I interviewed them, not all migrant workers have the desire to
settle down in cities. For those migrant workers who don’t want to stay in the city, the
reasons might be different. For those migrant workers who want to stay in the city, the
degree of the desire might also be different. This section will focus on those migrant
workers without such a desire, which could be divided to “No Desire” and “Lost Goal.”
The next section will distinguish “Hopeful Desire” and “Expected Goal” for the migrant
workers with the desire to settle down in cities.
Un-thought “No Desires” to Settle in Cities
When I asked the first question 21 of “have you ever thought about permanently
settling down in cities,” 22 two typical answers are “No, I have never had such a desire” 23
and “Yes, I used to think about such a thing.” If I got the first answer, I asked “why not?”

20

On August 16, 2013, in his presentation for a conference about high-quality urbanization in Beijing,
Chan Kam Wing commented on the translation of the tile of Doug Saunders’ “Arrival City,” in which he
said that the title should be “get urban houku,” rather than “get a foothold in cities.”
21
Here, “the first question” is not the first question I asked in my interviews. In order to present my result, I
singled out the questions relevant to my research topic of this paper. These questions are sequentially
arranged in real interviews. So, “the first question” is the first one in a sequence of questions relevant to the
research topic.
22
In Chinese, this question is “您有没有想过在城市里定居？” In this question, the verb “想过” (literally,
thought about) could be used to ask about both thinking (opinion) “and” feeling (desire). In real interviews,
it turned out that some were talking about their desires, while other were talking about their opinions.
23
As the quotation mark shows, this sentence is given by some of my informants. However, not all
informants said as this. However, some other informants expressed the similar opinion or feeling. So, this is
a “typical” answer, which represents a kind of answers. Similarly, this also applies to the other “typical
answers” I singled out in the following parts.

118

The answer I got typically started with “I feel……” which means they haven’t carefully
or rationally thought about “settling down in cities.” This kind of un-thought desire to
settle down in cities is simply “no desire to settle in cities.” These migrant workers
usually just start working as migrant workers (new migrant workers) 24 . There is a
difference between old and young new migrant workers. While old and new migrant
workers just want to make money through dagong, young and new migrant workers
didn’t develop their own clear goals yet.
Old and new migrant workers usually have run their own business in agricultural
or other industries. They temporarily work as migrant workers because they don’t have
business for a short-term or fail in other businesses. They think they are too old to
migrate to cities and just want to make money; or, they will be idle. For example, Yao
was 55 years old. He used to raise chicken. After that he transported wheat straw to a
papermaking factory by his own tractor. Now, his main business is to harvest agricultural
products (wheat and corn) by modern harvesters which were bought with one of his
friends. However, between harvest seasons he doesn’t have other business to do than
working as migrant workers (in a construction site, then). When I asked about his
desire/intention to settle in cities, he said:
“I am a farmer. I never thought of settling in cities. I feel I am too old to
migrate to cities. Moreover, I work hard in the rural villages and have my
own businesses (…) I didn’t work like this before. Only in recent years, I
started work as migrant workers. Even now, I have my regular work [his
own businesses] to do. I don’t want to waste my time between harvest
seasons (…) Though my two sons have been married and don’t need my
money any more, I have to earn more money for me and my wife so that
we will not be my sons’ burden (…) I cannot be lazy. That is intolerable.”

24

As the next chapter will show, only some of new migrant workers don’t have the desire to settle in cities.
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New and young migrant workers have not been independent from their parents or
developed their own worldview and personality. So they didn’t develop their own
motivations. They feel reluctant to work as migrant workers. Here is a typical case. En
was 17 years old. He worked as a migrant worker in the local city. He worked for a
private enterprise as an electro-gas wielding worker. He dropped out of school at the age
of 16, a year before the interview. However, the primary middle school promised to give
him a certificate. When I asked him whether he had any clear goal to work in the city, he
kept silent, which indicates that he hadn’t conscious goals. Then I asked him why he
worked in cities. He felt forced to do so, because he had nothing else to do and was not
interested in schooling.
“I had nothing else to do when I came back home from schooling (…) I
am not interested in studying. I worked hard. But I cannot understand what
teachers said. I became extremely tired of studying. There were so many
things to learn and to memorize: literature, arithmetic, geometry, biology,
physics, chemistry, history, and politics and so on … Even if I could
continue, studying means more burden for me.”
Then I asked him directly about his desire to settle in cities by the question “Have
you ever thought about permanently settling down in cities?” He said:
“I feel it is impossible for me to move to cities. You know, I didn’t
graduate from the primary middle school. I think the first thing I should do
is to learn skills. I feel it will be easier for me to do that in the future if it
became possible to do that.” [Later, he also said, “I feel my parents don’t
want to me work too hard,” “I feel urban city is not happy, because there
are too many people,” and “I feel somewhat tired of leaving home.”]
In this part of conversation, we can find En’s own feelings and
calculations in this part of conversation. Emotionally, he was tired of schooling
and felt impossible to migrate to cities. However, he also had his own rational
calculation: to learn skills. But he seemed also bored of the urban lifestyle,
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because he was not completely independent from his parents and not ready to
work outside home for such a long time. So, as a new migrant worker, he was still
occupied and even confused by his emotions/feelings. Specifically, he did not
have a clear goal of his dagong life, to settle in cities or to learn skills. With
respect to the desire to settle in cities, the answers of “un-thought no” can be
called “no desires” to settle in cities.
Unthinkable “No Desires” to Settle in Cities
If I got the second answer to the first question—“Yes, I used to think about such a
thing”—I continued to ask the second question: “Are you still thinking about settling
down in cities?” Then, one of the two typical answers is “No, I think it unthinkable
(unbelievable, or impossible).” Like their answers to the first question, the answers to the
second question also began with “I think,” which indicates that these migrant workers
have carefully or rationally thought about “settling down in cities.” However, because
they almost gave up this desire, I called this kind of “unthinkable desire” as “lost desire.”
These migrant workers usually have worked in cities for a long time, have more family
burdens, work in unstable and labor-intensive industry, have not receive any promotions
in the factories or companies, and don’t see any improvement of their life conditions.
Even after working in cities for many years, it is still hard for Chinese migrant
workers to settle in cities. Furthermore, migrant workers have recognized the
impossibility, whether the settling in cities means family migration or household
settlement. This is especially true for migrant workers in unstable construction industries.
Long was born in 1984. He has worked in cities for ten years. After he graduated from
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the primary middle school, he went to the local city and worked as a migrant worker. He
said of his experiences like this:
“I have to change working places very often. After finish a construction
project, I have to move to another one to make money. I have never such a
sense of stability (…) I think it impossible for me to settle in cities if one
doesn’t have a stable job and guaranteed income. Even if I can make some
money for a certain period of time, it is still very likely to go back to my
rural village because I might not have work to do or money to earn.”
Working in manufacture industries and having relatively stable jobs, migrant
workers also recognized the impossibility to settle in cities. Here is a part of conversation
with an informant, which indicates this kind of unthinkable desire to settle down in cities.
Liao, a migrant worker in Beijing, was 45 years old. He was a carpenter in a private
factory. He had been working in Beijing for more than 15 years. Before he came to
Beijing, he worked at his hometown in Liaoning Province. But he used to go back home
and worked for a while. His wife was working in the same urban village of Beijing. His
son attended a private school in that urban village. 25 When I asked him whether he ever
thought about permanently settling in cities, he said “yes.”
“After I worked in Beijing for a couple years, I went back to my
hometown. Then I thought I had enough money to start my own business.
I also wanted to settle down in the local county. I tried, but I failed (…)”
But he gave up the idea of moving to cities when I interviewed him, because he
thought it impossible. But he continued working in Beijing to save more money for his
family.

25
I want to say that there are three kinds of urban villages in China. The first type of urban village
developed by industrial development, as worker both work and live in the village. The second type of urban
village developed through informal settlement for workers who work in city center. The third type of urban
village locates in old center of cities, also developed through providing informal settlement. However, in all
three kinds of urban villages, there are specific services (restaurants, housing, department stores, and public
transportations) provided for migrant workers.
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“I think it is impossible for me to do that … It was too expensive to move
to and live in cities. Here is 30 kilometers far from Tiananmen. But it is
impossible to build your own house, because you don’t have the local
Hukou. It is also impossible to buy an apartment, as the price has been
very high (…) I have to make money for my parents and child. My son
goes to a school here. Though it is not very expensive, he will need more
money if he goes to college (…) I can make more money in Beijing than
in my hometown. Furthermore, my son can go to school here and my wife
can find a job too.”
First of all, “settling in cities” for him mainly means “household” and “house,” as
Liao’s family had lived in Beijing. As an experienced migrant worker, Liao has
calculated the possibility to settle in cities, which also means the possibility to build or
buy a house in Beijing. So, though he also didn’t have the desire to settle in cities, this
“no desire” is a rational choice. However, he used to think about settling in cities, but he
gave up at some time. This kind of “no desire” can be called “unthinkable no” or “lost
goal.”
Migrant Workers with the Desires to Settle in Cities
For those who answered “Yes” to the second question, I asked the third question
“Do you have any specific plan to settle down in cities?” I got two typical answers: “I
hope I could live in cities as my co-worker Hui (or somebody else),” and “I expect that I
would buy a house within two years.” The two typical answers are from my
conversations with two informants. These two answers represent two kinds of desire to
settle down in cities: while the first answer represents a “hopeful yes,” the latter answer
signifies an “expected yes.” However, the difference between the two types of desire is
not just a matter of wording. The difference between “hope” and “expectation” is
significant. As Ivan Illich (2010: 98) said,
“Under the influence of this promise (of development), desires also
changed their status. The hope to accomplish the good has been replaced
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by the expectation that needs will be defined and satisfied … Hope orients
towards the unpredictable, the unexpected, the surprising.
Expectations…orient towards claims, entitlements and demands. Hope
appeals to the arbitrariness of a personal other, be he human or divine.
Expectations build on the functioning of impersonal systems that will
deliver nutrition, health care, education, security and more. Hope faces the
unpredictable, expectation the probable”.
So, a hope is largely an emotional wish, while an expectation is a rational goal. As
shown below, the two kinds of desire/goal would also influence their attitudes and
responses to the social context.
“Hopeful” Desires to Settle Down in Cities
As to the “Hopeful Yes,” migrant workers have a strong desire to settle down in
cities, but they haven’t developed a clear plan to achieve that desire. However, as hope is
an emotional force, which is oriented to unpredictable things and surprise. So these
migrant workers usually want dramatic social change to happen, so that they have more
opportunities. These migrant workers are usually young, don’t have many life
experiences, and want better life conditions in cities. They are also independent from
their parents and want to do something for their families and the society by themselves.
They have somewhat of a heroic complex.
Here is a migrant worker, Lin, who had been working as a migrant worker for 13
years when I interviewed him. He graduated from the primary middle school in 1996. He
was 32 years old, but he was just married for a year. He had changed his jobs for many
times. He used to work in Liaocheng, Jinan, Tianjin, and Beijing. He used to work as
security staff, run his own small restaurant, and work for large hotels. He was working
for a hotel and cooking western-style food when I interviewed him. When I asked him
whether he wanted to settle in cities, he said,
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“I have worked and lived in cities for more than ten years. I have got
accustomed to urban life. It is impossible for me to go back to do
agricultural production.”
Then I asked him whether he had any specific plan to migrate to the city.
He said,
“I want to re-start my own business. But I don’t know when I could do
that. [Suddenly he became impatient, anxious and angry] Since I was born
I have been working hard, because I have my dream. I want to have a
better life. But, it is not my own fault that I still live like this—struggling,
struggling and more struggling. There are so many social problems which
have influenced ordinary people’s lives, such as capitalists’ cruelty and
official corruption (…) I hope there is social revolution, which I think will
give us ordinary people more opportunities. [Laughing]”
We find that Lin had worked and lived in cities for more than ten years. It is hard
to tell whether he was used to the urban life, but he was sure that he didn’t want to live in
the countryside any more. This is also the reason why he wanted to migrate to cities.
However, he hadn’t developed any specific plan to settle in cities, though he had affirmed
that to dagong for others is not viable for him to achieve his desire. On the other hand, he
had tried for so many times that he felt somewhat depressed and confused, so he thought
he was just following his fate. For him, the only way (at least a possible way) to change
his fate is a dramatic social change (a kind of revolution for him). So, his desire to settle
in cities is an emotional hope, a “hopeful desire.”
However, female migrant workers who hold a hopeful desire to settle in cities are
less aggressive, because they don’t want social revolution. Rather, they try to take some
adventurous effort to change their fate, especially through marriage. Jing is a female
migrant worker, who was working in the same hotel as Lin. She was still single. When I
asked her whether she had a desire to settle in cities, she said yes. But she didn’t develop
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any specific plans to do that. Then we talked about whether she had any chance to settle
down in cities.
Fayin: “Do you think more education can make you achieve you desire?
Do you want to do that?”
Jing: “Yes, but I have been far from schooling for many years. I think it is
almost impossible for me to go back to school (…) Even if I can go
to private vocational schools, it is said that it is unhelpful to find
better jobs.”
Fayin: “Do you think changing jobs can make you achieve you desire? Do
you want to do that?”
Jing: “Yes, but it is still hard. After all educational qualification is
important.”
Fayin: “How about marriage?”
Jing: “I think if I can marry an urban guy, I can migrate to this city. But I
don’t know how possible it is to do this.”
Fayin: “Have you ever tried?” [After I encouraged her, she started to
answer this question]
Jing: “It is hard for me to have an urban citizen as my partner. But I think
it is possible to find some boys from suburban areas. These guys
are not urban citizens. Their educational levels are not too high.
But they are likely to become urban citizens because the
government will appropriate their farm land (…)”
Jing also only holds a hope of settling in cities, as she has the desire without
specific plans to do so. However, she was also trying some less possible ways (marriage)
to achieve this desire.
“Expected” Desires to Settle Down in Cities
Those migrant workers with an “expected desire” to settle down in cities are
sophisticated migrant workers, who have earned better working and life conditions and
had the possibility to settle down in cities. They not only have a strong desire to settle
down in cities, but also have a specific plan to achieve that desire. For them, what they
need to do is to work hard and carry out their plans. So, they need social stability,
especially gradual social reforms which will not break the social order. On the one hand,
they want social reforms to remove barriers to permanently migrate; on the other hand,
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they don’t want revolutionary social reforms which might make their effort meaningless
and spoil their own plans.
Li worked in Jinan. She was a female migrant worker in the marketing department
of a real estate company. She was 31 years old. She had worked in Jinan for two years.
Before she came there, she did a similar job in her local city. Her husband did his own
business in Jinan—transporting agricultural product to Jinan from his hometown. As her
husband can earn more money in Jinan than in his hometown, she came to work in Jinan
too. She had a five-year old baby and left the baby in his hometown. Her family has
developed a specific plan to move to Jinan some day. Here is a part our conversation.
Fayin: “Do you want to live in this city permanently?”
Li: “Yes. But we don’t want to buy a house now.”
Fayin: “Why?”
Li: “We don’t need to do that. It is still a burden for us to buy a house. It is
cheaper to rent an apartment in suburban areas.”
Fayin: “When are you going to buy a house?”
Li: “We planned to buy a house when our child has to go to school. Firstly,
we have to make more money. I earn less than my husband. But
we can save some money every month. We want to live with our
child. We want him to attend a school in this city two or three
years later.”
Fayin: “Do you think it is still possible to buy a house then? You know,
the price of real estate goes up every day.”
Li: “I hope the government could control the price of housing. I also hope
the schools could operate more formally. Even if we don’t buy
house or get the local Hukou, my student can still enter schools in
this city. I am afraid that even if we have local Hukou, our child
still cannot go to good schools.”
First of all, we have to consider migrant workers’ family conditions. Li didn’t
earn too much, but her family as a whole had earned a better life mainly through her
husband’ business. This also made her see the possibility to settle in cities. Based on this
possibility, her family developed a specific plan to do that. So, to settle down in the city
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is not just an emotional hope, but also a rational plan. Furthermore, the development of a
rational plan depends on life conditions.
Conclusion and implications
To conclude, this part will construct four ideal types of Chinese migrant workers’
desire/goal to settle in cities, according to (1) whether they have the desire to settle in
cities and (2) whether their desires are based on emotion or rationality. Then, the
implication of these ideal types for the changes in their desires will be examined. Finally,
the unsolved questions with respect to their motivations to dagong will be discussed.
Different types of the desire to settle down in cities
I use the term “un-thought no” or “no desire” to describe the first type answer,
which indicates that some migrant workers didn’t have a desire to settle in cities, because
they emotionally felt it impossible to do that. The term “unachieved no” or “lost goal”
refers to the second type of answer, which means that some migrant workers didn’t hold a
goal to settle in cities, because they thought it impossible based on their rational thinking
about the possibility. Though both kinds of answer indicate some migrant workers at least
have no strong desire to settle down in cities, the natures are different. While the “unthought no” happened before migrant workers’ thinking about the meaning and
possibility of settling down in cities, the “unachieved no” took place after migrant
workers experienced urban life, developed a meaning of migration, and calculated the
possibility of permanent migration. Similarly, the “hopeful desire” is largely an
emotional force, while the “expected desire” is based on rational thinking about the
possibility and meaning of settling down in cities. Table 8 illustrates different types of the
desire to permanently migrate.
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The distinction between these different desires have gone beyond previous studies,
which only distinguish “have” and “have not” the desire to permanently migrate, because
these types also involve a ordinal measurement of the migrant workers’ desire to settle
down in cities. Furthermore, the working conditions, living conditions, family life, and
migration process will influence migrant workers’ desires.
The changes in migrant workers’ desires to settle down in cities
As above analyses indicate, the different desires are not only synchronical
differences, but also diachronical differences. Because the four scenarios also imply that
a certain migrant worker might change his or her desire, so it could be used to describe
and explain the changes in his or her desire to permanently migrate. Furthermore, the
working condition, the living condition and the family life will contribute to the changes
in the desire to settle down in cities. Though the previous studies also pointed various
factors which have influenced migrant workers’ desire, they tend to ignore the issue of
time in the migration process. This analysis emphasizes the importance of the definition
of life cycle, urban experiences and so on.
Here it is important to distinguish inter-generational change and intra-generational
change of migrant workers’ desire to settle down in cities, because the categorization
between first-generation and second-generation migrant workers has become so popular
in recent years (Yue, et al. 2010; Wang 2008; Hannan 2008). However, this intergenerational analysis is largely a structural analysis, in which the date of birth (as an
independent variable) divides the migrant workers into two groups. This implies that two
generations have two kinds of settlement intentions or desires, other things being equal.
Though this distinction could help capture the influences of institutional transition on the
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inter-generational changes of the group migrant workers, 26 it tends to ignore the intragenerational changes of certain concrete migrant workers. However, it is necessary to
examine the intra-generational changes to justify inter-generational analysis. An oldgeneration migrant worker (for example, at the age of 40) might have different desire,
compared to a new-generation migrant worker (for example, at the age of 30). This didn’t
exclude the possibility that when the new-generation migrant worker might have same
desire with that old-generation migrant worker, when s/he came to the age of 40.
Future research
Firstly, this chapter only focuses on Chinese migrant workers’ desires to settle
down in cities. It was found that not all migrant workers have a (strong) desire to migrate
to cities and even for those with such a desire, the nature of the desire is also different. If
the desire to permanently migrate is not a common motivation to support migrant
workers’ dagong lifestyle, what other motivations do they have? If the desire to settle in
cities is changing in the migration process, then what forces other than the desire to settle
down will rise in those situations? In order to answer these questions, the next chapter
will examine migrant workers’ motivation to dagong in general.
As the above analyses indicate, though the first-generation migrant workers have
different desires to migrate to cities. However, there are some common factors
influencing their desire, including family life, working condition and living condition in
cities. So, this analysis indicates: (1) it is not very reasonable to say that the second-

26
Actually, it is hard for this approach to distinguish the influences of institutional factors from those of
individual factors. For example, the data was selected at a certain point of time, all migrant workers, old- or
new-generation, live in the same institutional contexts. So, there is no direct data about the institutional
context in the previous era. Therefore, the differences are variations derived from individual factors. As
shown below, studying intra-generational changes could complement this approach by considering more
about institutional changes through informants’ life stories.
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generation migrant workers have a stronger desire to settle in cities than the firstgeneration migrant workers, because they are at different stages of their life cycles; (2) if
the institutional arrangements have changes so that different generations have different
life cycles, it is reasonable to say that there are differences between the two generations;
and (3) if, by contrast, the institutional arrangements didn’t change fundamentally, it is
possible that the second-generation migrant workers would have the same experiences
with their predecessors. If their life experiences will influence their motivations, then
what institutional arrangements will influence their life experiences? Have these
institutional arrangements changed? If yes, what are the consequences for migrant
workers? In order to answer these questions, the second part will focus on the
institutional arrangements relevant to migrant workers’ life experiences.
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Table 8. Different desires to Settling Down in Cities (N=36)*
Basis

The Desire to Settle Down in Cities
No

Yes

Emotional

Un-thought “No”
(No Desire)
(16; 44%)**

Hopeful “Yes”
(Hopeful Desire)
(8; 22%)

Rational

Unachieved “No”
(Lost Intention)
(8; 22%)

Expected “Yes”
(Expected Intention)
(4; 12%)

*The 36 interviewees are selected by theoretical principles according to migrant workers’
characteristics. So, these interviewees might not be proportionate to the overall structure of
Chinese migrant workers.
**The number and percentage of cases in each category out of selected cases.

Copyright © Fayin Xu 2015
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Chapter Six:
Chinese Migrant Workers’ Stratified Motivations to Dagong
Previous institutional analyses indicate that market is the main mechanism
through which China’s rural-urban migration happened in the three decades (Li 2008;
Cai, et al. 2008), as the government didn’t force Chinese farmers to relocate as it did in
the communistic era (such as the Intellectual Youth Movement) (Wang and Liu 2006;
Fairbank, et al. 2006). This is true despite the fact that the state policies and development
ideology, especially the reform policies since late 1970s (including the reforms of the
Hukou system), have contributed to the huge rural-urban migration and that the nature of
labor market is still controversial (Fan 2008; Ngai, et al. 2009). This means that Chinese
migrant workers make their own decisions to migrate without straightforward physical
coercion to do so. So, it is important to examine migrant workers’ own motivations to
dagong, in order to understand the emergence and existence of this group of people.
The last chapter indicates that permanent migration is not the motivation for all
Chinese migrant workers. Furthermore, the desire to settle down in cities might be a
secondary motivation and changing in the migration process. The question is: what is the
motivation to dagong for other migrant workers? If the desire to settle down in cities is
changing, how is the relationship between this motivation and other motivations like?
This chapter will firstly discuss the debate between the permanent migration paradigm
and the household strategy paradigm, with respect to Chinese migrant workers’
motivations to dagong. Then, this debate will be examined in the context of migration
theories, as both paradigms are derived from migration theories in general and the
migration motivation theories in particular. With these theoretical debates in mind, this
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chapter will empirically investigate Chinese migrant workers’ motivations. Two models
were proposed with respect to Chinese migrant workers’ motivations to dagong, which
deal with the structure and changes of their motivations respectively. First, a stratification
model of motivations was used to describe the structure of migration motivations, which
integrate multiple-level factors involved in migrants’ decision-making. Second, a
dynamic model of motivation to migrate is constructed to describe the changes of
motivations to migrate, which can go beyond the moment of decision-making and include
the following migration processes.
The Debate on Chinese migrant workers’ motivation
As far as Chinese migrant workers’ motivations to dagong are concerned, two
dominant

paradigms—permanent

migration

paradigm

and

household

strategy

paradigm—could be distinguished, on which other theories were also developed. While
permanent migration paradigm assumes that the desire to seek better life conditions in
cities is the main motivation for Chinese migrant workers, the household strategy
paradigm argues that Chinese migrant workers treat dagong life as a way to meet family
needs. This section will describe the basic logics of the two paradigms and the next
section will examine their roots in migration theories.
Permanent Migration Paradigm
The basic assumption of the permanent migration paradigm is that rural labor
migrants “desire to stay in city and bring their families there” (Fan 2008: 11). As a
paradigm, this theoretical approach also has its own interpretations and applications,
besides this basic assumption. Specifically, both development economics and migration
theory have provided justifications for the assumption of permanent migration. The
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structural disparities between rural and urban areas and between regions will pull surplus
labors to non-agricultural sectors. It is a reasonable choice for rural laborers to pursue
superior wages, social services, job opportunities and consumption patterns in urban and
developed areas (Cai, et al. 2008; Li 2008; Unger 2002;Hare 1999; Lewis 1954; Fan
2008). This paradigm has become a dominant convention, because this assumption has
been explicitly or implicitly involved in research on all important questions about
Chinese migrant workers. These areas of application include migrant workers’ decision to
migrate (Lee and Meng 2010), migrant workers’ social adaptation (Connelly, et al. 2011),
migrant workers’ life conditions in cities (Lü 2013), migrant workers’ desire to settling
down in cities (Li 2006), structural transformation (industrialization and urbanization) in
China (Chai, et al. 1997; Li 2006), critics of institutional arrangements (Chan and
Buckingham 2008; Chan 2009; Huang 2010), and migrant workers’ consciousness and
responses (Lee 2007; Lo and Jiang 2006).
However, the Chinese migrant workers’ motivation is an empirical question. If
this question was left unexamined, all other research in this tradition would become
ungrounded. Based on theoretical challenges to this paradigm and previous empirical
investigations on Chinese migrant workers’ desire/goal to settle in cities (Hare, 1999;
Zhan, 2011; Fan and Wang, 2008; Huang, 2008; Fan, 2011), the last chapter found that
not all of them have a strong desire to do that, because some of them “feel” or “think” it
impossible. Furthermore, not all migrant workers with the desire have developed a
rational plan to do that. So, it still needs to examine their motivations to dagong in
general. Finally, the continuous migration could be an instrument for migrant workers to
bargain with capitalists and protest against governments; therefore, the permanent
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settlement migration paradigm has become insufficient to understand migrant workers’
own responses in transitional China (Wang and Wu, 2010; Han, 2011).
Household Strategy Paradigm
Treating households as the unit of analysis, the household strategy paradigm
argues that migration in general and dagong in particular is a household strategy, which
is intended not only to pursue the maximization of income, but also to minimize risks
associated with labor and product markets (Fan, et al. 2008; Fan 2008; Zhang, 2013).
Associated income diversification and risk minimization, the relative deprivation, or the
change of relative status of the households in rural community, is another driving force of
migration. So, household strategy is not only structured by household structure and
economic condition, but also by social contexts, including rural community (Cai and
Yang 2002; Li 2003). Consistent with “gender-sensitive approach” to migration (Samers
2010: 98-103), another related issue is the relationship between gender and migration.
For Chinese migrant workers, migration as a house strategy is usually associated with the
split-household strategy. Influenced by Chinese traditional culture of intra-household
relationship, women tend to stay in rural areas and work in the agricultural sector, while
men are likely to leave home and work in cities. For a certain family, this split-household
strategy has facilitated the man working as migrant workers in cities.
If not all Chinese migrant workers have the desire to settle in cities as the last
chapter showed, it is also true that not all of them only treat dagong as a household
strategy. Then the question is: why did some Chinese migrant workers only treat
migration as a household strategy to diversify income resources, rather than as a way to
settle down in cities where there are more employment opportunities and higher living
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standards? Furthermore, treating migration as a household strategy might conceal the
differences in migration experiences between male and female migrant workers. For
example, Pun Ngai pointed out that in the process of becoming dagongmei (female
migrant worker), others (including coworkers, supervisors and so on) defined them as
“women,” “farmers,” and “migrant workers” at the same time, which had led to female
migrant workers’ distinct identity (Ngai 1999).
The debate between permanent migration paradigm and household strategy
paradigm indicates that there are two geographical orientations in Chinese migrant
workers’ motivations: urban migration and rural needs. Furthermore, the debate also
implies that household structure and family life are important for understanding why
some Chinese migrant workers have the desire to permanently migrate and others just
treat dagong as a strategy to meet household needs in rural areas. However, these two
paradigms failed to fully elaborate the meaning of urban migration and rural needs,
though they pointed out the two general geographical orientations. This study is to more
closely examine the meaning of permanent migration and rural needs.
Migration theories and migration motivations
In order to solve the puzzles involved in the opposition between the two
paradigms, it is helpful to return to the broad context of migration theories in general and
migration motivation theory in particular, because the two paradigms are directly related
to migration theories. For example, the basic logic of permanent migration paradigm is
consistent with migration theories focusing on structural disparities, such as push-pull
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theory, macro neoclassical economic theory, and dual labor market theory 27. The basic
reasoning of household strategy paradigm is closely related to such migration theories as
behaviorist approaches, new economics approaches, relative deprivation theory, and
gender-sensitive approaches.
In migration studies, it is argued that the internal migration and international
migration are interrelated. Theoretically, the internal rural-urban migration has some
common characteristics with international migration and some theories about
international migrations were developed based on internal migration (Dong 2011; Samers
2010; Lee and Meng 2010). Empirically, there might be common forces underlying both
internal and international migration, so there is a substantial correlation between internal
and international migration (Pai 2012; King, et al. 2008; Korcelli 1994). This section will
firstly review migration theories in general by focusing on key questions about
migrations and then focus on those theories about migration motivations.
Migration theories in general
There are many theories of, or approaches to, migration (internal or international).
Furthermore, in order to understand the reality of migration, these theories are also
critically summarized and examined by some scholars. For example, Massey et al. (1993)
divided migration theories into theories about the initiation of international migration and
theories about the perpetuation of international movement. The former kind of theories
includes macro and micro neoclassical economic theories, the new economics of
migration, dual labor market theory, and work systems theory, and the latter kind of
theories includes network theory, institutional theory, cumulative causation theory, and
27

Many literatures have introduced these theories in detail, so it is unnecessary to repeat these theories. For
basic arguments of these theories, see Boyle, Paul, Keith H.Halfacree, and Vaughan Robinson 1998;
Samers, Michael 2010; and Bean, Frank D., Susan Gonzalez-Baker, and Randy Capps 2001.

138

migration systems theory. However, the assumption of this classification is that there has
been a migration stream or migration pattern, so that it would be reasonable to say and
analyze how the migration pattern was initiated and maintained. The problem is that
because migration behaviors are conducted by individuals, it is unreasonable to exclude
the theories about the perpetuation of migration from the explanation of the initiation of a
certain migrant. For example, social networks would also influence an individual’s initial
imagination and decision of migration. That is, Massey et al.’s classification is able to
deepen our understanding of migration patterns or migration streams, while this metatheoretical examination doesn’t identify the factors involved in individuals’ migration
behavior.
Another meta-theoretical analysis is Paul Boyle et al.’s (1998) distinction between
determinist, humanist and integrated conceptual approaches to migration. While
determinist approaches emphasize the objective structures and fail to pay enough
attention to individuals’ active role, humanist approaches stress the individuals’ own
choice-making processes, and integrated approaches developed from the interaction
between determinist and humanist approaches. Adopting this distinction, Michael Samers
(2010) classified ten theories into two categories: (1) determinist theories including pushpull approaches, neo-classical economic analyses, behaviorist approaches, new
economics approaches, dual labor market and labor market segmentation approaches, and
structuralist approaches; and (2) more integrated approaches including social-network
approaches, transnational arguments, gender-sensitive analyses, and structurationist
perspectives. However, this classification is also problematic, because, as Samers himself
said, “often so-called determinist arguments integrate a number of different political,
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cultural, economic, environmental and social processes, and integrative theories can be
remarkably determinist” (Samers 2010: 53).
More generally, Boyle et al.’s meta-theoretical construction depends on the
history and epistemological differences of migration theories. So, his integrated
approaches only listed those theories which are developed later than determinist theories
and emphasize the interaction between structure and agency. By contrast, Massey et al.’s
meta-theoretical analysis is featured by its problem-orientation—the problem of the
initiation and perpetuation of migration patterns. However, the problem of migration
pattern by no means is the only problem of migration. Actually, because of their
assumption of migration pattern, Massey et al.’s classification could not explain the
problem of migration process in general. It should be noted that Massey et al. didn’t treat
their analysis as an attempt to integrate various theories. They were just willing to lay
groundwork for constructing an accurate and comprehensive theory.
Echoing Massey et al.’s emphasis on the problem of migration pattern, here is
another attempt to construct an integrated and comprehensive theory of migration, which
is centered on the problems of various migrations. So the approach proposed here is a
problem-oriented approach. The logic is: because migration involves more than one
single problem, in order to understand migration behaviors, it is reasonable to figure out
the important problems, according to which theories are classified and reconstructed.
Because of the concern of this chapter, here just outline the basic problems involved in
migration processes.
The first problem is the structural possibility. What structural factors have
provided the possibility for migration to happen? Or, what are the distributions of
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resources that make migration a way to meet migrants’ needs? This is not a determinist
problem, which argues that structural disparity alone could determine the happenstance of
migration. Rather, to answer this question only points out the possibility for migrations to
happen. The theories pertinent to this question include push-pull theory, macro
neoclassical theories, dual labor market and labor segmentation theories, structuralist and
related understandings, and world systems theory.
The second problem is the operational resources. Who can help migrants feel safe
to migrate towards a certain destination? What economic, political, social and cultural
resources available to migrants to take action? If structural factors only provide a
possibility for migration, then operational resources are facilitating tools for migration.
Without these necessary resources (for example, travel fund), it is still impossible for
migration to happen. Relevant theories are social network theory, gender-sensitive
theories, micro neoclassical economic theories, dual labor market and labor market
segmentation approaches, institutional theory, cumulative causation theory, and
migration systems theory.
The third problem is the decision-making process. The second question actually
should be “if some people decide to migrate, what resources are available to them?” That
is, if no people want to migrate, structural possibility cannot guarantee migrations and
operational resources cannot be utilized. The key questions about this problem are “what
motivates people to migrate?” and “what alternatives to migration are available?”
Existing theories relevant to these questions include micro neoclassical economic theory,
the new economics of migration, relative deprivation theory, network theory, behaviorist
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approaches, structurationist perspectives, gender-sensitive analyses and migration culture
theory.
The migration motivation in particular
Under the above theoretical background, this section focuses on theories related to
the motivation to migrate 28 . Rather than repeating the arguments of each theory, this
section only outlines the basic debates, which have opened the opportunity for further
integration and development. These debates include the dichotomy between economic
and social motivations, the debate between rationality and irrationality, the controversy
between individual and society, and the separation between state and process. As the
micro neoclassical economic theory has been involved all these debates, so it will be
introduced as a typical individualistic, economic, rational and static approach, against
which other approaches were compared (Massey, et al. 1993).
In micro neoclassical economic theory, individuals are the agents who make the
decision to migrate. Furthermore, individuals are rational actors who calculate the costs
and benefits involved in the migration over time horizon and then make the decision to
migrate. The costs and benefits considered are largely economic costs and benefits.
Though the potential migrants will take into account the psychological costs, these
psychological issues are not motivations, but barriers. Messay et al. (1993: 434-35)
illustrate these costs and benefits by this formula:
𝑁𝑁

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(0) = ∫0 [𝑃𝑃1 (𝑡𝑡)𝑃𝑃2 (𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑 (𝑡𝑡) − 𝑃𝑃3 (𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌0 (𝑡𝑡)] 𝐸𝐸 −𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 − 𝐶𝐶(0)

Where ER(0) is the expected net return to migration calculate before migration; P1 (t) is
the probability of avoiding deportation from the destination area; P2 (t) is the probability
28

As this chapter’s topic is Chinese migrant workers’ motivations to dagong, so I just focus on the
migration theories related to this topic. Additional researches are needed for the other two problems.
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of employment at the destination; Yd (t) is the earnings if employed at the destination
place; P3 (t) is the probability of employment in the origin area; Y0 (t) is earnings if
employed in the community of origin; r is the discount factor; and C(o) is the sum total of
the costs of movement including psychological costs.
As to the debate economic motivations and social motivations, while the micro
neoclassical economic theory emphasizes such economic factors as employment
possibility and wage differences, the theory of migration culture stresses the cultural
meaning of migration attached by the migrants themselves; for example, the Mexican
young people might treat migration as a transition to manhood (Kandel, et al. 2002; Gil
and Gang 2010). This indicates that migration might have different meanings for
migrants themselves, which motivate their migration.
As to the debate between rationality and irrationality, while micro neoclassical
emphasizes migrants’ rational calculation of costs and benefits, some theories have
pointed out the irrational factors involved in their consideration; for example, the
behavioral approach points to the irrationality of individual decision-making (Samers
2010). However, it is important to distinguish irrational decision and irrational values.
While irrational decision refers to the factual relationship involved in decision making,
irrational values are the motivations underlying rational or irrational decision-making
process. It is the latter which is the concern of this chapter.
As to the dichotomy between individuals and the society, the new economics of
migration and the theory of relative deprivation contrast the micro neoclassical economic
theory by focusing on the intra- and inter-household relationships. While the new
economics of migration also emphasizes the economic actions of diversifying income
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resources and minimizing risks, it argues that households or families (and other larger
units) should be the unit of analysis. Relative deprivation theory, which is considered as
an application of the new economics, argues that migration could be used as a tool to
improve income relative to other households and reduce the relative deprivation (Stark
and Bloom 1985; Katz and Stark 1986; Lauby and Stark 1988; Samers 2010; Massey, et
al. 1993; Stark and Yitzhaki 1988; Stark and Taylor 1991a; 1991b). The implication is
that intra- and inter-household relationships will influence the motivation to migrate, as
both could enter the migrants’ horizon.
Finally, there is a debate between state and process. Most migration theories only
focus on the moment of making the decision to migrate and thus ignore the subsequent
processes after they have migrated. For example, though the micro neoclassical economic
theory talked about the decision-making process, it failed to trace the changes with
respect to information, motivations and values. Social adaptation theory is to some extent
complementary to this neglect, because social adaptation theory focuses on the
subsequent processes after migration (Jiang 2003; Liang and Wang 2010). This is
important for Chinese migrant workers, because they usually don’t completely and
permanently migrate to cities soon after they decide to migrate. Rather they work and live
as migrant workers for a certain period of time or return to their origin areas (Lü 2013; Li
2008).
To conclude, in order to understand migrants’ motivations to migrate, the factors
involved in the theoretical debates should be empirically examined, including the
interaction between rational calculation and irrational values in decision-making process,
the interrelationship between economic motivations and social motivations, the
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influences of social relationships on individual motivations, and the changes in migration
motivations during migration processes. Having these questions in mind, this research
examines Chinese migrant workers’ motivations to dagong. As the fourth part will show,
Chinese migrant workers’ economic and social motivations are stratified in different
manners, because of the influence of their family and community lives. Furthermore,
Chinese migrant workers’ motivations have been changing in their migration processes.
The stratification of migrant workers’ motivations to Dagong
In his voluntaristic theory of action, Parsons (1937) distinguished goals from
norms, values and ideals. If actors’ choices of means are oriented to goals, both goals and
means are framed by norms, values and ideals. So, means-selection, goals, norms, values
and ideals are stratified in a unit action. Similarly, Anthony Giddens (1984) also
identified three levels of agent: reflexive monitoring, rationalization and motivation of
action. In my interviews, I continually asked informants about their reasons/motivations
to dagong. I found that migrant workers’ motivations or intentions are stratified. In the
stratification structure, both economic and social motivations are involved. Furthermore,
there are different numbers of layers in their stratification structures.
Direct ends
“To make money,” “to learn skills” and “to advance personal development” are
the three main direct motivations. Most middle-age and old migrant workers simply told
me, “to make money.” For example, Hua is a cleaner working for a real estate company
in Jinan. She was from a nearby village. Her son was in middle high school. Living in the
suburban area, her family only had a small plot of farm land. When I asked her why she
worked there, she just told me:
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“I want to make some money for my family (…) I have three parents (her
mother, mother-in-law and father-in law) to take care of. My son goes to a
middle high school in the city. So, his schooling is expensive (…) My
family doesn’t have much land to work on. After all, I cannot be idle if I
don’t have agricultural work to do.”
However, young, single migrant workers often told me that they want to learn
skills and develop personality. For example, a 20-year old migrant worker Di was single
and worked as security staff for an estate company. He told me:
“I cannot communicate with others very well. I easily lose my temper. I
cannot stay patient when I worked in a factory. I remembered that I fought
with another young man because I thought he offended me. But, now I
think it was unnecessary to fight with him then. I think I should control
myself and talk with him calmly. So, I think I have not adapted to the
social life outside home. Now, I work here to exercise myself and develop
my social skills. I try to patiently finish my task and communicate with
others, especially my co-workers from different cities. I think I will
become mature through working here.”
Di, a novice migrant worker, had very simple stratification structure of ends. He
just wanted to train self-discipline. This is also related to his simple life experiences. He
just worked in a factory in the local city. He only experienced his inability to
communicate with his coworkers, which made him committed to developing his social
skills.
Various Stratifications
When I continued to ask why they want to make money, learn skills, and develop
personality, migrant workers presented their more indirect ends, including to seek better
job, make more money, meet family financial needs, build houses in rural villages, and
buy apartments in cities. Moreover, migrant workers have different numbers of layers in,
and different types of motivations, in their stratifications of ends. Even new and single
migrant workers might have different ends. The following are two novice migrant
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workers: Shun and Hu. Their motivations indicate different kinds and stratifications of
ends.
Shun, 19 years old, was single and worked as migrant workers just for two years
after graduated from a primary middle school 29. He worked for a privatized SOE—a lathe
factory. When I asked him why he wanted to learn electric wielding skill, his reason is
much simple:
“At first I didn’t know what to do. I played for several months at home. I
want to work, because nobody can live without work. I don’t know much
about anything. Now, I work as electric wielder because my cousin
introduced me to the company.”
Then I asked him “What do you plan to do in the future?” Again his
answer is very simple:
“I don’t know what to do next. Just wait and see.”
Hu was two year older and work two year longer than Shun. Different from Shun,
Hu had to consider his marriage at that time. When he just started work, he didn’t give
his parents the money he earned; rather, he had dinner with coworkers and friends, and
bought phones and clothes. However, he gave money to his parents when I interviewed
him. When I asked him why he did that, he said:
“Now my parents want to build a new house in my home village. The
house is indispensible for young adults to get married…I have to learn
skills and make more money. Then, my parents will not be so
pressured…I am old enough to help my parents.”
The two cases indicate new migrant workers’ motivations are stratified in
different matters. Again, the difference is related to their life courses and experiences.

29

In contemporary educational system of China, after kindergarten, children have the right and obligation
to finish nine-year obligatory education, including six-year elementary school and three-year primary
middle school. Then, they can go to higher middle schools or lower-level occupational schools. Those
attending higher middle school can go to colleges or higher-level occupational schools.
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While Shun just worked to learn skills and didn’t have any clear plan about his future, Hu
had considered his marriage because he was two years older than Xiaoshun and had more
life experiences.
Finally, two ultimate motivations emerged as we kept talking about their sakes: to
settle down in cities and to meet family needs. This seems to be consistent with
permanent migration paradigm and household strategy paradigm. However, as the
following sections will reveal, neither of the two paradigms could explain all migrant
workers’ motivations, and the two ultimate motivations are much more complex than
assumed by the two paradigms.
Permanent migration could be an end or a means
The fundamental assumption of the permanent migration paradigm is that all
migrant workers have a strong desire to settle down in cities because of the structural
disparity between rural and urban areas with respect to living standards and job
opportunities. However, not all migrant workers want to settle down in cities, as the last
chapter has shown. Furthermore, even for those with the desire to permanently migrate,
the nature of the desire might be different. The last chapter identified four levels of the
desire to permanently migrate. Besides this, permanent migration could be an end or a
means.
Permanent Migration as a Means
For some migrant workers who want to permanently migrate, to settle down in
cities is not the ultimate end. Rather, it is more likely to be treated as a strategy to meet
family needs. These migrant workers are usually middle-age, married and short-distance
migrant workers, whose family burdens are not heavy and working and living conditions

148

in cities are not bad, because they have seen the possibility to settle down in cities. The
major reason to settle down is to provide better education for their children.
For example, Mi 30 was a female migrant worker in a casting factory in her local
city—Liaocheng. She was 30 years old. Her husband was a cook in the same city. Her
child was 10 years old and attended an elementary school in the city. Her family is
registered in rural villages about 20 kilometers away from the city. She wanted to settle
down in cities for her child’s education.
“All citizens are required to finish nine-year obligatory education,
including six-year elementary education and three-year primary middleschool education (…) All children have some schools to go for the nineyear education. However, if the children wanted to go to high middle
school and colleges, they have to take entrance exam. So, those in better
schools are more likely to attend (…) In Liaocheng, the Hukou system has
no influence on children’s first six-year elementary education now.
However, for another three-year obligatory primary middle-school
education, children have to take an entrance exam for better schools. If the
children were not qualified for better schools, they would go to the schools
at the place of Hukou registration. For our child, the school in my
hometown [where her family was registered] is very bad (…) if we don’t
have urban Hukou, my children might go to the bad school and are less
likely to attend better high middle-schools and colleges (…)We will work
hard and earn more money. If we can buy house in the city, we could
move our Hukou registration to the city. Then, our child will have better
schools to go.”
Because of her concern with her child’s education, Mi had more information
about children’s education and the influence of the Hukou system. This was also the
reason she worked hard to settle in cities. She wanted to have her child receive better
education. She also knew how to achieve this goal—to settle in cities. Furthermore, she
also saw the future of permanently migrating to cities.

30

It turned out that she graduated from the same primary middle-school at the same year with me. However,
she is not my original informant. I contacted a manager in the factory she was working for. That manager,
who is also a migrant worker, introduced her to me. Getting her permission, I release my relationship with
her here.
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Li (in Chapter 2), who worked in Jinan, also treated permanent migration as a
means to improve her child’s education in the future. Li and Mi have some things in
common with respect to their desire to permanently migrate. First, both treat permanent
migration as a means to improve their children’s education. Second, their ultimate ends
(the children’s education) can only be achieved in cities. Third, they developed such ends
because they have seen the possibility to settle in cities.
Permanent Migration as an end
For young and single migrant workers in the first years of dagong life, permanent
migration could be an ultimate end. When young and single migrant workers come to the
city and experience the better working and living conditions, they feel that cities are
better places than their rural villages. They want to live in the cities permanently and
enjoy the higher living standards there. On the other hand, most of them have few family
burdens, because their parents are healthy and can work, and they don’t have wife and
children to look after.
For example, Ping was a single girl at the age of 20. She was working for a
restaurant in Beijing. She just worked there for half a year. She was from Sha’an Xi
Province. When I asked her how she felt about the urban life, she said her life in the city
was better than that in her home village:
“The urban life is totally different from the rural life. I have known lots of
new things. I can eat foods that I have never eaten in rural village. I can
buy clothes that I have never worn in rural village. I can visit museums,
shopping malls, and scenic resorts at my convenience. The biggest
difference is that the life here is more standard—if you work, you can get
money.”
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That is why she had a desire to settle in cities, which means, for her,
having her own house and family in the city. I asked her “Do you want to settle
down in cities? Why?” She said,
“Yes. As I said, the life is better here than in my hometown. I think I have
no future if I went back to the rural village.”
Ping didn’t have many experiences in cities. Though she wanted to “have
her family in cities,” her family was not her burden. She just wanted her family to
have a better life in cities. She wanted to settle in cities mainly because of the
better life conditions in cities. So, to settle in cities is her ultimate end.
Jing and Lin, who have been talked about in the last chapter, also treated
settling in cities as their ultimate ends. All of them have felt the disparity in the
quality of live between rural and urban areas, which made them admire urban
residents and their lifestyle. Moreover, all of them didn’t have many family
responsibilities, which make them easy to have the desire to settle in cities.
To conclude, different from the assumption of permanent migration
paradigm, to settle in cities is not the motivation of all Chinese migrant workers.
Even for those migrant workers with the desire to settle in cities, the desire might
be rational choices or emotional wishes and might be a means or an end.
Family Life is the ultimate motivation for most migrant workers
In the last section, we find that even migrant workers with a desire to permanently
migrate might treat dagong as a means to achieve family needs. For the migrant workers
without this desire, family life is the primary motivation to dagong. However, different
from household strategy paradigm which only focuses on economic life, family life is
much more complicated than this. The family needs could be divided into the needs of a
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family as a whole, and the needs of an individual as a family member. In the latter case,
the family relationship is a social background for individuals and their attitudes. Different
from household strategy paradigm which treats household as the unit of analysis, the
concept “family life” means household as a whole, intra-household and inter-household
relationships, all of which are related to the individual members’ motivations.
The Needs of family as a whole
The needs of family as a whole are very important for those middle-age migrant
workers who have heavy family responsibilities, including supporting children’s
secondary education and higher education, taking care of their elder parents, and building
or buying houses for their children’s marriage, and so on. They don’t have the desire to
settle down in cities, because they think it impossible to save money.
The case of Tai represents migration as a strategy to meet the needs of the family
as a whole. Tai was forty years old and working in Beijing as a construction worker. He
had two parents, one of whom was sick and needed money to see the doctor. He had two
children. The elder daughter had worked as a migrant worker in the local city for three
years, and the younger son was in the third grade of the best elementary school in his
local town. He told me:
“I have to leave home and work in Beijing, because I need money. Two
years ago, my father was severely sick. I borrowed money from friends
and relatives to treat my father. Now I have to work harder to return the
money I have borrowed (…) Though my daughter is working now, I
cannot ask her for money (…) My son’s education is not cheap, because I
send him to the best school in my local town. Even for the transportation, I
have to spend more than 200 Yuan (…) I want him to go to college
someday. Then he could live a better life.”
Tai was the mainstay of his family. He also had the whole family in his mind. The
above quote indicates that he was thinking about his family as whole and wanted to earn
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money to meet the needs of his family as a whole. Because middle-age and male migrant
workers are main bread-earners for their family and they also accept this family
responsibility, they have their family in their mind and treat dagong as a means to meet
the needs of family as a whole.
The Needs of Individuals as Family Members
There are some migrant workers who treat dagong as a strategy to meet their
personal needs derived their roles as family members. Different from those migrant
workers with the needs of the family as a whole, these migrant workers are very young or
very old or female, which make it not too urgent or necessary for them to take up family
responsibilities. They go to dagong in order to earn a higher status and more respects
within their families. Here is a case of an elder migrant worker, Laoshao, who was sixtysix years old. He was working in a construction site in Jinan, when I interviewed him. His
son and daughter-in-law were working in a local factory of Shaoxing, thousands of miles
away from Jinan. He already had a grandson. Here are some parts of our interesting
conversations:
Fayin: “Does your family still need your money? Does your grandson’s
education need your support?”
Laoshao: “No. Both of my son and daughter-in-law are working in local
factories (…) They can make enough money to support my
family.”
Fayin: “Then why do you leave your home so far and work in an
unfamiliar city?”
Laoshao: “Just for fun. I want to experience new places.”
Fayin: “Have you been tourist resorts of this city, such as Daming Lack,
Qianfo Mountain and Baotu Spring?” [Daming Lack, Qianfo
Mountain and Baotu Spring are most famous tourist resorts in the
city where he was working]
Laoshao: “No. I am not familiar with this city. I mainly stay in the
construction site and safeguard the construction materials.” [I think
“for fun” might be a reason to dagong. But “for fun” doesn’t need
to leave home so far.]
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Fayin: “What do you mean by “for fun”, if you didn’t go the scenic resorts
here and just stay in the construction site?”
Then, he kept silent. I didn’t know how to continue the conversation. I was
sure that his family didn’t need his money. It seemed that he didn’t have fun in
Jinan. However, I really wanted to know why he left home so far. I was thinking:
is it fun to leave home because he can avoid something, or he can earn
something? So, I asked him “What would you do, if you didn’t come here?”
Laoshao: “I would work in other places.” [Anyway, he would work!]
Fayin: “How would your family members (your son and daughter-in-law)
treat you, if you didn’t work? Do you think they will treat you the
same?”
Laoshao: “Absolutely not. Probably they would think me as lazy and a
family burden.”
Fayin: “You mean you can earn respect from other family members,
right?”
Laoshao: “Absolutely right! I leave home and work faraway to make
money, which can help me improve my status in my family,
right?” [He gave me a thumb-up. Then I said “sorry” for making
him embarrassed.]
Laoshao was old and other family members could support him. It seems that he
didn’t need to work outside home any more. But, he worked far from his home in order to
earn respect from other family members. Laoshao is not alone. If some migrant workers
seem not have reasons to dagong, they leave home and work in cities in order to meet
their personal needs derived from their role of family members.
Simultaneously for family needs and for personal needs
Middle-age and Female migrant workers also tend to treat dagong as a strategy
both to meet family needs and to earn family respect. Ju is a female migrant worker in a
construction site. She has a son in middle higher school. She told me she just started to
work outside the village about two or three years ago, because in his home village few
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females went to work in cites and only in recent years more and more females went
outside the village. When I asked her why she worked outside agricultural sector, she
treated herself as a family member to meet the needs of her family as a whole.
“Now more and more females go out to earn money. We women have
such opportunities to earn a better life for our family. Why not do this? (…)
The expenditure of my family has increased in the past few years, because
every family can make more money now. My son’s tuition has become
high. The gift exchanges in rural communities and between relatives have
become expensive…”
She said she also had to take care of her family’s farm land, so that her husband
could work longer outside. So, only when she didn’t have much agricultural work to do,
she went to work as a migrant worker. So, I also asked her “if you have to work in land
and don’t have much time to work outside, you can have a rest. After all, you husband
can earn enough money for your family. Why don’t you have a rest at home?” She said:
“I also want to contribute more to my family. When other women in the
village go outside to work, if I have a rest, my husband and others in the
village would consider me as a lazy lady (...) I will also feel ashamed. My
parents-in-law will not think me as a good daughter-in-law because I don’t
assume more responsibilities to relax their son. My son will also not like
me because I am lazy (…)”
The case of Ju indicates that some migrant workers treat dagong as both a means
to meet the needs of the family as a whole and the needs of individuals as family
members. The difference is that male and middle-age migrant workers emphasize their
role of bread-earner for the family as a whole, while female and middle-age migrant
workers also consider their own honor and prestige. However, for those migrant workers
(for example, old migrant workers and young migrant workers) who can be dependents
and don’t need to work, dagong is more considered as a way to earn personal respect
from other family members.
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Changes of migrant workers’ motivations
Chinese migrant workers also change their motivations over their migration
processes, especially when they are unable to settle down in cities immediately after they
started working in cities. Again this section focuses on the changes of the two ultimate
motivations. In interviews, two kinds of processes were found: radicalization and
conservatization. The radicalization refers to the process in which migrant workers’
desire to permanently migrate increases. Radicalization happens mainly at two points.
The first point is when they just start working in cities and experience the disparity of
living standards between rural and urban areas. The second point is when they get better
working and living conditions in the cities, which might have increased their ambitions.
The conservatization process refers to the process in which migrant workers reduce the
desire to settle down in cities and focus more and more on their other needs, especially
family needs. After radicalization at the two points mentioned above, marriage and
children’s education might lead to a conservatization process. Because of migrant
workers’ concern with their family lives and the limitations of their working and living
conditions, the general trend is the conservatization process. Here are two cases, which
respectively represent

the two

points of radicalization and the subsequent

conservatization. Actually, most of my interviewees had experienced some changes in
their motivations to dagong. The following two cases represent the two points of time
when radicalization and conservatization happened. In term of the desire to settle in cities,
most of them used to experience gaining and losing the desire.
The case of Qian indicates that marriage and childbearing might reduce young
migrant workers’ desire to permanently migrate, which is derived from a feeling of
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urban-rural disparity. Qian was 25 years old. He was working for a construction company
in Beijing. Before he came to Beijing, he worked for a shipbuilding factory in Jiangsu
Province. However, he gave up better working conditions and social insurances 31 in the
shipbuilding factory, in order to make more money in Beijing. When he started work in
the shipbuilding factory, he was just 15 years old and he worked there for six years. He
felt the better life conditions in the city than those in his home village:
“Urban life is much better than rural life. I made money by myself. My
parents almost didn’t ask for my money. So I could buy anything I wanted.
But in rural villages, I would have nothing to do and have no money.”
He also developed a desire to settle in cities when he (1) saw the higher quality of
life in cities than in the countryside and (2) felt the possibility to do so:
“At first, I just wanted to learn skills and make money. Then I felt I made
lots of money, because my wage was much higher than my parents and
friends. After I enjoyed enough cell-phones, video games, and good foods,
I did start thinking about my future. I felt it was possible for me to buy an
apartment in the city. Then I began saving money to be able to stay in that
city.”
However, his wage became lower and lower, which made him give up that
job because he needs more money. When I asked him why he needed more
money, he said,
“I got married two years before I quit. A year later, I had a baby. My wife
was not able to work. I had to make more money to support my family.”
Qian became radical or developed a desire to settle in cities after he worked in the
shipbuilding factory. When he just started working in the factory, he experienced a better
life condition. This made him want to enjoy the urban life for a long time through settling
in cities. However, he became conservative or reduced the desire to settle in cities, after
31

He said that he had all insurances. But when I specifically asked him what kind of insurances he received
there, he could not list those insurances. So, I am not sure whether he had received all insurances. But this
cannot change the fact that he quitted his job in the factory.
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he got married and had a child. These family events drove him to make more money for
his family.
The case of Laoge indicates that children’s education could lower the well-off
migrant workers’ desire to permanently settle down, which is caused by promotions,
better working and living conditions. Laoge was 42 years old. He was a manager in a
sand casting factory. He got married early—at the age of 20. He had two children: a
daughter of 19 years old and a son of 15 years old. His daughter was a college student,
studying preschool education. His son just passed the entrance exam to higher middleschool in the local city. He nearly gave up buying houses and thus permanently migrating
when I interviewed him. After becoming a manager in the factory, he developed the
desire to settle in the city:
“At first, my wage was low. Then I didn’t have any thought of buying a
house in cities, because I felt that I could only temporarily work here…
The boss I previously worked for went bankrupt. (…) Then I became a
farmer again. So I thought my job was not stable and I was a farmer.
However, it seems that this factory develops very well and my wage has
been rising in the past few years. So, I wanted to permanently migrate to
the city a couple of years ago.” (…)
He also thought to buy a house (or an apartment) was the main element of
permanent migration. However, when I asked him when he were going to buy a
house, he said,
“But right now I have given up the idea of buying a house in the city. I
sent my son to the best primary middle-school. It was a private and
expensive school. So I don’t need his Hukou registration to attend schools
in the city. Fortunately, he passed the entrance exam to higher middleschool (…) My daughter is attending a college now. At first she went to an
occupational school. Then the tuition was low… But now she goes to a
college and the tuition is much higher (…) In the coming years, I have to
spend my money on the two children’s education. I cannot afford an
expensive house in the city.”
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Laoge was an experienced migrant worker. He had got promotion in the factory.
As his working and living conditions improved, he also saw the possibility to live in
cities. That is, he became radicalized. Again family needs—his children’s education—
made him give up the luxury desire and became conservative with respect to his
expectation.
Conclusion
The last chapter and this chapter have focused on Chinese migrant workers’
motivations to dagong. The last chapter shows that not all migrant workers have a strong
desire to permanently migrate to cities. This chapter presents a stratification model of
migration motivations, in which permanent migration and family life serve as two
dominant ultimate motivations. Furthermore, both chapters imply or indicate that Chinese
migrant workers might change their motivations during the migration process. According
to the place of the motivation of permanent migration, two processes were described as
radicalization and conservatization. These analyses have both substantial and theoretical
significance.
Chinese Migrant Workers’ Stratified Motivations to dagong
In my interviews, I continually asked informants’ reasons/motivations to dagong.
I found that migrant workers’ motivations or intentions are stratified. In the stratification
structures, migrant workers have their conscious and direct goals to dagong. However,
these direct goals are means to achieve indirect purposes. At the lower level of the
stratification structure are direct and conscious intentions. When I ask “why do you come
here to dagong?” informants’ answers are really simple. “To work,” “to make money,”
“to learn work skills” and “to learn social skills” are main direct motivations. All of these
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direct ends can be considered as economic motivations, because all of them indicate that
migrant workers tend to treat dagong as work or investment. They work to earn money or
they invest their time to learn skills. When I continued to ask why they came to work in
cities, make money, learn skills, and develop personality, migrant workers presented their
indirect ends, including “to seek better jobs,” “to make more money,” “to meet family
financial needs,” “to build houses in rural village,” “to enjoy urban lifestyle,” and “to buy
an apartment in the city.” These indirect motivations can be economic or social. But, it is
in these indirect motivations that social motivations become more apparent than in direct
motivations. There are two aspects of the social nature. First, Chinese migrant workers
don’t just calculate economic costs and benefits involved in migration. They also
consider social costs and benefits, including family needs, urban experiences, and social
respect. Second, they not only consider themselves as individuals, but also as members of
social groups, especially of their families.
The fundamental assumption of the permanent migration paradigm is that all
migrant workers have a strong desire to settle down in cities because of the structural
disparity between rural and urban areas with respect to living standards and job
opportunities. However, it was found that not all migrant workers go to work in cities for
permanently settling in cities. Furthermore, putting permanent-migration motivation in
the stratification structure indicates that permanent migration can be a means or an end.
There are indeed some migrant workers who consider dagong as a household strategy.
Household strategy theory argues that migration is motivated by the desire to improve
household income and reduce economic risks by diversifying income resources. So, this
theory stresses the economic nature of migration as household strategy. However, putting
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these economic needs in stratification structures, it was found that these they are shaped
by larger social background. For those migrant workers treating dagong as a household
strategy, there are two sources of household needs. The first is household consumption
needs. These needs are very important for those middle-age migrant workers who have
heavy family responsibilities, including supporting children’s secondary education and
higher education, taking care of elder parents, and building or buying houses for their
children’s marriage, and so on. The second type of household needs is to maintain
household status in rural communities and networks. They have a kind of competitive
relationship with other households in terms of family life quality. So, they go to work in
cities in order to improve family life standard, which is a means to earn a high household
status in their communities and networks at home. These migrant workers usually have
worked for a long time in cities.
So far, we have found that Chinese migrant workers’ motivations to dagong are
stratified, composed of direct economic motivations and indirect social motivations. In
these stratification structures, there are two geographical orientations: urban–oriented and
rural-oriented. For each of the two geographical orientations, their motivations might be
individualistic or societal.
Based on these classifications, four types of Chinese migrant workers’ general
orientation to dagong can been identified: personal honor at home, personal future in
cities, household need at home, and family development in cities. Table 9 presents the
relationship between the four ultimate orientations. They are categorized along two
dimensions: individualistic versus societal motivations, and rural- versus urban-oriented
motivations. Personal honor at home is an individualistic motivation rooted in rural
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villages, while personal future is an individualistic motivation toward cities. Household
need is a societal motivation at home, while family development is a societal motivation
toward cities.
Implications for integrating migration theories
There are many calls for integration in migration theories. Massey et al.’s (1993)
research has contributed to this integration in three aspects. Firstly, they pointed out that
there are many migration theories, careful examination and critics of which could be
groundwork for integrating these theories. Secondly, the contemporary migratory
processes need an integration of the existing theories to describe and explain. Thirdly,
these theories are possible to be integrated, as they focus on different levels of
aggregations and their explanations are not necessarily exclusive (also see Samers 2010).
Boyle et al. (1998) pointed out that there indeed many attempts to integrate theories. If
Boyle et al.’s approach represents a theoretical integration of migration theories, King et
al.’s (2008) approach is to achieve an empirical integration of migration theories of
internal migration and international migration, when they tried to figure out the
relationship between internal and international migration.
This chapter proposed a problem-oriented approach to integrate migration
theories by distinguishing three key problems involved in some or all migration theories
and to solve those problems by drawing upon relevant theories. Three problems were
singled out: structural possibility, operational resources, and decision-making process.
This chapter examined the theories related to migrants’ motivations to migrate and then
proposed an integrated model of migration motivation—the stratification model of
migration motivation—by solving the four theoretical debates of these migration theories.
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When this model was used to trace the changes of Chinese migrant workers’ motivations,
a dynamic model of migration motivations was found, in which the layer of the
stratification structure and the nature of its elements are changed with the working and
living conditions in migration process. If this approach is reasonable, further research is
needed to integrated migration theories around other common problems.
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Table 9 Four Ultimate Motivations of Chinese Migrant Workers to dagong (N=36)
Social Orientation

Geographic Orientation

Rural
Urban
Personal Honor at Home
Personal Future in Cities
Personal
(12*, 37.5%**)
(5, 15.6%)
Household Needs at Home
Family Development in Cities
Social
(10, 31.2%)
(5, 15.6%)
*This number is the number of cases within the category in the data;
**This number is the proportion of all cases within the category in the data. All these
numbers are to describe the data, rather than represent the population of Chinese migrant
workers.

Copyright © Fayin Xu 2015
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Chapter Seven:
Chinese Migrant Workers’ Attitudes to the Dagong Lifestyle
This chapter is to examine Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes to the dagong
lifestyle—whether they accept this lifestyle. This question is based on the assumption
that motivations and attitudes are two different questions, because Chinese migrant
workers have their own motivations to dagong doesn’t mean that they accept the dagong
lifestyle, though there are some relationships between motivations and attitudes, for
example, the desire to permanently migrate might make them resist against their
unbalanced relationship with employers (Lü 2013; Lee 2007). This question is important
because attitudes will directly influence their behaviors (Bohner and Wänke 2002). This
question is important also because to answer this question is necessary to understand the
emergence, existence and future of Chinese migrant workers in general.
After reviewing previous studies about Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes, this
chapter will examine their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle, which has been defined as
“leaving home in rural villages, going into cities, and working for others, in order to
make money.” It will also examine the role of comparing dagong and its alternatives in
their attitude formation, and the influences of their attitudes on their motivations and
attitudes.
Chinese Migrant Workers’ Attitudes in Previous Studies
Because of its importance, previous studies have explicitly or implicitly taken into
account Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes. In previous studies on Chinese migrant
workers’ attitudes, conservative and radical viewpoints could be distinguished in
previous studies.
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According to conservative viewpoints, Chinese migrant workers tend to hold a
positive attitude to their life conditions. At the macro-level, Chinese migrant workers’
attitudes were usually examined in the context of urbanization. In Chinese traditional
culture, rural residents have a deep connection with farm land, which has led to a
traditional way of life characterized by gerontocracy, gender difference, the differential
mode of association, the rule of ritual, and no litigation, and so on (Fei 1992). In the
modernization process, Chinese peasants’ attitudes to farm land and agricultural
production have attracted attention of scholars in different areas. It was argued that the
rural residents prefer non-farm work to agriculture, because of the income differentiation
between agricultural production and non-agricultural jobs (Lü 2013; Zinda 2006). At the
micro-level, Li and Li (2007) argued that migrant workers’ lower future expectations,
conceptions of their human capital, and comparisons with farmers had led to their
positive attitudes to social security, social justice, and life conditions in cities.
By contrast, radical scholars argued that Chinese migrant workers held a negative
attitude to their life conditions. At the macro-level, Chinese migrant workers have
gradually recognized their interests and rights and become dissatisfied with their life
conditions, which have posed a challenge and will caused a severe challenge to the
present labor regime (Lee 2007; Hannan 2008; Chan 2008). At the micro-level, after
Chinese migrant workers experienced the lifestyle in cities, they would compare their
own life conditions and those of their urban compatriots, which would in turn strengthen
their sense of unfairness (Lü 2013).
Despite their contradictory conclusions, the two perspectives have pointed out
some common and important questions about Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes. In
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order to solve the contradictions, their approaches to these questions have to be critically
analyzed.
First, what is the attitude object for Chinese migrant workers? Previous studies
have referred to their attitudes to agricultural production (Zinda 2006; Lü 2013), family
life and rural community (Myerson, et al. 2010; Fan 2008), working and living conditions
in cities (Chan and Qiu 2011; Jiang, et al. 2009), social justices and security (Li and Li
2007; Lü 2013), state policies and government corruptions (Lee 2007). However, some of
these objects are just parts of their dagong lifestyle (e.g., working and living conditions in
cities, family life and rural community), while attitudes to other objects (e.g., state
policies and government corruptions) are influenced by the attitude to the dagong
lifestyle. For example, Chinese migrant workers’ social attitudes depend on their attitude
to their immediate working and living conditions. So, this study focuses on Chinese
migrant workers’ attitudes to the dagong lifestyle. This approach has two advantages: (1)
this can overcome the contradictory conclusions derived from examining only parts of the
dagong lifestyle, and (2) this can help explain Chinese migrant workers’ social attitudes
in general, because their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle have shaped their social
attitudes.
Second, there is an intimate relationship between motivations/expectations and
attitudes. Previous studies especially emphasize that role of comparing expectations with
outcomes in attitude formations. This logic could be found in both conservative and
radical thoughts. In conservative thought, Chinese migrant workers’ lower future
expectations are thought as a cause of their positive attitudes. According to radical
viewpoints, Chinese migrant workers’ recognition and expectations of interests and rights
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have resulted in their dissatisfactions. There are two problems with this logic. First,
besides expectations, perceptions and calculations also influence attitudes. Second, if
attitudes are more affected by other factors than motivations, they might also change
expectations or motivations.
Third, social comparison is considered as the main factor which influences
motivations and attitudes. Holding a conservative stance, Li and Li (2007) argued that
Chinese migrant workers’ frame of reference was those who still live and work in rural
villages and comparing their own life conditions with farmers’ had shaped their positive
social attitudes. For radical scholars, Chinese migrant workers tend to compare their life
conditions with urban citizens, which might make them depressed and angry (Lü 2013;
Loyalk 2013). However, social comparisons might also help develop perceptions besides
expectations, both of which could influence attitude formations.
To conclude, this chapter is to examine Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes to the
dagong lifestyle from their own perspectives, and to investigate the relationship between
their attitudes, motivations and perceptions.
Motivations and attitudes
As shown above, Chinese migrant workers’ motivations have been thought as a
determinant factor in explaining their attitudes. In chapter two and three, Chinese migrant
workers’ motivations have been investigated, which can serve as a background for
examining the relationship between their motivations and their attitudes. It was found that
Chinese migrant workers’ motivations are stratified, with permanent migration and
family needs as two ultimate goals. However, both ultimate goals are more complex than
permanent migration paradigm and household strategy paradigm have assumed.
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Furthermore, in the stratification structure of motivations, the relative places of the two
ultimate goals are different and changing during their migration processes and through
their life courses.
Radical Migrant Workers’ Attitudes
How are the attitudes of migrant workers who have strong desires to settle in
cities? It is found that whether migrant workers have strong desires to settle in cities or
not, they may accept the dagong lifestyle. Here, I focus on a participant, who had a strong
desire to settle in cities but accepted the dagong lifestyle. Yang was a maintenance staff
in an apartment in Beijing. He had worked there for three years when I interviewed him.
He came from Henan province. He graduated from a technology school. He was twentyfive years old and just got married. When talked about his plan in the future, he said:
Fayin: “Why not work in agricultural sector?”
Yang: “In Henan Province, we don’t have much farm land. So we cannot
make much money. It is impossible to live a better life through
agricultural production (…) You can only have a better life by
living in cities [not just by going to and working in cities].”
Fayin: “Do you want to live in the city in the future?”
Yang: “Yes, I want to earn a better life for my wife. If I have any children,
I also want them to have a better life (…) This is also the reason
why I didn’t get married before twenty-four years old. But, you
know, in the countryside, we usually get engaged before twenty
years old and marry soon.”
Because of this motivation or expectation, he was not satisfied with his present
life conditions as a migrant worker. When we talked about his working and living
conditions, he said:
“My living condition here is miserable. This building has fifteen stories.
We three maintenance workers live in a room in the attic. We don’t have
any extra space to accommodate our families (…) We don’t earn enough
money to rent rooms outside. So our bedroom is also our office (…) I got
married in the last year, but I have to separate with my wife because I
don’t want to lose this job.”
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An interesting thing is that although he was not satisfied with his present life
condition, he had to accept the dagong lifestyle as a means to meet his needs. So, when I
asked “As your living conditions are not good and you don’t want to live like this, why
do you still stay here?” He said,
“I don’t have other choices! I know there is no future to work on farm land.
I have to work in cities. I don’t want to live in a backward rural village for
my lifetime (…) I don’t want to work on farm land either. Fortunately, one
of my fathers’ friends introduced me to the boss I am working for. So, I
could experience the lifestyle in the biggest city of China. (…) I want to
be like my boss. He is from the same county with me. He was also a
migrant worker several years ago. He is smart. He also worked hard. He
was promoted as a manager after he became familiar with the businesses. I
admire him (…) However, I think it is normal to “eat bitterness” (endure
hardship) before you can be better than the majority. So, for the near
future, I have to work hard, learn skills, develop social networks, and
perfect myself.”

This case typifies all the elements involved in attitude formation for those migrant
workers with desires to settle in cities. First, their attitudes to present working and living
conditions are different from their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle as a means to an end.
That they are not satisfied with the living conditions doesn’t mean that they reject the
dagong lifestyle. Furthermore, they are not satisfied with their living conditions in both
rural villages and cities. Secondly, the dagong lifestyle is considered as a means to
achieve their goals. As they “have no other choices,” they have to accept this means.
Finally, social comparisons with other successfully urbanized citizens strengthen their
motivations and attitudes toward the dagong lifestyle.
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Conservative Migrant Workers’ Attitudes
How about those migrant workers without strong desires to settle in cities and
treating family needs as their ultimate motivations? Their attitudes to their living
conditions are also different from their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle as a means. While
they are not satisfied with the living conditions in cities, they tend to think dagong as a
reasonable means to meet their needs, as they also “have no other choices.” The
difference with radical migrant workers is that they tend to be satisfied with their life
conditions in rural villages, because they are more concerned with their households in
rural areas.
For example, Tai was forty years old and working in Beijing as a construction
worker. He had two parents, one of whom was sick and needed money to see the doctor.
He had two children. The elder daughter had worked as a migrant worker in the local city
for three years, and the younger son was in the third grade of the best elementary school
in his local town. As the last chapter introduced, he worked in Beijing because he wanted
to pay off the money he borrowed for his father’s medical treatment and to support his
son’s education. He lived in a small, informally built house, which was located in a
remote village from Beijing center. I visited that village with him and did a second
interview with him there 32. When we talked about his working and living conditions in
Beijing he expressed both a sense of satisfaction and a sense of pride.
“Every morning I have to get up very early, because it takes much time for
me to travel a long distance to the Beijing center and work there (…)
There are a large number of migrant workers (those who come here to
dagong) living in this village. So, sometimes all the buses are extremely
crowded. Sometimes, we have to wait for a long time during cold winter
32

In last chapter, I take him as an example to illustrate how family needs serve as ultimate goals. The data
is from our first interview at his working site. After that I went to his living place and had dinner with him
in his bedroom, because he only had a small room. During the dinner I did an informal interview with him.
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and hot summer (…) Sometimes I feel exhausted. I am tired of repeating
this life (…) But I have to do this (…) Now I can make more money here
than at my hometown. I can support my family. I have almost paid off my
debts. I think it is me who have work hard and earn a better life for my
family (…) I still survive. I think I am doing right things. I have no guilt. I
am proud of myself. My wife and children are also proud of me.”

Again, when I asked him, “As your living conditions are not good and you don’t
want to live like this, why do you still stay here?” He also mentioned “no other choices,”
and thought dagong was a reasonable way to meet his needs:
“I have to come here, because I need money. I have no other means. I
cannot earn enough money through agricultural production.”
Apparently, this is a simple question for him, which doesn’t need much
explanation. Though he didn’t have a strong desire to settle in cites, he also accepted
dagong as a means to meet his family needs as those migrant workers with that desire.
To conclude, Chinese migrant workers’ motivations only influence their attitudes
to present life conditions, because their motivations involve expectations about their
future life conditions, which serve as standards to assess the present life conditions.
Furthermore, whether they live as migrant workers for permanent migration or family
needs, they tend to hold negative attitudes to the present life conditions. However, if
motivations and life conditions are of same category, motivations and the dagong
lifestyle are of different categories. While motivations point to goals such as family needs
and permanent migration, the dagong lifestyle is the means. So, motivations can justify
the lifestyle as a means, rather than reject it. This is also the reason why nearly all
migrant workers to some extent have accepted the dagong lifestyle as a reasonable means
to achieve their needs. So, motivations can only explain a part of their attitudes—the
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attitude to life conditions. It needs more attention to their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle
as a means.
Attitudes and calculations
All of the above analyses on Chinese migrant workers’ motivations indicated that
the dagong lifestyle is just a means to achieve their own ends, whether the ends is to
make money, to meet family needs, or to settle in cities. So, from their own perspectives,
their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle are also developed out their treatment of the
lifestyle as a means. When I asked research participants “why do you dagong” to get
information about their motivations or intentions, some of them just told me “I have no
other choice.” Here, we can find that they are thinking about dagong and its alternatives
to meet their needs. More, generally, comparing dagong and its alternatives shapes their
attitudes to the dagong lifestyle. This section argues that Chinese migrant workers’
instrumental rationality has caused the different degrees of accepting the dagong lifestyle
and the changes in their attitudes, by comparing this lifestyle with its alternatives against
their expectations/ motivations.
High degrees of accepting the dagong lifestyle
New, young and single migrant workers often compare dagong with education.
Whatever industry they are working for, all these migrant workers use their failure in
education to justify their dagong lifestyle. They feel it is normal to dagong as a kind of
social education if they have quit schooling. Gang is 18 years old and single. He
graduated from primary middle-school at the age of 16. Since then, he worked in the
construction sector. When I interviewed him, he was working for a bus-making factory. I
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asked him “why do you come and work here?” in order to know his purpose or intention
toward dagong. He said:
“I don’t go to school. I have to do something (…) Studying is
boring. I don’t like studying (…)”
Even though his parents wanted him to go back to school and were
able to support his education, he didn’t continue his education. He felt that
he let his parents down, so he had to work to pacify his parents.
“They [his parents] also encouraged me to go to school. They also
think education is very important. After all, I should have such
basic skills as reading and calculating (…) My parents transport
bricks for construction sites. They also do some construction jobs.
They could earn enough money to support my education. [Later, he
mentioned that his family had built a new house in the village,
which cost more than 100, 000 Yuan.]”
“They (his parents) were very disappointed and angry at first.
Finally, they didn’t force me to go back to school. Probably they
knew that I will not do well at things in which I am not interested
(…) My parents want me to continue my schooling. But I don’t
like studying. I let them down. I made them very angry (…) I have
to work, because it is me who didn’t want to go to school. I have to
do something to spend my time, which should be spent at school…
If I don’t work, I would be forced to go back to school.”
He told he didn’t like the job he was doing and he was not satisfied
with his life conditions. Again when I asked him why he worked there
even if he didn’t like it, he said, “I have no other choice (…)”
This study doesn’t focus on the education system in China. However, education
matters for migrant workers’ calculations, especially for new and young migrant workers’.
Regardless of the educational conditions, the failure in schooling is a reason for new
migrant workers to leave home and have something to do.
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Older migrant workers usually compare agricultural production with dagong in
cities. Rural migrant workers have the possibility to work in agricultural sectors, though
some of them never did agricultural activities. Some scholars thought that rural villages
are declining (Lü, 2013; Pai, 2012), but my interviews show that agricultural production
has been developing in the past three decades. Especially the technological and
organizational changes have resulted in more and more surplus laborers in agricultural
sectors, who would have nothing to do if they didn’t dagong. On the other hand, the
income from agricultural production has been decreasing because of the high prices of
machines, services and fertilizers. So, some migrant workers have given up agricultural
production and worked in cities. Ning was a male migrant worker from the Shandong
province and was working as a carpenter in Beijing. When I interviewed him, he just
came back to Beijing from his home village a month ago. He went back to Shandong to
help his family harvest wheat. I asked him, “don’t you have other farming work to do?”
He told me:
“Farmers don’t have much work to do except sowing and harvesting. Now,
sowing and harvesting are much easier than before, because of
mechanization. Fifteen years ago, harvesting wheat exclusively depended
on hand and animal. It lasted for about a month from harvesting wheat to
sowing corn. About ten years ago, we started using tractors to harvest and
grind wheat. Tractors could do the work within one or two weeks. Now,
huge machines could do all the work at once within several hours. Sowing
corn only takes another day (…) In the past, we had to pull weeds every
week after sowing wheat or corn. Now, we have herbicides for all plants
(wheat, corn, bean, and so on). After using herbicides, we don’t need to
pull weeds by hand for a whole season (…) In the past, we also applied
fertilizers nearly every month. But now we have new fertilizers. It is
enough to apply these fertilizers once a season for the plants to grow (…)
Now my wife is at home. She actually doesn’t have much farm work to do,
either. Her main task is to look after the children (…) I also try to raise
pigs in my home village. But I found that raising livestock is very risky.
Even when I used scientific methods, I found that there so many factors
out of control. I tried twice. For the first time, the price of pigs became
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very low when I tried to sell mine. The market is not stable. For the
second time, several pigs were sick and died. Then, I went bankrupt…”
Agricultural production is an alternative for Ning. However, he didn’t give up his
rights to work on farmland, because agricultural production is becoming easier and easier.
However, new technologies are expensive, so he could earn enough money to support his
family.
Low degrees of accepting dagong lifestyle
Some migrant workers gradually become disappointed, when they find that they
cannot carry their wives and children to the working place, or when they cannot earn as
much money as they expected or needed. They try to find other ways to improve their
living standards. Some are thinking about agricultural production, for example livestock
raising, greenhouse vegetable cultivation, and so on. Some are thinking about starting
their own businesses in rural or urban areas. A typical example is Ye, who was 33 years
old. He was working for a hotel as a chef. He used to work in Jinan as security staff more
than ten years ago. Then he worked for a small dumpling restaurant and then ran that
restaurant for three years because the boss transferred it to him. In order to become more
professional, he went to Tianjin and Beijing and worked as an apprentice in several large
hotels. Then, he went back to the local city and worked as a chef in the best hotel in that
city. However, he said he could not earn enough money to support his family and tried to
start his own restaurant again:
“Now I have two daughters. My older daughter goes to school in this city.
My younger daughter is just two years old. [It seems that he will have a
baby boy. But he didn’t tell me clearly.] So, my wife has to look after the
children and cannot go to work (…) I subcontracted the land to others,
because I am able to earn more money by working in cities than
agricultural production (…) Because we don’t have agricultural activities
in my village, I lease an apartment in this city and all my family members
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are living here (…) So, though I could earn more money by working in the
city, the living cost is also very high. I always feel that I cannot earn
enough money (…) I have worked in several places and for several bosses.
My experiences tell me that working [he said “dagong”] for others is not
the way to make money, and only working for yourself can give you a
better life, because working for others can only earn money for others(…)I
have been thinking about starting my own business. I probably want to run
my own restaurant. But I don’t have enough money. I can start a small one,
but my family members cannot help me because my wife has to take care
of my children (…) I also thought about building a greenhouse in rural
village, but contracting land in good place is too expensive. I think a few
years later I will start with a small restaurant and then expand my
business.”
Ye is a skilled migrant worker and has some experience of running his own
business. So, he has some alternatives to the dagong lifestyle. These alternatives have
made him hold a negative attitude to the dagong lifestyle.
To conclude, the key to understanding migrant workers’ attitudes to the dagong
lifestyle is to define “alternatives” to the dagong lifestyle. In this paper, dagong means
rural residents, whose families have houses in rural villages and could work in
agricultural sectors otherwise, leave their rural homes and work for others in nonagricultural sectors. So alternatives could be (1) to go back to rural villages and work in
agricultural sectors, or (2) to run their own businesses in agricultural or non-agricultural
sectors. This definition can distinguish migrant workers’ attitudes to the dagong lifestyle
from their attitudes to their jobs. A large number of studies have pointed out migrant
workers in China changed their jobs, industries and places very frequently. Some even
though that the frequent turnovers indicated they didn’t work to dagong, which would
lead them to resist the social arrangements (Wang, 2005; Lü, 2013; Hannan, 2008).
However, if migrant workers’ attitudes to the dagong lifestyle are distinguished from
their attitudes about their jobs, migrant workers’ high turnover rate only indicates that
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migrant workers have more and more job opportunities for migrant workers. In migrant
workers’ eyes, these opportunities might have made dagong a better choice than
alternatives.
Changes of Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes
Migrant workers’ attitudes are not only different, but also changing during their
migration processes. The case of Lin (in chapter two) indicates that experienced workers
have tried alternatives to dagong and different jobs as migrant workers. When I
interviewed with him, he still wanted to try alternatives to dagong, because he felt
depressed by his dagong experiences. The process in which the being unsatisfied with
dagong experiences led them to try alternatives can be called depression.
Migrant workers may also become optimistic to the dagong lifestyle. This process
can be called justification. This happens mainly for two reasons: (1) they failed in
alternatives to dagong, including education, self-employment, and agricultural production;
and (2) they have more choices as migrant workers, including the options of industries,
factories and cities. The process of becoming optimistic because of failure in alternatives
could be called forced justification, while the process based on increasing choice could be
called seductive justification. Both kinds of justification have contributed to the
increasing degree of buying into the dagong lifestyle. However, it is hard to distinguish
the two kinds of processes in reality. In most cases, the two reasons lead to a justification
together. Most of my interviewees were not satisfied with their working and living
conditions, which made them have tried or trying some alternatives, except for new
migrant workers.

178

Laosi had been working as a migrant worker for 26 years. He was 43 years old. At
the age of 17, he left his home in the Sichuan province and went to the far western
province of Xinjiang to build roads. Though he only stayed there for a month and got no
money, that trip started his migrant-worker experiences. After his adventure to Xinjiang,
he tried other provinces, including Jilin, Shanxi, Tianjin, and Inner Mongolia. However,
he said at that time migrant workers had no guarantee of their jobs, working conditions,
or income. After working hard for a year in Xinjiang and Shanxi, he couldn’t even get his
wage and thus went back home for a family reunion with empty pockets. Finally, he was
too angry to work outside as a migrant worker:
“I couldn’t bear such miserable events. I just wanted to make money by
my hand. But I was hoaxed again and again… I was almost sold as a slave
in a coal mining company (…) I decided to give up working outside. I
wanted to find something to do in my hometown.”
At first, he tried to learn cooking skills and started his own small restaurant. But
he failed because the community was reorganized and his restaurant was forced to shut
down. After this trial and error, he worked in several nearby cities as a construction
worker. He said at that time he could get money at the end of a year. When he felt he had
enough money, he went back to the rural village and raised chickens. But he became
bankrupt again. According to his own opinion, the failure in raising chickens is caused by
the middle man between himself and the company, because he sold poor-quality feed at
the price of regular feed to make money. He told me:
“During those years, nearly all I thought about was starting my own
business… However, everything seemed to be difficult and even
impossible. (…) When I ran my own restaurant, I had to work till 2 or 3
o’clock in the mornings…But the result was not very good…At the same
time, I found that those who followed me and worked outside before have
made a lot of money. Some of them have become bosses or
businessmen…”
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Probably because he was encouraged by others’ success, he decided to work
outside again as a construction worker in the year of 2004. He went to Beijing and found
that construction companies didn’t postpone their wages anymore. At the end of 2004, he
went back home with his wages and he was very happy. He also worked in factories. But
he felt working in factories was boring: piecework wages made him feel very pressured
and tired, and his personal life was limited to the dormitory in the factories. He also said
that wages in factories were lower than in construction sectors. So he worked in factories
twice, but only for a short time. When I interviewed him, he was working in Beijing as a
construction worker. He had come to Beijing from Guangzhou six months earlier. At that
time, his son went to an occupational school after graduated from primary middle school.
The occupational school was a private school. So he said he had to work outside to
support his son’s education. When I asked him about his opinion on the jobs he used to
do, he said:
“Though I am so far away from my home, I can make more money that I
couldn’t earn if I worked in the local city. (…) Though the construction
job is not stable so that I have to move from place to place for jobs, I can
make more money than I worked in factories. (…) Though I have to work
harder physically as a construction worker, I don’t need to use my mind so
much as when I ran my small restaurant…”
These analyses indicate that migrant workers have their own calculations. Their
calculations not only influence their different degrees of accepting the dagong lifestyle,
but also the changes in their attitudes. It seems that they are rational calculators, because
they develop their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle by treating it as a means to their ends
and by comparing this means with its alternatives. Apparently, the rationality is an
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instrumental rationality of means-end calculation (Weber 1978: 24-26). Homans’ last
proposition in his social exchange theory says:
“In choosing between alternative actions, a person will choose that one for which,
as perceived by him at the time, the value, V, of the result, multiplied by the
probability, p, of getting the result, is the greater.” (Homans, 1974:43)
This proposition gives us the following equation of rational logic:
𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑉𝑉, 𝑝𝑝)

Where C is the choice, V is the value of the result and p is the probability of getting the
result.

Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes to the dagong lifestyle are also consistent with
this instrumental rationality. For example, for those migrant workers who want to make
money to support family needs, though agricultural activities have a high probability to
make money, the amount of money earned becomes small because of the shortage of land
and the commercial use of new technologies. However, to start their own business has
higher values but also has higher risks. Comparing with these two alternatives, to dagong
becomes a reasonable choice, because of more job opportunities and the government
policies guaranteeing wages.
Conclusion
So far, Chinese migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes have been examined.
They are two factors emphasized by micro-level theories about the emergence and
existence of Chinese migrant workers, which could be found in permanent migration
paradigm, household strategy paradigm, conservative and radical viewpoints about their
future. Putting them together, this section is to conclude the micro-level analysis in terms
of a life-experience theory about Chinese migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes.
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Four types of migrant workers
In order to comprehend the emergence, existence and future of Chinese migrant
workers, it is important to examine their own understandings of their life conditions. This
chapter and the previous two chapters try to figure out their own interpretations.
With respect to their motivations to dagong, this research goes beyond the
opposition between permanent migration paradigm and household strategy paradigm by
combining various theories of migration motivation. It argues that Chinese migrant
workers’ motivations to dagong are stratified, though different migrant workers might
have different layers of motivations in the stratification structure. At the top of
stratification structures, two ultimate motivations are permanent migration and family
needs. However, permanent migration might also be treated as a means to meet family
needs. Family needs might also be treated as a means to permanent migration (Loyalka
2012) 33. So, permanent migration and household strategy are not exclusive to each other
and both could be arranged in a stratification structure of motivations.
As far as Chinese migrant workers’ attitudes are concerned, their attitudes to their
life conditions are separated from their attitudes to the dagong lifestyle, because the latter
are different from the former because the former is only part of the latter. This research
finds that though they are not satisfied with their current life conditions, they accept the
dagong lifestyle as a means to meet their ends. As all migrant workers treat the dagong
lifestyle as a means, the degree of accepting the lifestyle is determined by comparing this
lifestyle with its alternatives. Those migrant workers who recognize alternatives and have
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In chapter three, she talked stories about teenage girls who worked in beauty salons. A legendary story
was widespread among beauty girls that a girl had married an urban guy. Stimulated by this story, some
girls dreamed that one day they would marry an urban boy so that they could permanently migrate into
cities.
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higher expectation of alternatives tend to have a lower degree of accepting the dagong
lifestyle.
According to their own motivations and attitudes, four ideal types of migrant
workers could be constructed (Table 10). While optimistic migrant workers believe that
through working as migrant-workers they could meet their strong desire to settle down in
cities, adventurous migrant workers try other ways to settle down in cities and tend to
doubt the future of migrant-worker lifestyle. While instrumental migrant workers work as
migrant workers to meet other needs other than settling down in cities, fatalistic migrant
workers have lost their hope of settling down in cities or migrant-worker lifestyle and are
prone to return to rural areas.
Life and Subjective Experiences
Table 10 only shows four “ideal” types of Chinese migrant workers, not only
because there are no clear boundaries between the four types, but also because a certain
migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes are changing. These changes in subjective
consciousness—motivations and attitudes—are called subjective experiences. As to the
changes in motivations, the term “radicalization” refers to the process in which migrant
workers’ desire to permanently migrate increase. The term “conservatization” refers to
the process in which migrant workers reduce the desire to settle down in cities and focus
more and more on their other needs such as family needs. The term “optimisticization” is
used to describe the process in which migrant workers gradually accept the dagong
lifestyle as a reasonable way to meet their needs. By contrast, “adventuring” could be
used to describe the process in which they become unsatisfactory with the dagong
lifestyle and want to try its alternatives.
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Subjective experiences are only a part of Chinese migrant workers’ experiences,
because subjective experiences are conditioned by their immediate life conditions,
including working conditions, incomes and family lives. Furthermore, their life
conditions are also changing during their migration processes and through their life
courses. The changes in their immediate life conditions are called life experiences.
Subjective experiences are conditioned by life experiences because their motivations and
attitudes are changing with their life conditions. As Bourdieu (1963; 1972) said,
“subjective hopes” tend to be consistent with “objective chances,” which is a mechanism
of social reproduction. Radicalization happens mainly at two points. The first point is
when they just start working in cities and experience the disparity of living standards
between rural and urban areas. The second point is when they get better working and
living conditions in the cities, which might increase their ambitions. After radicalization
at the two points mentioned above, marriage and children’s education might lead to a
conservatization process. Migrant workers become optimistic to the dagong lifestyle
mainly for two reasons: (1) they failed in alternatives to dagong, including education,
self-employment, and agricultural production; and (2) they have more choices as migrant
workers, including the options of industries, factories and cities.
Unsolved problems
The above life-experience theory only involves the relationship between life
experiences and subjective experiences. Specifically, Chinese migrant workers change
their motivations and attitudes because of the changes in their immediate life conditions
such as working conditions and family lives. However, there are several unsolved
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problems with this reasoning. All of these problems are important to understand the logic
of the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers.
If motivations and attitudes change with life conditions, do they change frequently?
Or are their motivations and attitudes relatively stable for a certain period of time? Are
there dramatic changes in their life conditions? Or are their life conditions only changing
within a certain limit? So, we need to examine the factors which have influenced Chinese
migrant workers’ life conditions. If migrant workers have some cognitive and
manipulative power over their immediate life conditions (this is also the reason why these
life conditions are said “immediate”), these life conditions might be shaped by other
conditions beyond their control. These remote conditions might be beyond their condition
and manipulation, so they are systems in Harbermas’ term (1984; 1987). The next two
chapters will examine the institutional or systematic factors which have shaped their life
conditions and subjective consciousness.
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Table 10. Four Ideal Types of Chinese Migrant Workers (N=36)*
Whether
migrant workers have
high degree of
accepting the dagong
lifestyle

Whether migrant workers have strong desires
to settle down in cities
Yes

No

Yes

Optimistic
(7; 19%)**

Instrumental
(21; 59%)

No

Adventurous
(5; 14%)

Retreating
(3; 8%)

*The 36 interviewees are selected by theoretical principles according to migrant workers’
characteristics. So, these interviewees might not be proportionate to the overall structure of
Chinese migrant workers.
**The number and percentage of cases in each category out of selected cases.

Copyright © Fayin Xu 2015
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Chapter Eight:
Conclusion
With industrialization, the internal migration from the countryside to cities in
China has been considered as the largest migration in world history (Meng and Manning
2010). Despite the rapid urbanization process, most of these migrants have not become
workers who have settled as urban residents; rather, they became migrant workers and
guests in cities. Furthermore, this group of migrant workers has existed for more than
three decades and the number of migrant workers has been increasing in the past decades.
The problem is that their working and living conditions are unfavorable compared to city
dwellers and even quite miserable in absolute terms. They commute between rural and
urban areas, especially during traditional festivals and harvest seasons. They concentrate
in physically demanding jobs where they work long hours under severe working
conditions, but their wages are low compared to most city dwellers. Even though their
work is legal and vital to the economy, they work without formal job contracts. Most of
them have no health insurance, retirement insurance, injury insurance, unemployment
compensation, and other welfare benefits or social services. Their children cannot go to
public city schools. Their living quarters are very small and most of them have to live
separate from most of their family members. Their jobs are neither secured nor stable.
Furthermore, these unfavorable life conditions often cause psychological problems, such
as depressive symptoms. Yet they continue to dagong since wages are slightly higher
than in their villages.
This study is about the logic of the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant
workers, which can explain their current situation and future. It is argued that in the past

187

three decades Chinese migrant workers have formed a social class with a distinctive
dagong lifestyle, because:
(1) This group of people has a large number of individuals, possesses persistent
proportions in Chinese social structures, and has existed and will exist for an
uncertain but not currently foreseeable period of time.
(2) Stable institutional arrangements have maintained the existence of Chinese
migrant workers by shaping their life conditions, identities, motivations and
attitudes, and these institutions include the development of household autonomy
system in rural villages, the encouragement and regulation of informal
employment relationship in cities, the maintenance of differential citizenship with
migrant workers receiving less in the cities, and the strengthening of identitybased market ideology.
(3) Chinese migrant workers’ motivations have justified their dagong lifestyle even
when their desire to permanently stay in cities is blocked, and these motivations
include personal honor at home, career future in cities, household needs at home
and family development in cities.
(4) They tend to accept the dagong lifestyle, especially when they fail to meet their
needs through returning to agricultural activities, starting their own businesses,
and pursuing further education. This process is called the structuration of Chinese
migrant workers which happened based on the changing macro-institutional
arrangements and diverse micro-subjective experiences shaped by and shaping
those institutions.
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These findings can be summarized as a class-structuration theory of Chinese
migrant workers. These findings are important to understanding the rapid and continuous
economic growth in China because Chinese migrant workers have provided a labor force
for China’s economic growth. This has given China a competitive advantage and made it
the world’s factory. These findings are also significant to explain the social stability in
China, because they can reveal Chinese migrant workers’ multiple responses to their life
conditions and social institutions. These findings also have significant implications for
state policies for removing the migrant-worker class because the logic of the emergence
and existence of Chinese migrant workers in this study points out the underlying forces of
this class, which have to be abolished or ameliorated in order to eliminate the unfavorable
life conditions of the migrant-worker class. This conclusion will summarize the main
findings of this study, and explain both its contributions and limitations.
Institutions, Experiences and the Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
As the number of Chinese migrant workers has been increasing for more than
three decades, this study has argued that Chinese migrant workers have been structured as
a social class with a distinctive dagong lifestyle. Furthermore, this structuration process
has both macro-institutional and micro-subjective bases. This part will reiterate the main
arguments and findings of this study.
The Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
Because of the changes in Chinese migrant workers’ life conditions, previous
definitions have become inadequate to grasp their common characteristics. In this study,
Chinese migrant workers are defined as those workers characterized by their dagong
lifestyle, whereby dagong means leaving rural villages, where they have the rights to
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contract farm land and build houses, and work in towns and cities, in which they work for
others in order to earn higher wages than in the villages but lower than most city dwellers.
This definition focuses on Chinese migrant workers’ behavioral characteristics, but also
integrates their features of economic and social status, so it can grasp the recent changes
in their life conditions.
Chinese migrant workers emerged since the late 1970s when China launched its
Reform and Opening-up Policies. In 1978, when China initiated its economic reform, 82
per cent of the total population in China was rural and worked in agricultural sectors with
extremely low productivity and income (Li 2008). This part of Chinese population had
been collectivized into communes in agricultural production before 1978 by the
communistic party-state. Furthermore, the Hukou arrangement had been developed to
tightly control rural people’s movement from the agricultural sector to the nonagricultural sector and from the countryside to cities. Because of the economic growth
and institutional reforms since 1978 when Chinese government launched the project of
reform and opening-up, the number of migrant workers has been increasing for more than
three decades. Even in the last five years, the number of Chinese migrant workers has
been increasing by 8% from 225.42 million in 2008 to 268.94 million in 2013.
Not only has the number of Chinese migrant workers been increasing, the
proportion of this group of migrants in the economic structure has grown and become
relatively stable. With respect to the industrial structure, migrant workers concentrated in
labor-intensive industries, including manufacturing, construction and service industries.
This industrial distribution did not change much in the past decades, which indicates that
Chinese migrant workers have become a structural element in Chinese industrial structure.

190

On the supply side, the employment opportunities described above have attracted surplus
labors from rural agricultural sectors. The proportion of migrant workers out of total
urban employment also indicates that Chinese migrant workers have grown to be a
structural element of the Chinese labor force.
Furthermore, they have developed to a social stratum with a distinctive dagong
lifestyle, which is different from both the lifestyles of typical rural residents and urban
residents. This dagong lifestyle is characterized by Chinese migrant workers’ various
connections with rural community and their marginalized life conditions in cities and
towns. All migrant workers are from agricultural sectors and have some connections with
their rural villages. These connections with rural villages are also the reasons why
migrant workers frequently move between their hometowns and cities. This connection
could be of economic or social nature. As to economic connections, they have the right to
contract farm land in rural villages, so they are not willing to give up agricultural
production because it is a basic security. The split household strategy adopted by rural
families usually involves leaving some family members in rural villages. The separation
of family members only intensifies their social connections with their rural villages. In
cities, they concentrate in physically demanding jobs in manual labor, which are jobs
usually shunned by urban residents. So the occupations taken by migrant workers have
low prestige, such as domestic worker, security staff, porter, and construction worker,
and so on 34. Their jobs are very unstable, with some of them being day laborers and some
of them changing jobs for many times a year. The working conditions at construction
sites and service occupations are usually unsafe and dirty as they frequently work over-
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Studies of Chinese migrant workers show many of them are in the manufacturing sector. Part of my
contribution is to show how migrant workers form as a class and obtain their identities in other industries.
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time. Migrant workers’ living conditions in cities are also marginalized with respect to
their consumption, residence, and children’s education.
Finally, some Chinese migrant workers have become a political force, which can
be found in both governmental policy-making targeted to Chinese migrant workers and
their own bottom-up responses to their life conditions. The government has introduced
regulations particularly targeted at improving migrant workers’ living conditions.
However, all of these policies are to permit and serve the existence of migrant workers,
rather than to eliminate migrant workers in the labor system. No attempt has been made
to completely remove this system. There are three stages of policy making toward
migrant workers. The first stage was the pendulum between permission and limitation of
population migration. The second stage was a transition from permission to management.
In the third stage, state policies changed from managing migrant workers to beginning to
serve them. At present, gradualist reforms also try to provide basic social benefits to
migrant workers, rather than give them equal status and welfare with urban residents. On
the other hand, the resistance launched by migrant workers is another mechanism through
which Chinese migrant workers have been structured. First, the resistance particularly
launched by “migrant workers” indicates that migrant workers have some common
working and life conditions, which also have led to shared perceptions, attitudes and
actions. Second, nearly all studies indicate that migrant workers’ resistance is still at the
initial stage, which also implies that this resistance is not strong enough to change the
basic institutional arrangements within the short-term. The protest process indicates that
their resistance is still largely autonomous and not well organized, usually based on the
factory level. Third, resistance could serve as a signal to the state, which could develop
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corresponding policies to solve the problems causing resistance. But as analyzed above,
these state policies might not change institutional arrangements and eliminate the group
of migrant workers since acceptance certainly outnumbers resistance.
All of this evidence indicates that Chinese migrant workers have constituted a
semi-permanent social class with a distinctive dagong lifestyle. This process can be
called the structuration of Chinese migrant workers. Here, the structuration means the
emergence of a social class, which (1) has large numbers, (2) possesses stable proportions
in Chinese social structure, (3) has a distinctive lifestyle, and (4) has existed and will
exist for a long period of time. Generally speaking, the structuration of Chinese migrant
workers means that there are a number of social positions occupied by a group of people,
which have existed and will last for an undetermined but relatively long historical period.
Specifically, this structuration has two aspects: macro-structural forces and microexperiences combining motivations and attitudes.
Macro-Institutions and the Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
What institutional arrangements have contributed to the structuration of Chinese
migrant workers? Many argue that the Hukou system causes the emergence and existence
of Chinese migrant workers. In order to examine the effects of the Hukou system, this
study has clarified its meaning. After examining the origin, operation, purpose, and
function of the Hukou system, I defined the Hukou system as a state project, through
which the state has tightly controlled the population’s migration in the communistic era,
and which also provided a basis for the state to re-organize its citizens and other
resources. Focusing on its function of migration control, this definition emphasizes the
holistic nature of dual urban-rural structure derived from migration control, especially the
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differentiated citizenship between rural and urban residents. However, the previous
studies on the Hukou system tend to include everything in the Hukou system so that the
term has become vague and too broadly used.
Based on this definition, it is true that the Hukou system has contributed to the
large number of Chinese migrant workers because: (1) the loosened migration controls
have stimulated more rural residents to leave rural villages and work in cities and towns,
and (2) the differential citizenship between rural and urban residents and the partial
citizenship of Chinese migrant workers in cities and towns make it hard for migrant
workers to permanently migrate to urban area.
Moreover, the definition of the Hukou system employed in this study indicates
that the Hukou paradigm alone is inadequate for explaining the emergence and existence
of Chinese migrant workers. For example, the emergence of Chinese migrant workers
took place before the Hukou system reforms. That is, even before the government
loosened the tight migration control, rural residents had begun leaving home and working
in cities. To some extent, the Hukou system reforms can be treated as governmental
responses to the emergence of Chinese migrant workers and their own motivations.
Though everything can be abstractly related to the Hukou system, this system itself is
embedded in broader social arrangements, especially the interaction between the state and
market. Furthermore, the value of Hukou statuses depends on other institutional
arrangements besides migration control, such as agricultural production organization,
social management in cities, and the development of market economy, and so on.
So this study identified three other institutional arrangements besides the partial
reform of the Hukou system. After the migration control was loosened, four institutional
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arrangements have contributed to the structuration of Chinese migrant workers by
influencing their identities, motivations, and attitudes. These institutional arrangements
include: (1) the development of household autonomy system in rural villages, (2) the
encouragement and regulation of informal employment relationship in cities, (3) the
maintenance of differential citizenship with migrant workers receiving only semicitizenship in the cities, and (4) the strengthening of identity-based market ideology. The
development of household autonomy in rural villages has inadvertently strengthened
Chinese migrant workers’ identity as family members. The encouragement and regulation
of informal employment relationships in cities have reinforced their temporary identity as
guests in cities and towns. The maintenance of differential citizenship with migrant
workers receiving less in the cities has made them identify as rural residents. Finally, the
construction of identity-based market ideology has led them to think of themselves as
lower-level workers. Furthermore, the development of household autonomy in rural
villages and Chinese migrant workers’ identity as family members are especially related
to their motivations to dagong in cities. Especially, some migrant workers work in cities
to meet household needs and achieve family development. Chinese migrant workers’
informal employment, differentiated and partial citizenship, and their identity as guests
and rural residents are related to their unfavorable life conditions in cities and their
attitudes toward their dagong lifestyle. Once being accepted, the market ideology has
shaped Chinese migrant workers’ perceptions and attitudes toward their life conditions.
The next section will examine how these institutional arrangements have affected
Chinese migrant workers’ experiences.
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Micro-Experiences and the Structuration of Chinese Migrant Workers
As far as Chinese migrant workers’ micro-subjective experiences are concerned,
their motivations and attitudes toward the dagong lifestyle elaborate the influences of
institutional arrangements and explain the structuration of Chinese migrant workers.
Moreover, their motivations and attitudes uncover the micro-level mechanisms through
which Chinese migrant workers have been structured as a social class.
With respect to Chinese migrant workers’ motivations to dagong, not all migrant
workers have a strong desire to permanently migrate. Actually few migrant workers are
motivated by the desire to settle in cities. Why do many of them lack this desire? Within
the group of migrant workers without such a desire to settle in cities, some of them
simply feel that settling down is impossible to achieve that because they cannot make
enough money through dagong in cities. These migrant workers are usually just starting
working in cities as migrant workers. For them, though they feel the disparity between
the countryside and cities with respect to the living standards and job opportunities, they
feel it impossible for them to live in cities. This kind of desire I called “no desire.”
Within this group, some of them used to have a desire to settle in cities, but they have
given up because after they work and live in cities for some time, they think it impossible
to achieve citizenship in the city. This kind of desire can be called “lost intention.” For
those migrant workers with the desire to permanently migrate, some of them only have a
hope of settling in cities, while others have developed a specific plan to achieve this. That
is, some migrant workers only have a “hopeful desire,” while others have an “expected
desire.”
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However, the desire to settle in cities is by no means an ultimate motivation to
dagong and becoming a migrant worker within the dagong lifestyle is a process over time.
Why do some of migrant workers want to settle in cities? As some of them don’t have a
desire to permanently migrate, why do they go to dagong in cities? This study found that
Chinese migrant workers’ motivations to dagong are stratified, with direct, conscious and
economic motivations at lower levels and indirect, unconscious and social motivations at
higher levels. This study shows that migrant workers’ desires change over time with four
types of ultimate motivations. Some migrant workers’ motivations are rural-oriented,
while others’ are urban oriented. Some of them are personal-oriented, while others are
social-oriented. According to their motivations’ geographical and social orientations, four
motivations can be distinguished. First, “personal honor at home” is a rural-oriented
personal motivation, in which migrant workers try to earn honor and respect from other
family members. Second, “personal future in cities” is an urban-oriented personal
motivation, whereby migrant workers want to have a brighter future in cities. Third,
“Household needs” at home is a rural-oriented social motivation which means migrant
workers want to earn money to meet their consumption needs in the countryside. Fourth,
“family development in cities” is an urban-oriented social motivation in which migrant
workers want to settle in cities for a better family future, especially their children’s
education.
Though not all of them have a strong desire to settle in cities and towns, all
Chinese migrant workers have motivations to leave the countryside and work in cities
and towns. All of these motivations have justified the dagong lifestyle. However, this
doesn’t mean that Chinese migrant workers have accepted the dagong lifestyle. Because
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of the unfavorable working and living conditions associated the dagong lifestyle, some
migrant workers try to shed this lifestyle. So, whether Chinese migrant workers accept
the dagong lifestyle also depends on whether they have viable alternatives to this lifestyle.
Whatever their motivations are and whether they accept the dagong lifestyle depends on
whether there are alternatives to the dagong lifestyle.
According to their motivations and attitudes, four types of Chinese migrant
workers were distinguished:
(1) Adventurous migrant workers want to settle in cities but do not accept the
dagong lifestyle.
(2) Optimistic migrant workers want to settle in cities and accept the dagong
lifestyle.
(3) Instrumental migrant workers do not want to settle in cities and treat
dagong as a means to meet family needs.
(4) Retreating migrant workers do not want to settle in cities or accept the
dagong lifestyle.
Optimistic and instrumental migrant workers have especially contributed to the
structuration of Chinese migrant workers. Furthermore, through the process of their life
course, Chinese migrant workers tend to sooner or later reduce their desire to settle in
cities and to accept the dagong lifestyle.
Furthermore, during migration process both Chinese migrant workers’
motivations and attitudes are changing with their life course. There are two general trends.
First, they tend to reduce their desire to settle in cities, especially when they get married,
have children, and have more family responsibilities. Then they would become less
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ambitious and focus on their household needs. Second, they tend to accept the dagong
lifestyle. Especially after they try alternatives to dagong and fail, they are forced to
accept the dagong lifestyle as a reasonable way to meet their needs, which are also
changing during the migration process.
The Contribution to Sociological Knowledge
As the above summary indicates, this study tries to describe the current situation
and future of Chinese migrant workers as a group of people. It is argued that Chinese
migrant workers have been structured as a new social class with a distinctive dagong
lifestyle. This conclusion is based an examination of institutional arrangements and
migrant workers’ experiences in contemporary China. What are the implications of this
conclusion? This section will point out three important implications that go beyond the
description of the current situation of Chinese migrant workers.
A Class-Structuration Theory of Chinese migrant workers
As the number of Chinese migrant workers has been increasing for more than
three decades, studies on this group of people have also been increasing for more than
three decades. This study has criticized transitional perspectives—“permanent migration”
and “labor protest”—on Chinese migrant workers, as I have argued that they have
constituted a social class with a distinctive lifestyle. This study results in a classstructuration theory of Chinese migrant workers, which has important implication for
class-structuration process in general. Compared to other perspectives about Chinese
migrant workers, including migration perspective, urbanization perspective, classformation perspective, and labor-regime perspective, this class-structuration perspective
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can describe and explain the increasing number and long-term existence of Chinese
migrant workers.
Chinese migrant workers have many characteristics, including their migration
behavior, their unequal status with local urban residents, their wage-labor employment
relationship, and their resistance against their unfavorable life conditions. However,
previous studies tend to emphasize only one of these characteristics, which has led to
different, but in my view faulty or incomplete, perspectives about Chinese migrant
workers. According to their definitions of Chinese migrant workers, I identified four
paradigms in the study of Chinese migrant workers (Xu, 2015): the migration paradigm
treats them as migrants and concentrates on their migration behavior (for example, Fan,
2008; Zhu, 2007; Lee and Meng 2010; Ye, 2011); the urbanization paradigm considers
them as semi-urban-residents and examines their urban working and living conditions
(for example, Meng and Manning, 2010; Cai, 2010; Kwan, 2009; Knight, et al., 2011;
Wang and Zhang, 2008; Liang and Wang, 2010 ); the class-formation paradigm thinks of
them as a new working-class and focuses on their collective resistance (for example,
Shen, 2006; Lee, 2007; Chan, 2001; Pun and Lu, 2010); and the labor-regime paradigm
considers them as laborers and investigates their interaction with others in the labor
process (for example, Pun, 1999; Pun and Smith, 2007). Based on these definitions, these
perspectives also focus on different research questions: (1) the decision-making to
migrate and structural disparities involved in the migration paradigm; (2) the party-state
urbanization strategy in China and Chinese migrant workers’ social adaptation in the
urbanization paradigm; (3) the transformation from class-in-itself to class-for-itself in
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class-formation theory; and (4) and social reproduction and the labor process from a
labor-regime perspective.
However, all four paradigms leave some unanswered problems because each of
them only focuses on only certain dimensions of this phenomenon. Focusing on decisionmaking to migrate, the migration paradigm cannot explain Chinese migrant workers’
social adaptation and life conditions in cities. With the implicit assumption of
modernization and industrialization, urbanization paradigm fails to examine the longterm existence of the group of Chinese migrant workers. Empirical evidence shows that
Chinese migrant workers’ resistance is still at an early stage, which makes the classformation perspective unsuitable to the current situation of Chinese migrant workers—the
increasing number of Chinese migrant workers. Finally, the labor-regime perspective
tends to concentrate on the control of migrant workers by employers and their life
conditions, and thus cannot link to broad social contexts. Moreover, each of these
paradigms has examined only some institutions, so the influence of other institutions
cannot be completely investigated. Even though they have examined some same
institutions, each of them cannot explicate the complete effects of those institutions. For
example, the Hukou system has been examined in all four paradigms, but each of them
cannot completely explicate the influence of this institution.
But these paradigms are not exclusive to each other and to some degree their
research questions could be more complimentary. So it is important to construct an
integrative framework to understand the long-term existence and future of Chinese
migrant workers. The turn to class analysis is a good starting point because the
development of class analysis has integrated economic, political and cultural elements
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involved in class processes. However, the class-formation paradigm has narrowed the
scope of class analysis. Besides class conflict, there are other class processes, including
class structuration, class effectuation, class action, and class reproduction. This study also
treats Chinese migrant workers as a social class, but the basic question is the classstructuration process.
Among the four paradigms, labor-regime perspective has attempted to connect
migrant workers’ motivations, attitudes, and life conditions, on the one hand, to social
institutions, on the other. In order to investigate the increasing number and long-term
existence of Chinese migrant workers, this study also draws upon this perspective by
combining migrant workers’ experiences and institutional arrangements. This study has
tried to describe the current situation of Chinese migrant workers as the “structuration,”
which means Chinese migrant workers have formed a social class with a distinctive
dagong lifestyle, whereby dagong means leaving rural villages, where they have the
rights to contract farm land and build houses, and work in towns and cities, in which they
work for others in order to earn wages. Furthermore, this class-structuration process
includes both macro-institutional arrangements and micro-subjective experiences.
Migrant Workers, Economic Growth, and Social Stability in China
Chinese migrant workers have constituted an important economic force and
political force. They have contributed to the rapid economic growth and long-term social
stability over the past three decades. So, this study not only helps describe and explain
the emergence and existence of Chinese migrant workers, but also has implications for
the economic growth and social stability in China.
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The first direct implication of this study is about the future of Chinese migrant
workers. Because of Chinese party-state’s gradualist approach to institutional reform (Pei,
2005), the current institutional arrangements are serving and supporting the existence of
Chinese migrant workers, rather than removing and eliminating this group of people.
Furthermore, in the gradualist approach, institutional reforms have taken into account
Chinese migrant workers’ demands and reactions, so resultant institutional arrangements
have shaped both Chinese migrant workers’ motivations and attitudes. At least some of
them have accepted the dagong lifestyle as a reasonable means to achieve their needs or
motivations. Despite having considered Chinese migrant workers’ needs, in the future the
continuous trial-and-error institutional reforms will not remove all barriers at once to the
permanent migration of rural residents to cities and towns.
On the other hand, because their motivations have justified their dagong lifestyle
and they tend to accept this lifestyle, their protests will not become very revolutionary.
Especially, their protests are largely to improve their wages and living conditions, rather
than to change the whole social system. Even if their bottom-up collective actions are
rising, it still takes a long time for them to become strong enough to dramatically change
the institutional arrangements in contemporary China. As the term “structuration of
Chinese migrant workers” indicates, this group of Chinese migrant workers will exist for
a certain period of time in the future.
This first direct implication is closely related to the rapid economic growth in
China over the past three decades. Labor is an indispensible element for economic growth.
As labor-intensive industries constitute a large proportion of Chinese economy, labor is
especially important for its economic growth. In the past decades, China has become a
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“world factory,” which depends on the low labor costs in manufacturing industries. As
cheap laborers, Chinese migrant workers are the competitive advantage of China in the
world economy. So, the debate on “Lewisian turning point” is significant for Chinese
economic growth. However, the question is not only about the supply and demand of
migrant workers. It also involves the creation and existence of migrant workers, which
are related to Chinese unique institutional arrangements and migrant workers’
motivations and perceptions. This study implies that in the future Chinese migrant
workers’ market benefits will increase; for example, their wage will be higher and their
bargaining power will increase. But this doesn’t means that this group of people will
disappear soon because institutional arrangements will force them to work as migrant
workers and this will reinforce them to some extent to continue to accept the dagong
lifestyle.
The second direct implication is that for the response of Chinese migrant workers
to their life conditions. According to their motivations and attitudes, this study
distinguished four types of Chinese migrant workers: optimistic, adventurous,
instrumental and retreating migrant workers. Those adventurous migrant workers tend to
be unsatisfied with the dagong lifestyle and desire revolutionary social changes. These
migrant workers might launch various forms of protest. But all other three types of
Chinese migrant workers tend to accept the dagong lifestyle or quit working in cities and
towns. Furthermore, through their life courses, Chinese migrant workers’ motivations and
attitudes will change with their family life, working and living conditions. For example,
optimistic migrant workers might become adventurous, after which they might become
instrumental migrant workers. It was found that some adventurous migrant workers have
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become instrumental, when they got married and had kids, and some of them have
become optimistic, when they got promotions and earned better life conditions.
These implications are closely related to the social stability of China. In the past
few decades, the co-existence of economic liberalization and political authoritarianism
has become a puzzle in China studies because it was argued that economic liberalization
will release social forces, which will force political changes (Gallagher, 2007; Rawski,
2011). That is why labor protests launched by Chinese migrant workers have attracted
many scholars’ attention. Some argued that Chinese migrant workers have become a
social force with independent actions based on one or more of the following reasons: (1)
Chinese migrant workers’ demands have gone beyond those defined by legal regulations;
(2) some of their actions to struggle for their interests have gradually become radical; (3)
their collective actions have included more than one particular company and sometimes
loosely united across factories and/or cities; and (4) they have developed their own
discourses by borrowing from many political ideals (Lee, 2007; Chris Chan, 2009, 2010;
Chan & Ngai, 2009; Ngai & Lu, 2010). Other scholars rejected the above arguments
because they thought that (1) Chinese migrant workers’ collective actions are irrational
and spontaneous, rather than planned; (2) these actions are temporary, rather than longstanding; (3) collective actions across factories are rare cases subject to police action; and
(4) collective action can be ignored, compared to the vast numbers of Chinese migrant
workers (Ahlers & Schubert, 2011; Chan & Siu, 2012; Lee, 2013). This study shows that
only adventurous migrant workers are subject to labor protests and these migrant workers
eventually tend to become conservative. This process theory of motivations and attitudes
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partially explained the social stability associated with economic liberalization and
political authoritarianism.
Implications for State Policies
This study also has practical policy implications. My analysis of the structuration
of Chinese migrant workers shows the logic of the emergence and existence of this group
of people. This logic includes both macro-level institutional arrangements and microlevel subjective experiences. Furthermore, those institutional arrangements have shaped
Chinese migrant workers’ life conditions, motivations and attitudes. Finally, those
institutional arrangements involve the interaction between the state and market. The first
implication is that state policy is the key to improving Chinese migrant workers’ living
conditions and to eliminate the unfavorable life conditions of this group of people.
Second, it is inadequate to make policies based on migrant workers’ motivations and
attitudes alone because their motivations and attitudes are shaped by their life conditions
which in turn are affected by institutional arrangements. If only elite migrant workers had
more desire to settle in cities, then policies only allowing these migrant workers to settle
in cities will contribute to the urbanization process, but it will continue to maintain the
existence of Chinese migrant workers.
Though the current policies have considered Chinese migrant workers’ needs and
are just to serve and support the existence of this group of people, if the government
really wants to eliminate this phenomenon, they will have to take quite different measures.
The key is still the relationship between the state and markets. The state has to make
policies to construct a fair labor market, rather than to serve the bare existence of this
group of people. Besides the ideology of market, the state should also construct new
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market institutions. The state should pay attention to the following two problems: (1) to
solve the differential and partial citizenship of Chinese migrant workers, the state should
give equal citizenship rights to migrant workers with urban residents; and (2) to solve the
problem of informal employment, the state should strictly enforce the National Labor
Law with respect to migrant workers’ employment relationship and give them stronger
employment contracts and allow higher wages or at least wage supplements or bonuses
for being migrant workers.
Implications for Migration Theory
Chinese migrant workers are predominately characterized by their migration
behavior. Because all of them don’t become permanent urban residents and they have
various connections with rural villages, they have to circularly migrate between the
countryside and cities. The examination of Chinese migrant workers’ migration has
important implications for migration theories.
First, Chinese migrant workers’ motivations examined in this study can contribute
to the understanding of migration motivations. In migration theories about migration
motivations, there are debates between economic and social motivations, individual and
societal nature of motivations, and rational and irrational decision-making. This study
shows that migration motivations can be stratified, with economic motivations at lower
levels and social motivations at higher levels. More importantly, even when migrants’
migration is based on rational decision-making, the rational process is still embedded in
irrational and moral values. For example, all Chinese migrant workers rationally consider
dagong as a means to achieve their needs because of the structural disparities between the
rural and urban area in China. However, this rational calculation has different orientations.
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So, some migrant workers want to earn personal honor from their family members and
relative networks, while some other migrant workers want to earn money to meet their
nuclear family’s financial needs. Even within the group of migrant workers with the
desire to settle in cities, some want to have a brighter career future, while others want to
provide better education for their children.
Second, existing migration studies tend to separate the question of migration
decision from that of assimilation after migration. Most studies emphasize the
disadvantageous status of migrants in receiving areas, as if they are part of that society.
However, the circular migration of Chinese migrant workers involves both their decisionmaking to migrate and their life conditions in cities in which assimilation is largely not
possible. Furthermore, this study also pointed out how the institutional arrangements
have shaped Chinese migrant workers’ life conditions, identities, motivations and
attitudes. The conclusions of this study might be able to apply to understanding circular
migrations in other arenas. For example, some international migrants might commute
between sending countries and receiving countries if they fail to permanently migrate to
the receiving countries 35.
Implications for Structuration Theory
Treating Chinese migrant workers as a social class, this study has concentrated on
the structuration process of Chinese migrant workers, which means Chinese migrant
workers have become a structural stratum in Chinese social structure. The term
“structuration” employed here recalls Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory.

35

This contribution is somewhat different from the cumulative or rotational theory described by Masssey et
al. because it describes permanent rotational rather than partial rotation. In other words, Chinese migrant
workers are a semi-permanent class for almost all workers, as few ever become full residents.
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In this study, the term “structuration” has two meanings, only one of which is
same as Giddens’ definition. The first meaning is the definition of structuration as a
mechanism through which structure and agency are interrelated with each other. The
second meaning is the definition of structuration as a historical process of class formation.
Furthermore, this study shows that the structuration mechanism can used to explain
substantial structuration process. As Giddens’ concept of structuration focuses on the first
meaning of structuration as a mechanism, the double meanings of structuration employed
in this study have two implications for structuration theory. First of all, the concept of
structure in Giddens’ theory is very abstract, while the concept of structure used here is
very particular. As Giddens (1991: 201) said, his structuration theory is to “develop an
ontological framework for the study of human social activities”. As an ontological
concept, all of his concepts in his structuration theory are very abstract and general.
Though his analysis of the class structure in advanced societies and his critics of
linguistic theories involve some particular structure, his structuration theory focuses on
the general nature of structure—the duality of structure in the interaction between
structure and agency. However, the structuration of Chinese migrant workers focuses on
a particular structure—a specific social class structure in China, or specifically a
structural stratum of that structure.
Second, the structuration theory proposed by Giddens is reproductive, the
structuration here refers to social change or structural transformation 36 . For Giddens
(1984: 17-25), “structure, as recursively organized sets of rules and resources, is out of
time and space, saved in its instantiations and co-ordination as memory traces, and is
36

This also relates to the reproductive nature of Bourdieu’s theory. According to Parker (2000), Giddens
and Bourdieu are two structurationists, because both of their theories are characterized by the central
conflationism of structure and agency and the reproductive nature of their theoretical orientation.
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marked by an “absence of the subject.” The social system in which structure is
recursively implicated, on the contrary, comprises the situated activities of human agents,
reproduced across time and space. Analyzing the structuration of social systems means
studying the modes in which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of
situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts, are
produced and reproduced in interaction”. That is, the beyond-time-and-space structures
are reproduced by human actors’ situated activities, which resulted in a stable social
system. By contrast, the structuration of migrant workers means a new structural stratum
and a new structure emerged in Chinese society.
Giddens’ structuration theory could be called a reproductive structuration theory,
while the structural transformation and the structuration of a group of people could be
called a transformative structuration. However, the difference could not cover the
complementarity between the two kinds of structuration process. The structural
transformation implies that a relatively stable structure emerges, which indicates that
human actors are reproduced during and after the structural transformation. So, the
reproductive structuration is the mechanism through which the transformative
structuration happens. As a result, there is a complementarity between the two processes.
Limitations and Future Research
These findings and implications depend on recognizing the three major limitations
to this study. Two of them are substantial: the debate between class-structuration and
class-formation, and the relationship between state policies and civil society movements.
Another one is methodological, especially related to the selection of interview sites and
participants. Finally, this section will propose some future research.
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The Nature of Migrant Workers’ Resistance and Class Structuration
Admittedly, this study is limited by its starting point. The starting point of this
study is the fact that the number of Chinese migrant workers has been increasing in the
past more than three decades. The research questions are: what are the current situation
and future of this group of people? Why has this group of people existed for such a long
time? Every aspect of this study has been guided and constrained by this starting point
and these research questions.
Actually, Chinese migrant workers have many characteristics, such as their
migration behavior, social adaptation in cities and towns, market position, and collective
action. Because of the increasing number and unfavorable life conditions of Chinese
migrant workers, their collective actions have also increased. Some studies have started
with this fact. This approach can be called class-formation approach, though not all those
authors use the term “class” and migrant workers’ resistance doesn’t use class discourse
(Lee, 2007; Guo, 2014). A representative study is Ching Kwan Lee’s Against the Law
(2007). Focusing on Chinese migrant workers’ collective protests, she pointed out the
differences between migrant workers and veteran state workers with respect to their
grievances, actions taken, subjective identity, pattern of mobilization, discourses
employed, and barriers to further development of collective action. She found that the
major grievances of migrant workers are about wages and working conditions. Their
collective actions usually first take the form of petitions and lawsuit and then launch
collective protests against local governments. Their subjective identities and discourses
include “working class,” “class,” “citizen,” and “workers.” The pattern of their
mobilization is characterized by cellular activism, which only takes place at the workshop
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level and local government. The barriers to the formation of a class-for-itself of Chinese
migrant workers are rooted in their economic and social relationship with rural villages.
As matter of fact, in class analysis of Chinese migrant workers, we can
distinguish two stances: class-formation stance radically focuses on Chinese migrant
workers’ collective ability to dramatically change the social system and why classstructuration stance emphasizes the class-in-itself nature of Chinese migrant workers.
Focusing on their everyday experiences and consciousness, Pun and Lu (2011) argued
that migrant workers constituted an unfinished class or semi-proletarian class. Alvin Y.
So (2013) argued that Ching Kwan Lee’s study presents a very depressing picture of the
making of the migrant working class in South China because in Lee’s eyes the migrant
working class is powerless to defend its own interests and they only focus on narrow
economic issues rather than political issues 37. By contrast, So argued that (1) migrant
workers in South China seem to be drastically transformed in the first decade of the 21st
century, (2) they would use class perspective to explain their sufferings and identify
themselves as workers, (3) their collective actions would go beyond economic issues and
cellular activism, and (4) they would take more radical strategies to protect their class
interests.
Because of the starting point of research—the long-term existence of Chinese
migrant workers, this study adopts a different approach—a class-structuration stance. As
a result, this study didn’t examine Chinese migrant workers’ collective actions or labor
movements, though it is supposed to be helpful for understanding their collective action.
Although there are debates on the nature of Chinese migrant workers’ collective action,

37

In fairness to Lee and the workers she studied, the state will strongly intervene whenever a political issue
is addressed, especially if it espouses collective action. Consequently, workers know their constraints.
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the study of their collective action is a necessity for understanding their existence and
future. But my study is also a necessity for understanding another very broad sector of the
labor force.
The Influence of Migrant Workers’ Resistance and State Policies
Another substantial limitation to this study is related to state policy. All the
arguments of this research assume that the party-state will continue its gradualist
approach to institutional reform and only fine-tune the current policies. This study
outlined three stages of state policies related to Chinese migrant workers. But I did not
examine the logic of the policy-making in contemporary China because it would require
an internal study of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, in order to justify the conclusion
of this study, it is also important to understand policy-making logic in contemporary
China.
The most important questions are: (1) how long this gradualist approach will last,
and (2) whether there are possibilities that the state will make dramatic changes. The
authoritarian nature of Chinese politics and policy-making process make it hard to predict
future policies. However, there are some possibilities for this to happen. First, though
there are no democratic elections in China aside from some village and city elections,
each new generation of leaders puts forward somewhat new orientations for policymaking, which might dramatically change the current policies. On the other hand,
because of the bureaucratization of Chinese politics, this kind of dramatic change seems
impossible to happen. In this unique Chinese context, the political logic of the Chinese
party-state is very important. Second, the labor movements by Chinese migrant workers
might dramatically change the trajectory of state policy-making logic. If Chinese migrant
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workers, as So (2013) says, became more radical in the future, the state will make radical
policies to respond to their demonstrations and protests. Again, this points to the
significance of examining the current situation and future of Chinese migrant workers’
collective actions. Finally, related to the labor movement issue, there are other social
forces interacting with the party-state. The development of civil society organizations has
become a focal point in China studies (Huang, 1993; Howell, 2012). Some even argued
that the civil society organizations and movements might change the nature of the
Chinese party-state and the basic dynamics of governmental policy-making.
So examining the effect of migrant workers’ resistance is as important as
investigating the nature of their resistance. It is absolutely right that migrant workers’
resistance will more or less exert influence on state policies and future resistance. Guo
(2014) identified four types of migrant workers’ resistance: passive/individual,
passive/collective, active/individual, and active/collective. Among these types of
resistance, even though passive/individual and active/individual resistance have no direct
impact on the actor’s own rights, they can contribute to the growth of rights
consciousness and collective resistance. Moreover, collective acts of resistance have a
more direct effect on migrant workers’ individual and collective rights, but they also
attract attention and sometimes repression by the Chinese party-state.
Thus, the final result of migrant workers’ resistance also depends on the response
of central and local governments to their demands. Two studies are enlightening with
respect to the interaction between migrant workers’ resistance and governments’ response.
Cai (2010) examined why some collective resistance has succeeded in China. He argued
that the result of collective resistance depends on the interaction between the resistants,
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local governments and the central government. Based on an interactive and relational
conception of infrastructural state power, Lee and Zhang (2013) identified three microfoundations of Chinese authoritarianism: protest bargaining characterized by the logics of
market exchange, legal-bureaucratic absorption of rule bound games, and patronclientelism based on interpersonal bonds. Most of these processes are responses by the
government to migrant workers’ resistance and all of them have contributed to the
gradualist reform agenda and social stability.
To conclude, the nature and influence of Chinese migrant workers’ resistance are
important to understanding their existence and future. On the other hand, the argument of
this study—the structuration of Chinese migrant workers—also has significant
implications for understanding the nature of their resistance. In essence, Lees sees a glass
that is a quarter full (i.e., the presence of resistance), while I see a glass that is threequarters full (the permanence of a new class). For example, Lee’s depressing picture of
the low power of the migrant-worker class can be partially explained or covered by the
structuration of Chinese migrant workers and their acceptance of the dagong lifestyle.
Limitations Related to Research Methods
Because of the nature of research questions in this study, this research combined
interpretative and critical qualitative research methods. Specifically, this study not only
focuses on the meanings constructed by Chinese migrant workers about their life
conditions, but also tries to identify structural disparities and institutional arrangements
that have shaped their meanings. While interpretative methods are good at explicating
meanings, critical methods do well to link meanings to institutions. However, the scope
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of my specific research techniques have been constrained by the research questions I tried
to answer in this study.
First, my study starts from the fact of the long-term existence of Chinese migrant
workers and tries to explain the structuration of this social class. As a result, my study
focuses on Chinese migrant workers’ everyday experiences, including their life
conditions and subjective consciousness. Blecher (2009) argued that three kinds of
regional political economy have been developed during globalization and institutional
transition in China. These labor regimes include globalized despotism in the Southeast,
decaying rustbelt in the Northeast, and mixed and adaptive political economy in
Northern-Central China. My study was based on informants from central-northern part of
China, because my interviews were conducted in three central-northern cities: Beijing,
Jinan and Liaocheng. In the mixed-adaptive political economy, it is better to understand
Chinese migrant workers’ everyday life conditions and consciousness because the
migrant workers in this area represent the logic of the long-term existence of Chinese
migrant workers as a whole. Even in other areas with a different political economy, most
Chinese migrant workers also “eat bitterness” with their hard work (Lee, 2007; Luyn,
2008; Loyalk, 2013).
The limitation is that though migrant workers in different regions have some
similarities, different regions might have somewhat different institutional arrangements
and thus migrant workers in different regions might have different experiences and
consciousness. Though I believe that most of Chinese migrant workers work hard, even
though their working and living conditions in cities are unfavorable, it is still necessary to
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examine regional differences in institutional arrangements, because the institutional
transition since the 1970s involves an increasing autonomy of local governments.
Second, the purposive sampling method is to include all kinds of Chinese migrant
workers with respect to their family life, gender, age, industries, and migration distance.
This sampling method is to understand the logic of the structuration of Chinese migrant
workers, rather than to describe the composition of the population of Chinese migrant
workers. In other words, though these participants represent different kinds of migrant
workers and their experiences, motivations and attitudes, this sample doesn’t represent
the population of Chinese migrant workers as a whole. So, this study cannot accurately
reflect the proportions of these types of Chinese migrant workers in the population. But
again the composition of Chinese migrant workers with respect to their motivations and
attitudes is important. For example, a large number of adventurous migrant workers make
it easier for them to launch collective actions and a large number of conservative migrant
workers might lead this group of people to exist for a long time. In the future, a
representative sample in a large-scale social survey can hopefully be constructed to know
more about the composition of Chinese migrant workers.
Future Research
Because of the limitations to this study, there is still much work to do with regard
to the long-term existence and future of Chinese migrant workers. In the future, more
research should be conducted to elaborate the findings of this study and to examine those
topics beyond this study.
First, because a theoretical and purposive sample can only understand the logic of
the structuration of Chinese migrant workers, it cannot describe the composition of this
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group of people with respect to their motivations and attitudes. A large scale survey
project based on a weighted-random sample would be needed to make larger inferences
to the labor force as a whole. According to their motivations and attitudes toward the
dagong lifestyle, this study identified four types of Chinese migrant workers: optimistic,
adventurous, instrumental and retreating migrant workers. This typology has important
implications for Chinese migrant workers’ reaction to their immediate life conditions (for
example, their relationship with employers) and the society as a whole (for example, the
state policies). However, their reaction to some extent depends on the number of each
kind of Chinese migrant workers in different regions. So, in the future a representative
sample is needed to figure out the composition of Chinese migrant workers. Because of
the different political economy in different regions, a comparative study can be
conducted to figure out the regional compositions of Chinese migrant workers, which are
shaped by divergent institutions.
Second, the nature of the resistance initiated by Chinese migrant workers needs to
be closely examined. This is important because (1) this question might challenge the
conclusion of this study, as labor protests might break the continued structuration of
Chinese migrant workers; (2) this question might reflect the current situation of Chinese
migrant workers, because labor movements are embedded in social structure and
institutions, though labor movements have their own logic as social movement theories
indicate (Eder 1993); (3) this question is closely related to state policies, because the
gradualist reform in China is characterized by the trial-and-error governmental responses
to civil society organizations and movements; and (4) this question is also related to the
historical role of Chinese migrant-worker class and its future, but whether, when and how
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Chinese migrant workers would become or never become a revolutionary force or not
are still unanswered questions.
In the future, four important questions need to be elaborated and tested with
connection to my study: (1) what are the institutional arrangements that affect Chinese
migrant workers in each region of China; (2) what are the compositions of migrant
workers with various motivations in these different regions; (3) what is the nature of
collective actions launched by migrant workers in these different regions, and (4) what is
the impact of migrant workers resistance, demonstration and strikes in each of these
regions and overall on China as a whole. Answering these questions would provide a
more unified answer to the future existence and impacts of Chinese migrant workers. But
this study clearly contributes to piecing together the various regions of Chinese migrant
workers.
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